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ABSTRACT 
This thesis identifies five common characteristics of successful post-World War II 
insurgencies: (1) a cause to fight for, (2) local populace support, (3) weakness in the 
authority, (4) favorable geographic conditions, and (5) external support during the middle 
and later stages of an insurgency. This list of characteristics is incomplete for current and 
future insurgencies and a sixth characteristic, (6) an information advantage, is necessary. 
For this study, 72 post-World War II insurgencies are identified, of which 11 are 
classified as failed insurgencies. Of these 11 failed insurgencies, 6 were selected for 
analysis using the above 6 characteristics of an insurgency in order to determine any 
trends in their failure. The 6 selected failed insurgencies are: Greek Civil War, 
Philippines (Huk), Malayan Emergency, Kenya Emergency, Dhofar Rebellion, and 
Bolivia. This research determined that no one characteristic stands out as the key for 
defeating an insurgency. Counterinsurgent forces must consider and take into account all 
6 characteristics and plan accordingly. It is further determined that 3 of the 
characteristics: local populace support, external support, and information advantage, must 
be reduced to a significant disadvantage for an insurgency in order for an insurgency to 
fail. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether historical analysis of post-
World War II failed insurgencies identifies common characteristics that can be exploited 
to promote failure in future insurgencies. Most studies of insurgencies have focused 
primarily on counterinsurgency efforts, rather than on the characteristics of the 
insurgency itself. Furthermore these studies, to date, have focused most attention on why 
insurgencies succeed. However, there has been limited research into why others fail. 
Dietrich Dorner wrote in his book, The Logic of Failure, that “when we fail to solve a 
problem, we fail because we tend to make a small mistake here, a small mistake there, 
and these mistakes add up.”1 The complex problem of insurgency must be approached in 
a systematic fashion in order to identify these small mistakes which could then be 
exploited when developing a counterinsurgency campaign plan for combating future 
insurgencies. According to Dorner,  
Failure does not strike like a bolt from the blue; it develops gradually 
according to its own logic. As we watch individuals attempt to solve 
problems, we will see that complicated situations seem to elicit habits of 
thought that set failure in motion from the beginning. From that point, the 
continuing complexity of the task and the growing apprehension of failure 
encourage methods of decision making that make failure even more likely 
and then inevitable.2 
Learning from the mistakes made by leaders and forces of past failed 
insurgencies, counterinsurgency forces may be able to develop strategies that take 
advantage of mistakes in current and future insurgencies. By exploiting these mistakes 
counterinsurgent forces could promote failure in modern insurgencies.   
                                                 
1 Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations, New 
York: A Merloyd Lawrence Book, 1997, 7.  
2 Dorner, The Logic of Failure, 10. 
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B. RELEVANCY 
Strategists Steven Metz and Raymond Millen have observed that “insurgency has 
existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance.”3 In the post-
World War II era, the most pervasive form of conflict worldwide has been on the lower 
end of the conflict spectrum. These conflicts have primarily taken the form of 
insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and small scale contingencies. As explained in the U.S. 
Army’s newest counterinsurgency manual, in order to  
succeed against superior resources and technology, weaker actors have 
had to adapt. The recent success of U.S. military forces in major combat 
operations undoubtedly will lead many future opponents to pursue 
asymmetric approaches…Today the world has entered another period 
when insurgency is common and strategically significant. This is likely to 
continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer4  
Addressing the graduating class of United States Military Academy at West Point 
in 1962, President John F. Kennedy emphasized the point that insurgency is different 
than any other type of conflict and would require the development of new tactics, 
doctrine, and training methodology:   
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins--war 
by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of 
by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by 
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires in 
those situations where we must counter it a whole new kind of strategy, a 
wholly different kind of military training.5 
There are numerous theories regarding why conflict has become more prevalent at 
the lower end of the conflict spectrum. These theories are based primarily on two 
common themes: (1) the changing attitudes of populaces, and (2) technological advances 
that have greatly enhanced the ability to influence large masses of people. In 1962, B.H. 
Liddell Hart recognized the impact of the changing attitudes of populaces on insurgencies 
                                                 
3 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute report (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2004), vi. 
4 U. S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), 1-2. 
5  Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. 
Kennedy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 415. 
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and foreshadowed their struggle for legitimacy when he wrote, “campaigns of this kind 
are the more likely to continue because it is the only kind of war that fits the conditions of 
the modern age, while being at the same time well suited to take advantage of social 
discontent, racial ferment and nationalist fervours.”6  
Since insurgents make up a small percentage of the populace and lack material 
advantage they cannot hope to successfully confront counterinsurgent forces in 
conventional warfare, especially during the initial stages of an insurgency. Technological 
advances have greatly enhanced the insurgent’s ability to communicate with and 
influence the populace. Insurgencies, therefore, have incorporated technology into new 
strategies to offset the counterinsurgent forces’ strengths. By doing this, insurgencies 
have been able to not only overcome the material advantage of the counterinsurgent 
forces, but in many cases to actually level the playing field.  Insurgencies augmented by 
advancing technologies were a natural reaction for the weak against the strong. An 
insurgents’ continued inability to match the United States in conventional maneuver 
warfare makes it a certainty that the United States will confront insurgents in the future.  
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency operations is 
extensive in its critiques and prescriptions for individual insurgencies. Literature that has 
surveyed more than one insurgency at a time is, on the other hand, less common. Due to 
the nature of insurgencies, information will be drawn primarily from secondary sources. 
Primary sources will be utilized to the fullest extent, when available. Information is 
widely available from the counterinsurgent forces’ viewpoint. All efforts will be made to 
research and utilize sources from the insurgent’s viewpoint.  In both cases, as an 
objective researcher, I will make all considerations for the inherent assumptions and bias 
of the authors. 
Three seminal works on insurgency and counterinsurgency -- Low Intensity 
Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping by Frank Kitson, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: The Theory and Practice by David Galula, and Counter-insurgency 
                                                 
6 B.H. Liddell Hart, Forward to Mao Tse Tung and Ché Guevara: On Guerilla Warfare (Cassell, 
1962),  xi, (as cited in Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations [Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1971], 16).  
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Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare by Julian Paget proved to be essential 
sources for establishing the primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency.    
The once obscure RAND report entitled Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, 
provided numerous insights and perspectives of several individuals who fought in 
Malaysia, Kenya, South Vietnam, Philippines, and Algeria. The RAND Corporation 
sponsored the five day symposium in April 1962. Participants included such famous 
counterinsurgency names as David Galula, Frank Kitson, and John Shirley. This work 
draws on the actual knowledge of personnel who have conducted counterinsurgency 
operations.  
The Digital National Security Archive which contains 24 complete collections of 
primary documents central to US foreign and military policy since 1945 was an excellent 
source. The El Salvador, Philippines, and U.S. Intelligence Community, 1947-1989 
collections provided many hard to find primary source documents. 
1. Greek Civil War (1946-1949) 
In The Greek Civil War 1944-1949 Edgar O’Ballance examines two essential 
questions: (1) What circumstances made each round of the civil war possible?, and (2) 
why did the insurgent forces fail?7 The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist 
Insurgency in Greece, 1945-1949 by Charles R. Shrader depends heavily on English 
language sources. Shrader’s intent was not to break new ground on why the conflict 
occurred, but to conduct a detailed examination of the military aspect of the conflict. 
Shrader has also included a very extensive bibliography in his book. For a more nuanced 
interpretation of the Greek Civil War one must read David H. Close’s book, The Origins 
of the Greek Civil War. This Australian historian has done a much better job of using 
both English and Greek sources in order to get a better understanding of the ideologies 
that drove the conflict. Good analysis and background information on the Greek Civil 
War was found in Charilaos G. Lagoudakis’ chapter on the Greek Civil War in Challenge 
and Response in Eternal Conflict, and in Andrew R. Molnar’s Undergrounds in 
Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare.  
                                                 
7 Edgar O’Ballance. The Greek Civil War 1944-49 (Great Britain: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 
1966), 13. 
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2. Philippines (Huk Rebellion) (1946-1954) 
Insurgency sources include Luis Taruc’s Born of the People and He Who Rides 
the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerilla Fighter. Good case studies of the Huk 
Rebellion include Lawrence M. Greenberg’s Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a 
Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines – 1946-1954, Robert R. Smith’s 
“The Philippines (1946-1954)” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict Volume I 
The Experience in Asia, and Andrew R. Molnar’s “Philippines (1946-1954)” in 
Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. A good perspective 
on the point of view of the participants and supporters of the Huk movement is provided 
by Benedict J. Kerkvliet’s The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the 
Philippines. 
3. Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) 
Julian Paget’s “Emergency in Malaya” which is a chapter in Gerard Chaliand’s 
Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan is the 
best organized and concise explanation of the Malayan Emergency. Robert W. Komer’s, 
Rand Report, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort R-957-ARPA, provides a very objective and thorough 
assessment of the Malayan Emergency. Komer also provides numerous useful insights 
for current counterinsurgency strategists. Franklin Mark Osanka has reproduced three 
interesting articles on the Malayan Emergency in Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting 
Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. These three articles give the reader a 
definite feel for what the attitudes were at the beginning, middle, and end of the conflict. 
The first article by Paul M. A. Linebarger, “They Call ‘em Bandits in Malaya,” was 
written in January 1951 and gives the reader a good feel of why this war was initially 
called the Bandit War. The second article by Anthony Crockett, “Action in Malaya,” was 
written in January 1955 and gives the reader an appreciation of the frustrations and 
challenges of being a member of the counterinsurgent force in 1955. The third article by 
James E. Dougherty, “The Guerrilla War in Malaya,” was written in 1958 as the MCP 
was faltering and looking for the best terms possible. Andrew Molnar’s “Malaya (1948-
60),” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare and Bert H. 
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Cooper’s “Malaya (1948-1960),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume 
I, The Experience in Asia provided excellent overall analysis of the conflict. 
4. Kenya Emergency (1952-1960) 
For good analysis of the counterinsurgency effort see John A. McConnell’s 
Master Thesis titled The British in Kenya (1952-1960): Analysis of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Campaign, Anthon Clayton’s Counter-insurgency in Kenya 1952-60: 
A Study of Military Operations against the Mau-Mau, and D. M. Condit’s “Kenya (1952-
1960)” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume III The Experience in 
Africa and Latin America. Frank Kitson’s Bunch of Five provided valuable insights into 
the development and impact of pseudo-gangs on the Mau Mau organization. Good 
narratives on the conflict were provided by Michael Carver’s War Since 1945, Robert B. 
Asprey’s War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, and Charles Allen’s The Savage 
Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989. For analysis more focused on the Mau Mau 
see Wunyabari O. Maloba’s Mau Mau and Kenya: Analysis of a Peasant Revolt and Fred 
Majdalany’s State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau. Two texts that were not 
available but widely cited by all the above sources were L. S. B. Leakley’s, Defeating 
Mau Mau and Mau Mau and the Kikuyu.  
5. Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976) 
Detailed resources on the events of the Dhofar Rebellion are scarce. One must 
attribute this to the fact that this insurgency was primarily fought in an extremely remote 
location and received very little coverage outside of the Arabian Peninsula. Four sources 
were discovered that describe the conflict in varying degrees of detail: John Newsinger’s 
, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, John Townsend’s , 
Oman: The Making of the Modern State, Michael Dewar’s, Brush Fire Wars: Minor 
Campaigns of the British Army since 1945, and Leroy Thompson’s, Ragged War: The 
Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare.  
6. Bolivia (1966-1968) 
When reading literature on the failed insurgency in Bolivia, one must first read 
Ernesto “Ché” Guevara’s, Guerrilla Warfare. This book is a manual for how he would 
execute a guerrilla campaign to overthrow a government. Since he wrote this how-to 
book on guerrilla warfare many years before his failed attempt in Bolivia, it is a useful 
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document for understanding how Guevara’s mind worked, but leaves one wondering 
what he was thinking in Bolivia. Daniel James’ book, The Complete Bolivian Diaries of 
Ché Guevara and other Captured Documents, is best described by counterinsurgency 
expert Frank Kitson when he wrote, “His Bolivian diary gives a day-to-day account of 
the disintegration of his force and is one of the most instructive documents available.”8 
Henrey B. Ryan’s book, The Fall of Ché Guevara is a very detailed case study of the 
United States’ involvement in Bolivia in 1966-76. It is focused on the United States’ 
counterinsurgency response to the insurgency. Gary P. Salmon’s book, The Defeat of Ché 
Guevara: Military Response to Guerilla Challenge in Bolivia, is a well documented 
account of the challenge in Bolivia presented by Guevara. It was Gary P. Salmon’s 
company that captured Guevara. The book is a good synopsis of the events prior to, 
during, and after the defeat of Guevara. For good a good history of Bolivia in the context 
of revolution leading up to just prior to Guevara’s attempt, read James M. Malloy’s book, 
Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. Richard Gott, a reporter in Bolivia for the 
Guardian in 1967, wrote the book Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. Written in a 
journalist style it provides a wealth of insight into the events that led to Guevara’s capture 
and execution. Jon Lee Anderson’s Ché Guevara: A Revolutionary Life is most likely the 
most comprehensive examination of Guevara’s life. The book, The Great Rebel: Ché 
Guevara in Bolivia, by Luis J. Gonzalez and Gustavo A. Sanchez Salazar, has an 
extremely detailed appendix of the members of Guevara’s insurgent force by nationality.  
D.  METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative research approach was utilized for this thesis. This approach enabled 
the development of new perspectives about why insurgencies fail. The qualitative 
research design consists of six collective case studies using historical analysis.  
The time period for this study was narrowed to the post-World War II era, 1945 to 
the present. Limiting this study of failed insurgencies to this time period was done for 
two reasons. The first reason was the fact that the most pervasive form of conflict 
worldwide in the post-World War II era has been on the lower end of the conflict 
spectrum.  Though insurgencies prior to 1945 can offer numerous and valuable insights, 
                                                 
8 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 34. 
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the author of this study believes that post-World War II era failed insurgencies will prove 
more relevant in the current global environment. The second reason is due to the 
limitation of primary sources on pre-World War II era insurgencies. Initial research 
showed that records pertaining to pre-World War II era insurgencies were limited in both 
availability and accessibility. There were also indications that there would be severe 
limitations in the research due to linguistic complications and suspected potential 
historical bias in pre-World War II era primary and secondary sources.  Though one 
could argue that these limitations could be overcome with additional resources, it was 
clearly beyond the time limitations of this study to conduct such a broad research project.  
It is also necessary to discuss the limitations of this research. The author of this 
thesis has made every effort to maintain the perspective of the insurgent. This has proved 
difficult for several reasons. Typically when an insurgency fails there are no 
knowledgeable insurgent leaders left to write an unbiased and concise history from the 
insurgent’s viewpoint. Historical analysis of insurgencies has almost exclusively been 
conducted from the viewpoint of the counterinsurgent. After all, in war the victor gets to 
write history; therefore, author bias must also be considered. As the scholar D.M. Condit 
has noted, “Winners tend to write more than losers.” Furthermore, he posits that “the 
literature available in English has usually taken the point of view of the Western power 
rather than that of the indigenous government.”9 
The author has also made every attempt to not focus only on the military aspects 
of insurgency. Generally historical works examining insurgencies tend to be overly 
focused on the military aspects of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.  
The findings in this study are, to use Condit’s phrase, “dependent on what has 
been written rather than upon what should have been written.”10 As one reviews the 
extended bibliography in Appendix B it becomes obvious that much more was written on 
some insurgencies than others. Also it is pointed out in the book, A Counterinsurgency 
Bibliography,  
                                                 
9 D. M. Condit et. al., A Counterinsurgency Bibliography (Washington D. C.: The American 
University, 1963), 10. 
10 Condit et. al., A Counterinsurgency Bibliography, 9. 
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much more has been written in English about counterinsurgency in which 
British or Americans were prime movers than about other experiences in 
which the counterinsurgents were not English speaking…Thus the 
quantity of available literature on counterinsurgency is not the same for 
every campaign, nor does it necessarily reflect the importance of the given 
experience.11 
For this study, seventy-two post-World War II era insurgencies were identified. A 
complete list of these seventy-two insurgencies is available in Appendix A. Of these 
seventy-two insurgencies, eleven were identified as failed insurgencies and are listed in 
Figure 1 – “Failed Insurgencies.”  A broad spectrum of failed insurgencies was sought in 
this study in order to obtain results that could be generally applied against modern 
insurgencies. This broad spectrum can be identified by three distinguishing features for 
these failed insurgencies: duration, type, and location. 
Insurgency Duration Primary Participants 
Greek Civil War a  
    
1945-1949 Britain, then U.S. and the Government of Greece 
(GoG), vs. National Liberation Army (ELAS) 
Philippines (Huk Rebellion) a 1946-1954 Philippine Islands vs. Hukbalahap 
Madagascar b   
    
1947-1948 France vs. Mouvement Democratique de la 
Renovation Malagache (MDRM)  
Malayan Emergency a 
    
1948-1960 Britain vs. Malayan Communist Party and 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) 
Kenya Emergency b  1952-1960 Britain vs. Mau Mau 
Oman b    1955-1959 Jebel Akhdar and Britain vs. Talib 
Cameroon b  
    
1955-1962 French Cameroon vs. Union des Populations du 
Cameroon (UPC) 
Venezuela a  
    
1961-1969 Venezuela vs. Armed Forces of National 
Liberation (FALN) and Cuba-assisted guerillas 
Dhofar b  1962-1976 Oman and Britain vs. Dhofar Liberation Front 
(DLF) 
Bolivia a   1966-1968 Bolivia vs. Ché Guevara 
Salvadoran Civil War a 
    
1979-1991 U.S.A. and Government of El Salvador (GoES) 
vs. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) 
a – communist, b – nationalistic, autonomy, or independence from colonial rule 
 
Figure 1.   Failed Insurgencies 
The eleven failed insurgencies ranged in duration from 1 to 14 years with an 
average duration of 7 years. They can also be sub-divided into two types of insurgency: 
communist or one based on nationalism, autonomy, or independence from colonial rule. 
                                                 
11 Condit et. al., A Counterinsurgency Bibliography, 10.  
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Six of these failed insurgencies were identified as communist in nature and five were 
identified as insurgencies based on nationalism, autonomy, or independence from 
colonial rule. The location of these eleven failed insurgencies can be sub-divided into six 
geographic locations: South or Central America (3); Pacific (1); Asia (1); Africa (3); 
Arabian Peninsula (2); and Europe (1). Figure 2 – “Failed Insurgencies Timeline” 
illustrates the duration and broad global spectrum of these eleven failed insurgencies. 
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Figure 2.   Failed Insurgencies Timeline 
 
Of the eleven failed insurgencies identified in Figure 2 – “Failed Insurgencies 
Timeline,” six failed insurgencies have been selected for this thesis: Greek Civil War, 
Philippines (Huk), Malayan Emergency, Kenya Emergency, Dhofar, and Bolivia. These 
six failed insurgencies cover a broad global spectrum and duration. Each of these six 
insurgencies has its own characteristics and lessons, and a thorough examination of all of 
them can help counterinsurgent forces plan for future operations.  
The insurgencies in Madagascar, Cameroon, and Venezuela were eliminated 
largely due to the lack of primary sources. Available sources on these insurgencies have 
generally not been translated, and those records available in English were determined to 
contain bias that could not be adequately reduced by using numerous primary sources. It 
was also deemed necessary to eliminate the Oman and the Salvadoran insurgencies from  
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this list due to available research time for this thesis. The elimination of these five 
insurgencies does not impact the desired duration and broad global spectrum of this 
thesis.  
Now that six post-World War II failed insurgencies have been identified the next 
steps are to define insurgency and establish the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. 
Insurgency is defined and differing insurgency models (military-focused, protracted 
popular war, urban, conspiratorial, identity-focused, composite and coalition) are 
examined in Chapter II. In order to identify common characteristics that can be exploited, 
the prerequisites, which are the necessary and sufficient conditions of successful 
insurgencies, must be identified. Six prerequisites required for a successful insurgency 
are identified in Chapter III. These prerequisites are (1) a cause to fight for, (2) local 
populace support, (3) a weakness in authority, (4) geographic conditions, (5) external 
support, and (6) information advantage. A Likert scale with possible responses of 
significant advantage, limited advantage, limited disadvantage, and significant 
disadvantage was used to distinguish between characteristics of each failed insurgency 
and facilitate identification of trends. 
This study’s analysis includes a summary of each selected failed insurgency’s 
background, insurgent strategy, and counterinsurgent strategy. Each failed insurgency 
was then analyzed in relationship to the six prerequisites for a successful insurgency 
utilizing a Likert scale.  The initial and final stage of each insurgency was compared. The 
resulting information was then compiled in the “Blank Failed Insurgency Comparison 
Chart” shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.   Blank Failed Insurgency Comparison Chart 
 
An explanation of the estimative language of the Likert scale used in this thesis is 
required. The possible responses used in the Likert scale pertaining to the degree of 
advantage or disadvantage that an insurgency may have reference the counterinsurgent 
forces is intended to reflect a degree of comparison. Assigning a precise numerical rating 
to these judgments would require a more rigorous methodology than is required for this 
thesis. The neutral measurement was removed from this Likert scale because the status of 
neutrality of these prerequisites would in all likelihood be fleeting at best. The insurgency 
or the authority will always have an advantage or disadvantage at any given moment in 
time.  This methodology enabled the identification of meaningful trends that were then 
studied in order to build a theory for exploiting weaknesses in modern insurgencies with 
the goal of facilitating failure in future insurgencies. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The first chapter identifies the purpose of this thesis, the relevancy of studying 
insurgencies, and describes the methodology for selecting the failed insurgencies and the 
framework for comparison. The second chapter defines insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. Six insurgent approaches (military-focused, protracted popular war, 
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urban, conspiratorial, identity-focused, and composite and coalition) are described. The 
third chapter identifies and defines the six prerequisites (a cause to fight for, local 
populace support, a weakness in authority, geographic conditions, external support, and 
information advantage) that are necessary for an insurgency to succeed. The fourth 
chapter is the examination of six selected case studies of post-World War II failed 
insurgencies: the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), the Philippines – Huk Rebellion (1946-
1954), the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Kenya Emergency (1952-1960), Dhofar 
(1962-1976), and Bolivia (1966-1968). The fifth chapter is an analysis of the findings in 
the fourth chapter. Each prerequisite for a successful insurgency is discussed with a focus 
on identifying trends that could identify vulnerabilities for exploitation in future 
insurgencies. The sixth chapter is the conclusion and a discussion on the implications of 
the findings in the fifth chapter on future counterinsurgency operations. Appendix A is a 
list of the seventy-two post-World War II insurgencies. Appendix B is an extended 
bibliography. Appendix C is a list of abbreviations used in this thesis.  
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II. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The complex subsets of warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency, will be 
examined in this chapter. Though the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency do not 
easily lend themselves to precise definition, each exhibit common characteristics. 
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are distinctly different types of operations.12 Unless 
the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency are clearly defined and understood, 
productive discussion and comparative analysis of the selected six failed insurgencies 
becomes difficult, if not impossible.  
B. INSURGENCY 
The tactics that characterize an insurgency have existed as long as warfare itself. 
The official U.S. Department of Defense and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) definition of insurgency is "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of 
a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."13 The recently 
released U. S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency expands 
on this definition by stating that “an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-
military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent 
control...Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), 
informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and 
economic—to overthrow the existing authority.”14  
Throughout history insurgencies have taken numerous forms. Field Manual 3-24 
emphasizes the fact that insurgencies throughout history have utilized differing 
approaches and proven quite adaptive; therefore, counterinsurgency planners cannot 
focus their strategy on countering just one insurgent approach. Insurgencies can range 
                                                 
12 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 
13 U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001 [as Amended 
Through 9 November 2006]), 267. 
14 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 
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from terrorist and guerrilla tactics to conventional military action. Insurgencies are 
usually comprised of irregular military forces. Though each insurgency is unique, there 
are similarities amongst them. For example, all insurgencies seek political change, and 
the use of military force is subordinate to political objectives. Even religiously fueled 
insurgencies seek political change, but unlike other insurgencies this political change is 
not an end. Political change in the case of religiously fueled insurgencies is a means of 
acquiring the goals of the insurgency. Understanding that insurgencies are adaptive and 
affected by their surrounding external stimuli, counterinsurgent planners must 
comprehend that insurgencies cannot be defeated by a fixed approach.15  
In order to defeat an insurgency, counterinsurgent leaders must determine the 
most likely approaches that an insurgency is utilizing to advance its cause. Comparative 
analysis of the selected six post-World War II failed insurgencies is facilitated by using 
the following six insurgent approaches.16   
• Military-focused (Ché) 
• Protracted popular war (Mao) 
• Urban (Marighella) 
• Conspiratorial (Lenin) 
• Identity-focused 
• Composite and coalition.  
 
1.  Military-focused Insurgency Approach  
According to Field Manual 3-24, insurgencies that utilize a military-focused 
approach endeavor to generate a revolution or to overthrow the authority using military 
force. Military-focused insurgencies are usually characterized by the fact that they have 
little or no political structure; control is not spread through political subversion, but 
                                                 
15 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-3, 1-5. 
16 These approaches were developed primarily from two sources: (1) Insurgent approaches listed in the 
U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-5 to 1-8; and (2) notes from Dr. Gordon 
McCormick’s Guerilla Warfare Seminar SO3802, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 5, 
2006. 
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through the movement of military forces.17 Ernesto “Ché” Guevara’s foco approach is an 
example of a military-focused approach. In the foco approach the “guerrilla band is an 
armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people.”18   This fighting vanguard, 
consisting of small and mobile paramilitary groups operating in a rural environment, 
theoretically would enable the insurgency to turn latent populace dissatisfaction into a 
revolution.  
2.  Protracted Popular War Insurgency Approach 
Conflicts of protracted duration favor the insurgents, and the protracted popular 
war approach is arguably one of the best approaches to insurgency. Field Manual 3-24 
posits that this approach is complex and therefore few modern insurgencies have fully 
utilized this approach. It is important to understand, since most modern insurgencies 
utilize portions of this approach.19  
Mao Tse-Tung, one of the most influential theorists of insurgency in the 20th 
century, recognized that the Marxist-Leninist model of urban revolution, a conspiratorial 
insurgency approach, was inappropriate for the overwhelmingly rural populace of China. 
Fighting under these conditions Mao developed a model of insurgency that can best be 
described as a protracted popular war that occurs in three phases: strategic defense, 
strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. As the war progresses, the insurgency 
gradually develops into conventional forces that will operate in conjunction with regular 
conventional army units. This approach also emphasizes the necessity of the insurgency 
having a clearly defined political goal and a political organization within the insurgent 
force structure. If insurgent leaders believe that the war is purely a military matter, Mao 
Tse-Tung argues that this loss of understanding of the political nature of insurgencies 
“will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in defeat.”20 
The historian Edgar O’Ballance has written that “The completeness and 
immensity of the victories of the Red Army of China – when belatedly they were fully 
                                                 
17 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-5. 
18 Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 10. 
19 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-6. 
20  Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2000), 43. 
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comprehended – caused a depression to settle on Western Statesmen, generals, and 
military theorists, as conventional warfare seemed impotent against it.”21 Encouraged by 
Mao’s success many insurgent leaders sought to replicate Mao’s model of insurgency, 
protracted popular war. What most of these insurgent leaders failed to understand was 
that the success of Mao’s protracted popular war approach was primarily due to the 
unique conditions of China in the 1920s and 1930s. Unable to replicate these conditions 
when faced with failure in their own countries, insurgent leaders usually opted to modify 
their approach.     
3.  Urban-focused Insurgency Approach 
Insurgent organizations using the urban-focused approach operate in an urban 
environment using terrorist tactics to: sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the 
authority, intimidate the populace, kill authority and opposition leaders, fix and 
intimidate security forces, limit their ability to respond, and create an environment of 
increased government oppression. This approach requires little to no popular support. 22  
The approach advocated by Carlos Marighella in his book, Minimanual of the 
Urban Guerrilla, is a good example of how the urban approach could be applied. Born in 
1911 Carlos Marighella, the son of Italian immigrants, was a Brazilian guerrilla 
revolutionary and Marxist writer. Before becoming a guerilla revolutionary, Marighella 
worked as a Brazilian legislator and as a leader of the nationalist Communist party. In 
February 1968 he founded the Alianca Libertadora Nacional (ALN). The name of this 
organization was borrowed from a banned and short-lived 1930’s revolutionary 
organization. After Marighella was killed in 1969, the ALN was then completely 
destroyed by Brazilian security forces within a year. Marighella published two books, 
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla and For the Liberation of Brazil. The Minimanual of 
the Urban Guerrilla was a simple guidebook on how to disrupt and overthrow the 
authority with an aim to revolution. Many argue that the theories laid out in Marighella’s 
books have greatly influenced modern ideological terrorism.  
 
                                                 
21 Edgar O’Ballance. The Greek Civil War 1944-49 (London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 
19. 
22 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-6. 
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4.  Conspiratorial Insurgency Approach  
According to Field Manual 3-24, insurgencies that utilize a conspiratorial 
approach initially involve only a few leaders and a militant cadre. This approach requires 
the development of a small vanguard force that organizes and leads the revolution. This 
small force then either exploits existing revolutionary conditions or seizes control of 
critical government structures. This approach was used by Lenin during the Bolshevik 
Revolution. The insurgents must remain shrouded in secrecy until the conditions are 
established such that an authority can be overthrown quickly.23  
5.  Identity-focused Insurgency Approach 
An identity-focused insurgency approach is described in Field Manual 3-24 as 
mobilizing support for the insurgency “based on the common identity of religious 
affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.”24 This approach has become a common 
characteristic of most modern insurgencies. Though not always the primary approach 
used by an insurgency, it can be combined with the Ché, Mao, Marighella, or Lenin 
models of insurgency.  
A common characteristic of insurgent organizations utilizing the identity-focused 
approach is the lack of a dual military/political hierarchy. In most cases whole 
communities will join the insurgency, and utilize their existing social/military hierarchy. 
In an effort to gain strength, insurgent leaders will often attempt to mobilize the 
leadership of other clans and tribes.25 
6. Composite and Coalition Insurgency Approach 
Modern insurgencies have evolved in sophistication to the point where they often 
adapt by utilizing different insurgency approaches at varying times. Reacting to external 
stimuli, modern insurgencies will seek to utilize the most appropriate tactics that enable 
the insurgent leaders to take advantage of current conditions. As they do this they will 
often apply a composite approach. Additionally, competing insurgent forces may form 
loose coalitions when it serves their interests. This may lead to the confusing situation of 
insurgent forces fighting as a loose coalition against counterinsurgent forces, while 
                                                 
23 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-5. 
24 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-8. 
25 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-8. 
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simultaneously fighting amongst themselves. In today’s battlefield, counterinsurgent 
forces may be faced with several competing insurgent movements within their area of 
operations. This complicated reality has made planning and executing successful 
counterinsurgency operations even more difficult.26 
C.  COUNTERINSURGENCY  
The official U.S. Department of Defense definition of counterinsurgency is “those 
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency.”27 According to Field Manual 3-24, 
counterinsurgent forces must utilize all available instruments of national power in order 
to sustain an existing or emerging legitimate authority.  This requirement is why 
counterinsurgency is the graduate level of war.28 
Counterinsurgency expert John A. Nagl identified the two different 
counterinsurgency approaches that armies have turned to throughout history: annihilation 
and turning the loyalty of the populace. Nagl rightly points out that an annihilation 
approach is not feasible in liberal democracies. Furthermore the record of success for 
counterinsurgencies utilizing an annihilation approach is dismal. This approach generally 
leads to military dominated campaigns that miss both the critical political and populace 
aspects of counterinsurgency operations.29   
                                                 
26 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-8. 
27 U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 128. 
28 U. S. Depart. of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 
29 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26-27. 
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III. PREREQUISITES OF SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
It is not yet clear what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the initiation of 
an insurgency. However, it is possible to delineate prerequisites that are necessary for an 
insurgency to succeed. It is not clear, however, that the presence of these prerequisites by 
themselves will be sufficient for an insurgency to succeed.  
What are the primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency? A list of 
prerequisites required for a successful insurgency can be established using past historical 
studies of insurgencies. In this case, two seminal counterinsurgency works, by the authors 
Colonel David Galula and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Julian Paget were utilized to develop a 
list of prerequisites for a successful insurgency.     
B.  DAVID GALULA PREREQUISITES FOR A SUCCESSFUL 
INSURGENCY 
United States military officers have recently rediscovered Colonel David Galula’s 
book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, now considered an essential text 
on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Colonel Galula was born in Tunisia in 1919 and 
spent most of his boyhood in Casablanca, Morocco. In 1938 he chose a career in the 
French Army. Galula graduated in 1940 from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr, 
then served in the European theater during World War II and saw action in North Africa, 
Italy, Germany, and France. From 1945 to 1948 he was assigned to China where he 
studied Mao Tse-tung’s guerrilla campaign and was taken captive by the communists. 
Galula then spent eighteen months (1949-1950) in Greece as a United Nations Military 
Observer where he witnessed the end of the Greek Civil War. From 1951 to 1955 he 
served in Hong Kong as a military attaché. Finally he fought in the Algerian War from 
1956 to 1958.30  In 1956 Colonel Galula was given command of a company responsible 
for the district of Kabylie, east of Algiers. Though he took command of this company at 
the height of the Algerian Rebellion, Colonel Galula succeeded in clearing the area of 
insurgents and returning it to governmental control during his command. From 1958 to 
                                                 
30 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 4th ed. (London: Praeger, 1968), 
v.  
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1962 Colonel Galula worked at general military headquarters in Paris. During this time 
he focused on various aspects of unconventional warfare, especially issues related to the 
war in Algeria.31 In 1962 he joined the Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University.  In 1964 Colonel Galula published Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice. He died in 1967.  
Colonel Galula’s credibility as an expert on insurgency and counterinsurgency is 
enhanced by the fact that he was a practitioner and not a pure academic. As an author he 
demonstrated a keen understanding that insurgency and counterinsurgency were clearly 
different types of war. The military analyst Bernard Fall in his book, Street Without Joy, 
stated that Colonel Galula’s book was “the ‘how-to’ book in the field—and the best of 
them all”32   
In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Galula describes four 
primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency.33    
 A cause to fight for.   
 Weakness of the counterinsurgent – A police and administrative weakness in    
the counterinsurgent force. 
 Geographic Conditions – A not too hostile geographic environment. 
 Outside Support – In the middle and later stages of an insurgency.  
C.  JULIAN PAGET PREREQUISITES FOR A SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCY 
Sir Julian Paget, 4th Baronet, served from 1940 to 1968 in the British army as an 
officer in the Coldstream Guards Regiment. In 1965 Paget served in a staff position 
responsible for the planning of both civilian and military resources required to defeat the 
insurgency in his area of operations in Aden. While serving in this position Paget realized 
that though the problems he faced were complex and multifaceted they were for the most 
part not new. Lacking formal training in counterinsurgency Paget devoted his free time to 
                                                 
31 Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane (eds), Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 
1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), xix-xx. 
32 Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy, 4th ed. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 
1967, 400. 
33 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 42. 
  23
researching past insurgencies in the hope of finding answers for the current problems 
facing him on a daily basis in Aden. In 1967 Paget’s research notes were to form the 
basis for his book, Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare.34 
In Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare Paget 
describes five primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency.35    
• A cause to fight for.   
• Support from the local populace. 
• Bases from which to operate. 
• Mobility – freedom of movement. 
• Supplies  
D. PREREQUISITES FOR A SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCY IN CONTEXT 
OF THE MODERN WORLD 
Unlike conventional warfare, combating an insurgency requires new approaches 
to the development of both political and military strategies.  Military scholar Max G. 
Manwaring best captures this challenge in his statement, “The requirement to look for 
political, psychological, economic, and moral centers of gravity – and operationalize 
them – may challenge some long held beliefs.” 36 Galula and Paget’s lists of primary 
prerequisites for a successful insurgency were combined and account for the first five 
prerequisites listed below. But upon further examination this list of prerequisites is 
determined to be incomplete for combating post-World War II insurgencies; therefore, 
the last prerequisite, information advantage, has been added to form a new list of six 
prerequisites for a successful insurgency. 
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• A cause to fight for. 
• Local populace support. 
• Weakness in the authority. 
• Geographic conditions. 
• External support.   
• Information advantage.    
1. A Cause to Fight For  
Counterinsurgency expert Sir Frank Kitson observed in his seminal work on low 
intensity operations that “insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow to strength, 
while the counter-insurgents start with everything but a cause and gradually decline in 
strength to the point of weakness.”37 According to Galula, at the outset of an insurgency 
the importance of a cause is an absolute essential, but this importance progressively 
decreases as the insurgency acquires strength.38  
Successful insurgencies will exploit an existing issue to create a cause that 
appeals to the populace. Galula argues that this cause must be able to inspire, mobilize, 
and bring closer together the local populace and insurgents. This cause must also be 
lasting, if not for the duration of the insurgency, at least until the insurgent movement is 
well established.39 Paget adds that the insurgent’s morale and determination to fight are, 
to a large extent, dependent on having a worthwhile cause to fight for.40   
Galula believes that the vulnerability of a country to insurgency can be 
determined by the depth and the acuity of its existing problems. These problems may be 
political (related to domestic or internal situations), social, economic, racial, religious, or 
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cultural. Ironically, an artificial problem will even work as long as it is accepted as fact 
by the populace.41 Paget observed that the cause must be convincing to the populace as 
well as to the insurgents.42 Galula argues that it is not necessary for the issue upon which 
a cause is based to be acute. If an underlying issue is utilized, then the first task of 
insurgent leaders is to raise the political consciousness of the populace. Insurgents may 
utilize terrorism as an efficient and quick method for doing so.43 Political scientist 
Stephen Metz points out in his study for the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 
Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability, that virtually all of 
the successful insurgencies during the Cold War era followed some variant of a “people’s 
war” with one of the defining characteristics being the insurgent’s primacy of political 
organization over military operations.44 This demonstrates that the insurgents understand 
the importance of raising the political consciousness of the masses and properly 
grooming a worthwhile cause that is convincing to the populace as well as to the 
insurgents. Both Galula and Paget have also argued that a cause is critical to an 
insurgency accomplishing the second prerequisite of gaining the support of the local 
populace. 
2. Local Populace Support  
A primary characteristic of an insurgency is the fight to control the populace.45 
Since insurgents make up a small percentage of the populace and lack material capacity, 
technology, and firepower, they can not hope to initially successfully confront 
counterinsurgent forces in conventional warfare. They have sought new ground to offset 
the counterinsurgent force’s strengths. In 1968, Galula observed that this new ground was 
the populace.46 Success of both counterinsurgent and insurgent forces depends on their 
ability to influence the populace in ways beneficial to their causes. The most important 
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continuing goal of an insurgency according to counterinsurgency expert T. E. Lawrence 
“is to win over the civil population—whether by kindness or terrorism, by rosy promises 
of pie in the sky or by burning down dwellings.”47  
At the beginning of hostilities, the populace typically is divided into three distinct 
groups: a small body of people already willing to support the guerrilla, a large neutral 
group, and a small segment that is actively hostile to the insurgents. It is the task of the 
guerrilla leader to identify the small group already friendly to his cause and to use it to 
control the majority and neutralize the hostile minority.48 Success of both 
counterinsurgent and insurgent forces depends on their ability to influence the populace 
to do what is beneficial to them.  
In conventional war the primary objective is to close with and destroy the 
enemy’s military and then occupy his territory. In contrast the insurgent’s primary 
objective is to control the populace. Insurgent organizations understand that they are 
dependent on the local populace for information, supplies, recruits, sanctuary, and 
freedom of movement. The support of the populace can range from active participation to 
passive support. When individuals within the populace simply do not do anything to deter 
the insurgency, they are passively supporting the insurgency through their inaction and 
lack of support for the government. This passive support is the minimum support that an 
insurgency requires from the local populace. In order to be successful, an insurgency 
must set the conditions such that the local populace will not betray them.  The insurgents 
must separate the local populace from the counterinsurgent forces. An insurgency must 
identify and cultivate the constituency that it desires to influence. Counterinsurgency 
expert T. E. Lawrence contended that successful rebellions can be made by 2% of the 
populace actively serving in a striking force, and the remaining 98% is passively 
sympathetic.49 
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The key to local populace support is the net effects of the acts that the insurgency 
commits.  People generally react to incentives and disincentives. They will compare the 
net effect of positive and negative insurgency incentives versus the net effect of positive 
and negative government incentives. This can be simply expressed in equation form as:  
 
EBI - ECI ≥ or ≤ EBG - ECG
whereas,
E is expectation
CI is the cost to the populace for supporting the insurgency
CG is the cost to the populace for supporting the government
BI is the benefit to the populace for supporting the insurgency
BG is the benefit to the populace for supporting the government 
 
Figure 4.   Populace Support Equation  
(Source: Dr. Gordon McCormick, Guerilla Warfare Seminar SO3802, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA August 22, 2006) 
 
 
Local populace support for an insurgency derives from the fact that the expected 
net insurgent incentives are greater than the expected net government incentives.  There 
are primarily two ways that an insurgency can gain the required support of the local 
populace. The first way is that is that the insurgency controls the populace. The second 
way is that support for an insurgency may result not because the insurgency controls the 
populace but because of governmental mistreatment. Therefore, the ability of an 
insurgency to gain the required local populace support is not only based on the 
insurgency choices, but also on the choices that the government makes. 
If the government and counterinsurgent forces are unable to control the 
environment then the insurgents’ incentives are more credible. Counterinsurgent forces 
must understand that critical intelligence about the insurgency will not be found in 
satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicle live feeds, or computer databases, “but in 
people -- little people, insignificant people, but people without whose support the 
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combatant in the "little war" is bound to be defeated."50  Paget acknowledged the 
importance of the populace when he stated in his book, Counter-Insurgency 
Campaigning, that if the people defy the insurgents and co-operate with the government 
and counterinsurgent forces, as in the later phases of the Malayan and Kenya 
Emergencies, the insurgency cannot long survive.51 Successful insurgencies understand 
that they must first control the local populace and then win their support.  
3. Weakness in the Authority  
Is the authority unable to prevent insurgent operations? In FM 3-24 the authority 
is defined as “an established government or an interim governing body”52 that scholars 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. describe as having “a legal and legitimized right and 
capacity to command.”53 Galula argues that even if insurgent leaders are able to identify 
and develop viable causes upon which to base their insurgency, they cannot successfully 
begin operations without some sort of protection.54 The question for insurgent leaders is 
then how to acquire the required protection to begin operations.  
Successful insurgencies diminish security within the country by infiltrating the 
authority. If an insurgency is able to prevent the authority from providing security for the 
populace, the populace will act as the insurgents wish. A government that is unable to 
provide adequate security for the local populace cannot expect their support, while a 
government that does so can expect their support.  In the initial phase of an insurgency, 
insurgent leaders will strive to conceal their true intentions. If insurgents are successful at 
concealing, then the authority will be at a great disadvantage. During a symposium with 
both insurgent and counterinsurgent practitioners it was the consensus that “The 
counterinsurgent suffers a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the insurgent if the latter is 
allowed to develop unnoticed and unchecked.”55 
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Galula wrote that the counterinsurgent leaders’ resoluteness and knowledge of 
counterinsurgency warfare are major factors in determining the weakness in the authority. 
The resoluteness of counterinsurgent leaders is a major factor because insurgents usually 
begin with a dynamic cause and the authority’s reaction against a developing insurgency 
is typically slow. But, Galula argues that being resolute is not enough to guarantee 
counterinsurgent leaders victory; they must also understand how to fight an insurgency.56 
4. Geographic Conditions  
The role of geography in insurgency is critical to success.57 Galula argues that 
with an insurgency’s initial weakness, if it does not gain an advantage due to the 
geographic conditions, the insurgency may very well be condemned to failure before it 
even starts. International borders, size, configuration, and terrain are all geographic 
factors that effect insurgencies.58  
International borders may be a strategic weakness or strength for an insurgency. 
International borders are a strategic strength for an insurgency if the countries bordering 
the counterinsurgent country support the insurgency through sanctuary and freedom of 
movement. International borders are a strategic weakness for an insurgency if the 
bordering countries do not support them and the insurgency may be greatly weakened 
due to isolation.  
Galula observes that size can affect the ability of the authority to govern 
effectively. The greater the size of a country, the more difficult it is for an authority to 
control it.59 The more difficult it is for an authority to control a country, the greater the 
likelihood that an insurgency will be able to establish sanctuaries from which to operate.  
Configuration of a country can affect the success of an insurgency. Galula argues 
that a country that is easy for the authority to compartmentalize will hinder the 
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insurgent,60 while a country that is not easy for the authority to compartmentalize will 
enable the insurgent’s mobility and ability to establish bases.   
Terrain is also a factor that affects an insurgency. Successful insurgencies must 
adapt their operations to fit the terrain. Rural insurgencies will operate and communicate 
quite differently than urban insurgencies. Paget noted that generally the survival of the 
insurgents is considered more important than the retention of terrain.61 Successful 
insurgencies establish numerous well dispersed bases that, when discovered by the 
authority, the insurgents will make no attempt to defend. Paget argues that insurgents will 
seldom attempt to retain terrain, because to do so places the initiative in the hands of the 
counterinsurgent forces, and also deprives the insurgents of their greatest advantage, 
mobility.62 
5. External Support  
External support can take the form of moral, political, technical, financial, or 
military support.63  
• Moral support can take the form of propaganda.  
• Political support can take the form of diplomatic pressure in the international 
arena.  
• Technical support can take the form of advisors.  
• Financial support can be overt or covert in nature.  
• Military support can range from direct intervention to providing sanctuary for 
the insurgency’s training bases.  
No external support is required during the initial stage of an insurgency, though it 
obviously facilitates operations and the growth of the insurgency when available. 
External support is critical during the middle and later stages of an insurgency. External 
                                                 
60 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 36.  
61 Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 25. 
62 Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 25-26. 
63 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 39. Two of Paget’s prerequisites for a successful insurgency, 
bases and supplies, fall into this category. 
  31
military support cannot initially be absorbed in significant amounts by an insurgency. As 
an insurgency reaches the level of development where it passes from insurgent operations 
to more conventional forms of operations, the requirement for support and supplies will 
become greater. If the insurgent is unable to capture the required supplies from 
counterinsurgent forces then external support is required. Failure to acquire the necessary 
supplies or external support will hinder the development of an insurgent organization.64  
6. Information Advantage  
According to the new U.S. army counterinsurgency manual, the information 
environment is a critical dimension that insurgents attempt to shape to their advantage.65 
Guerrilla warfare scholar, Gordon McCormick, argues that at the beginning of an 
insurgency, the insurgency has an information advantage and a force disadvantage, while 
the authority has an information disadvantage and a force advantage. If it does not begin 
with an information advantage then it is not an insurgency. Insurgencies seek to maintain 
the information advantage over time as they improve their force disadvantage. On the 
other hand, the authority seeks to maintain the force advantage over time as they work to 
neutralize the insurgency's information advantage.66  
Information is more than traditional intelligence. It encompasses both the 
information and cognitive domains of the battlespace. If the authority and 
counterinsurgent forces do not understand the information environment, they will be 
unable to efficiently develop gathered intelligence. The information environment includes 
cultural awareness, an in-depth understanding of informal communications channels such 
as rumor and word-of-mouth, identification of formal and informal leaders, surveillance 
or sensors, covert and overt surveys of the battlespace which is the populace, as well as 
intelligence. It more importantly includes the battle for the minds of the populace, which 
is the cognitive domain. The support of the populace is required for the insurgency to 
maintain an information advantage. At a symposium of counterinsurgent and insurgent 
experts it was argued that in order for the insurgent to survive, he must have better 
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intelligence than the authority – an advantage that he can achieve only if he has sufficient 
support of the populace.67 
An information advantage allows insurgent leaders to have and maintain the 
initiative.  The greater their information advantage the greater their initiative capabilities.  
The insurgent Carlos Marighella argued that an insurgent’s information service must be 
better than the authority’s, because without initiative there is no insurgency.68  
Counterinsurgency expert T. E. Lawrence wrote in 1920 that “the printing press is 
the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.”69 Galula wrote that in the 
post-World War II era “propaganda is the chief instrument of moral support, used to 
sway public opinion when it is adverse, or to reinforce existing public sympathy.”70 The 
military history scholar, Ian Beckett, argues that “Contributing to the globalization of 
insurgency after 1945 was the development of mass communications and the ability of 
the insurgent to use the media in ways undreamed of by Mao, especially in urban 
areas.”71 The ability of insurgencies to gain an information advantage through 
propaganda has been greatly enhanced by technological advances. Field Manual 3-24 
points out that 
Insurgents have an additional advantage in shaping the information 
environment. Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick 
to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds; insurgents, 
on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and point out government 
shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency. Ironically, as 
insurgents achieve more success and begin to control larger portions of the 
populace, many of these asymmetries diminish. That may produce new 
vulnerabilities that adaptive counterinsurgents can exploit.72 
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 Counterinsurgent intelligence organizations will attempt to exploit local 
incidents, and in the words of the scholar Robert G. Thompson, also attempt “to sow 
discord in the insurgent ranks and between the insurgents and the population.”73 
Insurgent leaders must maintain enough of an information advantage such that the efforts 
of the authority described above are minimized or neutralized.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the six primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency are 
• a cause to fight for 
• local populace support 
• weakness in the authority 
• geographic conditions 
• external support 
• an information advantage 
Having established the primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency, we can 
now analyze the selected six failed post-World War II insurgencies, in order to determine 
common characteristics. This information can then be used to better understand and 
defeat future insurgencies by enabling counterinsurgent forces to develop strategies that 
take advantage of mistakes in order to promote failure in modern insurgencies.   
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine six case studies of post-World War II failed 
insurgencies: the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), the Philippines – Huk Rebellion (1946-
1954), the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the Kenya Emergency (1952-1960), Dhofar 
(1962-1976), and Bolivia (1966-1968). Each case study will begin by first examining the 
background of the conflict. The background is followed by separate and detailed 
discussions of the insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies. Then utilizing the 
information from the prior sections, the prerequisites for a successful insurgency will be 
used as a framework to examine the insurgency. Each case study will conclude with a 
discussion of the identified short-comings in the prerequisites for a successful insurgency 
in order to understand why each insurgency failed. 
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Figure 5.   Greece (1946-1949) 
(From Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume II The Experience in Europe 
and the Middle East by D. M. Condit, 1967, 498.) 
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B.  THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1946-1949) 
1. Background 
The Greek Civil War, the first of many post-World War II communist 
insurgencies, occurred between 1946 and 1949. The Government of Greece conducted 
counterinsurgency operations against the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the 
National Liberation Front (EAM), which was an umbrella organization for the KKE, and 
its primary military force, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). Insurgent and 
counterinsurgent forces involved in the Greek Civil War are outlined in the figure below 
in order to alleviate potential confusion due to the numerous abbreviations used in 
discussing this conflict.  
 
Insurgent Forces
KKE Communist Party of Greece
PDK Temporary Democratic Government
[established Dec 47] 
EAM National Liberation Front
[an umbrella organization]
ELAS National Popular Liberation Army
[military arm of EAM]
DSE Democratic Army of Greece
[replaced ELAS in Oct 46]
Counterinsurgent Forces
GoG Government of Greece
GNA Greek National Army 
JUSMAPG Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group
 
Figure 6.   Greek Civil War Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Forces 
 
The involvement of the United States in this conflict was an assertion of the 
Truman Doctrine and played a crucial role in the initial development of the United States’ 
Cold War strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. Historians typically describe this 
conflict as occurring in three rounds. The first round of the Greek Civil War was marked 
by fratricidal conflict between the various Greek resistance forces and occurred between 
1943 and 1944. The second round was also a period of fratricidal conflict and occurred 
between December 1, 1944 and January 15, 1945. During this round communist forces 
transitioned to conventional maneuver warfare during the battle for Athens, the capitol of 
Greece. The third round occurred between 1946 and 1949. During this final round of the 
Greek Civil War the Communist Party of Greece guided the armed forces that confronted 
the established government of Greece.  
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Prior to the invasion and occupation of Greece in 1941, the KKE was a small 
unpopular political party. According to the scholar Edgar O’Ballance, the KKE’s 
unpopularity with the Greek populace can be traced to three factors: adherence to the 
Comintern ideology, support of the Balkan Communist Federation, and advocacy for the 
autonomy of Macedonia and Thrace. Because of the unpopularity of these KKE positions 
the party was never able to garner more than ten percent of the votes in any election, and 
was able to gain seats in the National Assembly only after proportional representation 
was instituted in the Greek political system.74 Even so, as the insurgency scholar A. J. 
Joes has written, the occupation “transformed the Greek Communists into a force capable 
of attempting an armed revolution, and it opened a long chapter of physical destruction 
and moral agony for the Greek people.”75 
During the first round, the occupation, the KKE established the only considerable 
Greek military force, the National Liberation Front (EAM). The EAM was established in 
Athens in September 1941 as an umbrella organization for KKE military forces. The 
ability of the KKE to establish this force is attributed to the fact that, having operated 
under conditions of long-term suppression by the Government of Greece prior to the 
occupation, the KKE organization had become accustomed to working in secrecy and 
underground. This institutional knowledge gave the KKE and EAM a distinct advantage 
over the other resistance movements that would develop later during the occupation.  
The military arm of the EAM, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), 
was established in February 1942, and by November 1943 the ELAS had attacked and 
dissolved nearly all the anti-communist guerrilla groups formed by army officers in 
Greece. After the ELAS attacks only two forces remained, the National Democratic 
Greek League (EDES), founded in 1941, and the National and Social Liberation  
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(EKKA), founded in 1942.  John O. Iatrides, an expert on Greek history, has noted that in 
1942 the KKE drafted a plan to seize Athens immediately after the withdrawal of German 
occupation forces.76 
After Allied successes in North Africa and the Soviet successes on the Russian 
front in 1944, German occupation forces evacuated Greece in order to avoid being cut off 
and isolated. The British and Royal Greek Army forces that would move in to fill the 
power vacuum created by the rapid retreat of the Germans were initially small in 
numbers.  
The second round began in December 1944 with the ELAS attempting to seize 
Athens militarily. By the end of December the legitimate Greek authorities retained 
control of only a very small area in the center of the capitol, Athens. But the Greek and 
British forces were able to stop the ELAS assault long enough for external 
reinforcements to be brought into the fight for Athens. The reinforced Greek and British 
forces then defeated the ELAS. As the communist forces retreated from Athens the 
decision was made to take thousands of Greek citizens hostage. The scholar Dimitrios G. 
Kousoulas has noted that “this action, together with the excesses committed by the 
communists during the revolution, generated a volcanic reaction against them”77 which 
was carried over into the third round. The KKE and Greek government leaders signed a 
truce on 15 January 1945 ending hostilities. The subsequent Varkiza agreement of 
February 1945 gave the KKE and ELAS an amnesty, a referendum on the future of 
Greece and a general election. This agreement was advantageous to the KKE since it 
legitimized the KKE and enabled unimpeded preparation for the third round.  During the 
second round the KKE and EAM leadership had failed to understand that they had lost 
the external political support of Stalin until it was too late. 
In 1945 an electoral victory for the KKE was most unlikely. Intra-party quarrels 
and defections of key political and military leaders had greatly weakened the KKE as 
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they made preparations for the third round. The third round began with the KKE 
boycotting the national elections for a new parliament in March 1946. In October 1946 
the ELAS was effectively replaced with the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) 
commanded by the veteran General Markos Vafiadis. The DSE was to operate primarily 
in the mountains of central and northern Greece.  
The Temporary Democratic Government (PDK) was established by the 
communists in December 1947. In an attempt to seize a capital and gain much needed 
recognition by other communist governments, the small town of Konitsa along the 
Albanian border was attacked on 25 December 1947. Guided by the PDK the DSE 
transformed from operating as a guerrilla organization to operate as an organized 
conventional force. After the initial assault of Konitsa was repulsed the DSE laid siege to 
the town. Underestimating the improved expertise, organization, armaments, and strength 
of the Greek National Army (GNA), the DSE forces were surrounded and 650 men were 
killed or wounded.78 Having transformed into a conventional force prematurely, the DSE 
was now faced with the prospect of a severe loss of morale if they attempted to transform 
back to a guerilla force. During the summer of 1948 the DSE was driven from many of 
their mountain strongholds by the GNA. In January 1949, following several severe 
battlefield defeats and because he strongly advocated a return to guerilla tactics, Markos 
was replaced by Niko Zachariadis, a politician who was a self proclaimed military leader, 
who favored conventional warfare. In August and September 1949, Zachariadis made the 
fatal error of gathering and placing behind fixed defenses his remaining 1,200 men in the 
communists’ last mountain strongholds in the Grammos. The Greek Civil War ended, for 
all practical purposes, with the Battle of Grammos-Vitsi, in August of 1949. The DSE 
was forced out of Greece, leaving the GNA in firm control of the entire country. 
2. Insurgency Strategy 
The KKE and EAM treated the ELAS as their main source of military power 
beginning in May 1943. During the first round, the occupation, the ELAS minimized its 
activities against the German occupiers out of fear of the expected severe retaliation 
against Greek civilians. This also enabled the ELAS to gather strength during the 
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occupation in anticipation of securing control of Greece when the occupation forces 
departed. The KKE and ELAS hoped to rapidly fill the resulting power vacuum.  
According to O’Ballance, at the beginning of the second round the KKE and 
ELAS observed “the smallness of the Allied Liberation Force and noted the small 
fighting content, as well as the fact that it seemed to be more concerned with repairing 
roads and harbour facilities and distributing UNRRA [United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration] supplies than penetrating into the interior.”79 When 
fighting finally erupted around Athens, the communists did not have a deliberate plan to 
occupy the capital. Iatrides wrote that the KKE proved to be indecisive and unprepared to 
take the necessary military action at this point to gain the initiative.80 The KKE, in the 
end, had the ELAS turn to conventional urban maneuver operations in a bid to take 
Athens in the second round. Simultaneously the ELAS executed missions to destroy all 
other Greek anti-communist forces. This diverted already limited communist resources 
from the main effort in Athens. This decision to destroy all other competitors was flawed 
since the KKE could have easily destroyed all competition once in control of Athens.  
According to the scholar Charilaos G. Lagoudakis, the strategic aim of the KKE 
in the third round was to replace the legitimate Government of Greece with a communist 
regime.81 Kousoulas describes the KKE’s strategic plan during the third round as based 
on two major considerations: (1) that the communist states to the north would provide 
support and; (2) that British forces would be prevented from entering the fight and 
therefore the KKE would only have to contend with the domestic reaction. The initial 
insurgent strategy of the third round was based on classic hit-and-run guerilla tactics. 
According to Kousoulas the tactics were: “selection of target; concentration of forces; 
surprise attack at night against the gendarmerie station; forcible or voluntary recruitment 
of young villagers; pillaging of food stuffs; then retreat to mountain hide-outs.”82  At the 
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strategic level the KKE also provided support from their headquarters in Athens through 
propaganda and subversion. This support was to continue until December 1947 when the 
Greek government finally outlawed the KKE as a political party. With the formation of 
the PDK, the DSE transitioned to conventional maneuver warfare and sought to gain and 
retain territory in order to gain legitimacy by being recognized by other communist states.  
3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
During the first round, the German occupation forces were focused on securing 
the main north-south passage through Greece. Due to limited resources and forces the 
Germans were thus unable to aggressively execute a counterinsurgency campaign. 
During the second round the British and Greek Army forces were unable to conduct 
effective counterinsurgency operations. The strategy was to retain Athens and work to 
stabilize Greece. The KKE’s decision to have the ELAS fight in a conventional manner 
in an urban environment played to the British and Greek Army forces’ strengths.   
During the initial stages of the third round the Greek government depended 
primarily on the Gendarmerie to deal with the insurgent activities in the rural areas. In 
August 1946 it was apparent to the Government of Greece that the Gendarmerie was 
overwhelmed and the Greek Army was deployed to deal with the insurgent forces. 
According to Lagoudakis, the Government of Greece was also unable to take advantage 
of the popular support of the populace “because it lacked security forces trained to deal 
with the increasing infiltration of guerilla bands along Greece’s northern borders.”83 
Kousoulas wrote that due to lack of both experience and personnel, the leadership of the 
Greek Army and their British advisors adopted two tactics: static defense and short 
duration cleaning up operations. The first tactic, static defense, proved to be costly and 
ineffective. Lacking a mobile force to reinforce besieged villages; communist forces were 
able to select villages for attack that they could overwhelm. Greek forces from nearby 
villages were unable to provide support out of fear of ambush enroute or having their 
own unprotected village attacked while they were providing assistance. The second 
tactic, short duration cleaning up operations, was not costly in human life, but was 
extremely ineffective. This tactic consisted of developing a prescribed timetable for a 
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target area. No matter the situation, the Greek Army withdrew its troops according to the 
timetable.84 As the strength of the insurgent forces became more apparent the British and 
American forces increased support of both material and training support to the besieged 
Greek Government. 
As the flow of resources increased it became obvious by December that the GNA 
could not effectively distribute or plan the use of these resources. On 15 July 1947, the 
initial American Aid Mission to Greece was established. Then in November 1947 a joint 
Greek-American staff, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group 
(JUSMAPG), was established to orchestrate the fight against the communists. This 
effectively made the planning of military operations in Greece an American 
responsibility.   
Hit and run tactics of the communists during the initial phases of the third round 
had lowered the morale of the Greek Army. Western Allied funds, advisors and 
equipment now were flooding into the country, and under Western Allied guidance a 
series of major offensives were launched in the mountains of central Greece. Although 
these offensives did not achieve all their objectives, they inflicted some serious defeats on 
the DSE. Army morale rose, and the morale of the DSE fighters, many of whom had been 
forcibly conscripted, fell correspondingly. The development of commando units proved 
to be effective in helping the Government of Greece regain the initiative. As Lagoudakis 
wrote, “Their offensive spirit…inspired confidence among government forces and among 
the loyal civilian populace.”85 With American assistance, the GNA was able to increase 
its strength to 150,000 in the third round86 just as the communist forces were struggling 
to recruit and retain personnel. The Government of Greece faced a maximum of 28,000 
active communist insurgents.87    
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4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
 a. A Cause to Fight For 
The KKE lacked a cause that would generate support amongst the Greek 
populace. The KKE did not effectively identify an existing domestic issue and exploit it 
to create a cause that would appeal to the populace. The Greek communists failed 
because they failed to identify an issue and exploit it to create a cause that appealed to the 
populace. A cause based on the communist ideology of the KKE was at odds with Greek 
culture and failed to win the support of the populace; therefore, the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, was a significant disadvantage for the KKE 
throughout the insurgency. 
 b. Local Populace Support 
The communist alienation of the peasantry was a major factor in their 
failure. Support by the Greek populace was dissipated by the communist approach to 
party discipline. Military historian Charles R. Shrader observed that the communists’ 
overdependence upon executions, forcible conscription, confiscation of resources, and the 
use of terror to sustain the insurgency and force the local populace to support the KKE 
was very unproductive.88  
The communists lost much passive and overt support from the Greek 
populace immediately following their defeat at the end of the second round. O’Ballance 
wrote that as evidence of communists’ atrocities became known the populace of Greece 
was horrified. The harsh treatment, refusal to release, and even killing of hostages by the 
communist forces aroused the dislike of the majority and lost the support of sections of 
the populace that might have otherwise been attracted to their cause.89  
In the autumn of 1948 Markos wrote “since the middle of 1947, 
recruitment to the DSE was achieved almost entirely by force.”90 The DSE increasingly 
used forcible conscription to acquire recruits from the local populace. According to the 
military historian Ian Beckett the DSE started to become over reliant upon the 
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Slavophones of Macedonia, who established the Slavomacedonian Liberating Front 
(SNOF) in 1944. The Slavophones were a portion of the Greek populace that was 
alienated from the Greek society. 91 The lack of an appealing cause severely hampered 
the ability of the communists to recruit and retain manpower from the local populace. It is 
safe to assume that the lack of appeal of the Communist ideology to the local populace 
also hindered recruitment efforts.   
One of the most effective countermeasures that the Government of Greece 
executed was the removal of large sections of the populace from the unsecured frontiers. 
When the Government of Greece displaced the populace from the unsecured frontiers, the 
communists lost not only potential recruits, supplies, and information, but more 
importantly, the initiative.  
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, local populace support, was a 
limited disadvantage for the KKE immediately following the second round. The harsh 
treatment of the Greek populace combined with the use of terror to coerce the populace 
quickly changed this prerequisite to a significant disadvantage for the KKE for the 
remainder of the insurgency. 
c. Weakness in the Authority 
According to Kousoulas, at the beginning of the third round the Greek 
economy was disorganized; the civil service, poorly paid, was infiltrated with communist 
sympathizers and was inefficient; and the army was infiltrated and lacked both the 
organization and expertise to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign.92 The 
ability of the KKE to remain a legal political party following their defeat in the second 
round is an indication of the weakness in the authority at that time. O’Ballance also noted 
that pressure by the British “on the Greek Government to rule democratically – which 
meant allowing the Communist Party to operate openly … played into the hands of the 
KKE.”93  
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The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, weakness in the authority, 
was a significant advantage for the KKE initially. Greek government and security forces 
were vulnerable and unprepared to defeat an aggressive insurgency at the beginning of 
the third round. American material and technical assistance throughout the third round 
was to prove decisive in developing a more effective government and counterinsurgency 
effort against the communist insurgents. Though the communists lost the initiative in the 
third round largely due to this external assistance, the Greek government and military still 
leaned heavily on American advisors. For this reason this prerequisite is considered to 
have been a limited advantage for the KKE even as the communist forces were being 
defeated. The communists were just unable to leverage this limited advantage to their 
benefit. 
 d. Geographic Conditions 
The geography of Greece, sparse, barren, and largely uninhabited, was 
almost perfect for insurgency operations. The DSE had the advantage of terrain operating 
primarily in the mountains of central and northern Greece. O’Ballance wrote, there are 
“twenty-six separate mountain ranges in which looking for small bodies of guerrillas is 
like searching for needles in haystacks.”94 The guerrilla hit-and-run tactics took 
advantage of the available terrain. In mid-1948 the guerrilla forces’ geographic advantage 
was mitigated by their adoption of a strategy of attempting to retain territorial gains. 
Instead of continuing hit-and-run tactics the communists organized static defensive 
positions that the numerically superior GNA was able to effectively surround and 
destroy. The insurgency had given the initiative back to the Government of Greece and 
failed to take advantage of their mobility and international borders. 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a 
significant advantage for the communists throughout the Greek Civil War. Though the 
Yugoslavian border was closed in third round the communists still had a significant 
advantage because of their ability to freely cross the Albanian and Bulgarian borders to 
seek sanctuary. The fact that the communists chose a poor strategy of attempting to retain 
terrain against a numerically superior force, versus taking advantage of the geography of 
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Greece, especially the mountainous terrain, does not change the fact that the geographic 
conditions were still a significant advantage for the communists at the end of the 
insurgency. The Greek communists just failed to take advantage of the geography.  
 e. External Support 
The establishment of the Temporary Democratic Government (PDK) in 
December 1947 was an international embarrassment for the Greek Communist Party 
when not even the Soviet Union recognized the PDK as a legitimate government. This 
political failure was to greatly affect future external support from neighboring communist 
countries.  
The Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian governments supported the Greek 
communist movement with sanctuary and supplies. According to Lagoudakis, “Except 
for the initial stock of weapons hidden at the end of World War II, virtually all arms and 
equipment came from outside Greece.”95 Though the KKE met with representatives of 
the Soviet Union several times, the Soviets provided no direct support. It was not part of 
Stalin's strategy to start a war over Greece; in fact, as Kousoulas points out, the “Stalin-
Churchill understanding of October 1944 had placed Greece unconditionally within the 
British sphere of interest.”96 The leaders of the KKE and DSE waited throughout the 
third round for the support of the Soviet Union, support that was to never materialize.    
A decisive factor in the calculations of the KKE leadership was the 
support of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia at the beginning of the third round. Already 
a poor and rather undeveloped country, the occupation and subsequent civil war reduced 
the internal resources of Greece to the degree that the DSE found it difficult to obtain 
locally even its most basic needs. This lack of resources forced the DSE to purchase or 
acquisition needed supplies locally and become over dependent on external support 
which could oftentimes be quite tenuous. Charles R. Shrader, an expert on the logistics of 
the Greek Civil War wrote that “The Greek rebels, unable to find or produce significant 
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military resources internally, had to rely almost entirely on the logistical support by 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.”97  
The departure of the Yugoslavian communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, from 
the Cominform and his move towards a less militant policy towards the United States and 
Great Britain prevented any direct military intervention by Tito in support of the Greek 
Communists. In July 1949 Tito closed the Yugoslavian frontier, and denied further 
sanctuary to the DSE. The loss of their principal external support base and sanctuary 
greatly impacted the DSE’s ability to effectively operate.  
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external support, was a 
limited advantage for the communists initially. The closing of the Yugoslavian border 
coupled with the extremely limited material support actually provided to the Greek 
communists from external sources resulted in this limited advantage becoming a 
significant disadvantage by the end of the insurgency.    
 f. Information Advantage 
The KKE and its military forces had an information advantage over the 
Government of Greece and its military forces until mid-way through the third round. 
Following the defeat in the second round the KKE was recognized as a legitimate 
political party by the Varkiza Pact. Because the KKE was a legitimate Greek political 
party it could openly publish its own newspapers and other publications. This enabled the 
KKE to more effectively spread its subversive propaganda. This information advantage 
vanished with the establishment of the PDK. At this point the information advantage 
passed to the counterinsurgency forces because propaganda was no longer enough to hide 
the true intentions of the KKE from the populace.   
The separation of the communists from the populace, through mass 
relocations of the Greek populace, further restricted the flow of timely and accurate 
information. The premature adoption of conventional war by the communists was a result 
of the poor information collected by the PDK and DSE. The above countermeasures by 
the Government of Greece in the third round greatly restricted the communists’ ability to 
effectively collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. Inaccurate and out-of-date 
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information on the GNA led the communists to believe that it was time to transform to 
conventional warfare and seize victory. The communists believed that the GNA morale 
was low and the American military aid was not yet a decisive factor. In truth, the GNA in 
the summer and autumn of 1948 had been greatly transformed, in the words of the 
scholar O’Ballance, because of “the amounts of American material absorbed, the 
improved state of training, sounder planning, better staff work and a more aggressive 
policy and attitude generally.”98 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information advantage, was a 
significant advantage for the Greek communists initially. The effective separation of the 
communists from the Greek populace due to the Government of Greece’s relocation 
programs resulted in a significant loss of intelligence for the Greek communists. This loss 
of intelligence was great enough to reduce this prerequisite to a significant disadvantage 
by the middle of the third round.  
5. Conclusion 
The KKE’s defeat in 1949 stemmed from several factors rather than any one 
cause.  Three of these factors the KKE had little or no control over: (1) the improved 
morale, efficiency, and capability of the Greek government and security forces after 1947 
due to American material aid and training; (2) the dependence on external support due to 
the limited internal resources of Greece; and (3) Stalin’s decision to not support the KKE 
directly.  
There were numerous factors that the KKE had control over: (1) the strict 
adherence to the communist ideology rather than identifying a domestic issue and 
developing a cause that the populace would support; (2) alienating the Greek populace; 
(3) not using existing geographic conditions to take advantage of their mobility and retain 
the initiative against a numerically superior force; (4) failure to back Tito and retain 
external support; (5) loss of the information advantage in the third round resulted in the 
decision to prematurely transform to conventional maneuver and attempt to retain 
territory; and (6) failure to heed Soviet advice prior to the second round to not expand the 
struggle and concentrate on the mass political struggle.  
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Figure 7.   Greek Civil War Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency Chart  
 
Finally, using a Likert scale to examine the Greek Civil War against the 
prerequisites for a successful insurgency it becomes obvious that the KKE initially had 
three significant advantages, weakness in authority, geographic conditions, and 
information advantage. The KKE initially, also, had a limited advantage in the 
prerequisite external support. 
 The KKE’s significant disadvantage in the prerequisite for a successful 
insurgency, a cause to fight for, coupled with the reduction of the prerequisites local 
populace support, external support, and information advantage, to the status of significant 
disadvantage guaranteed the defeat of the communists in the Greek Civil War. 
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Figure 8.   The Philippines (1946-1954) 
(From Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume I The Experience in Asia by 
D. M. Condit, 1967, 474) 
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C.  PHILIPPINES (HUK REBELLION) (1946-1954) 
1. Background 
The Hukbalahap movement began in 1942 in response to the harsh Japanese 
occupation of the Philippines. The origins of this movement were rooted in the country’s 
pre-colonial period and the result of numerous internal Philippine conditions. The term 
Hukbalahap is an abbreviation of the Filipino term Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga 
Hapon which means "Army of Resistance Against Japan." The Hukbalahap movement is 
often referred to as the Huk Rebellion. The scholar Eduardo Lachica argues, that 
immediately following the liberation of the Philippines, the Huks under “Communist 
leadership saw a chance to seize national power at a time when the newly-proclaimed 
Philippine Republic was in obvious distress as a result of a monetary crisis, graft in high 
office and mounting peasant unrest.”99 Though this argument is compelling to historians, 
it fails to take into consideration the disinformation campaign waged against the Huk 
movement’s reputation, the failure of the American and Philippine governments to 
integrate the Huk leaders into the political process, the obvious corruption of the 
Philippine government, and finally, the government sponsored victimization of the rural 
agrarian peasant class.  
The truth is that the Huks realized that the Philippine populace was war weary, 
and therefore the Huks initially intended to peacefully demobilize. But during the closing 
months of the liberation in 1945, U.S. forces turned against the Huks. In his detailed and 
well researched book on the Huk Rebellion historian Benedict J. Kerkvliet argues that the 
Huks were arrested by government troops, and members of peasant organizations who 
petitioned for better conditions were openly victimized by landlords and police.100    
The scholar William Chapman identifies three critical events which forced the 
Huks in 1946 to initiate an insurgency against the Philippine government.101 The first 
was the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East had decided that the Huk 
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resistance movement was a communist organization that desired to overthrow any 
democratic government in order to establish a socialist state. In an effort to disrupt the 
perceived threat the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC) ordered Huk units to 
demobilize, disarm, and disperse to their homes. The CIC also jailed several prominent 
Huk leaders. Many Huks retained their arms and fled to the mountains rightly perceiving 
that they were now hunted as outlaws.  
The second event was the return of the Central Luzon landowners. Many 
landowners had sought refuge in Manila in 1942, but now they had returned, planning on 
picking up where they had left off. As the landlords demanded back rent, they realized 
that they now faced a much better organized peasant resistance movement. Assisting the 
landowners in their attempt to reassert their preoccupation rights and dismantle the new 
political force, the Philippine military police took an extremely heavy handed approach 
against the peasant classes of Luzon.  
The third event was the 1946 election for congress of all six Democratic Alliance 
(DA) candidates, one of which was a local Huk hero, Luis Taruc. None of the DA 
candidates were allowed to take office.  Eduardo Lachica posits that the ejection, by the 
Philippine Commission on Elections, of the six DA candidates was due to the highly 
doubtful circumstances they won under.102 But the Commission on Elections failed to 
give equal consideration towards investigating the campaign of terror conducted by 
Roxas supporters in the Central Plains of Luzon. Kerkvliet further argues that the ejection 
of the DA candidates was actually due to the concerted efforts of the Huk movement’s 
primary enemies; the wealthy landowners of Luzon, collaborators from the occupation, 
Philippine constabulary, American and Philippine government officials eager to maintain 
the status quo, and those that wanted to believe that the Huks were dangerous because 
they were communists.103 In the words of the scholar Lachica, “The ejection of the DA 
congressmen turned Central Luzon into a seething cauldron,”104 and left President Roxas 
in control of the Philippines at the national level. The overt and corrupt actions taken by 
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Roxas and his supporters gained further sympathy for the Huk movement. In May 1946 
Luis Taruc re-established the Huk movement’s headquarters and began re-building the 
military force. After several set backs, President Roxas realized that his military was not 
prepared to destroy the Huk movement. Though there was a truce between the upper 
levels of the Philippine government and the senior leaders of the Huk movement, the 
violence continued to escalate through 1946. In early 1947, the Philippine military 
executed operations against the main Huk strongholds in Luzon with little success. 
Throughout 1947 to 1948 the Huks reduced operations and focused on expanding the 
movement’s military and political forces. Finally, in March 1948, President Roxas 
declared the Huk movement an illegal and subversive organization and had the 
constabulary step up counterinsurgency activities. Then in April 1948, President Roxas 
died and Vice President Elpidio Quirino assumed power. Initially it appeared that Quirino 
wished solve the Huk problem through truce, amnesty and conciliation. President Quirino 
even let Luis Taruc take his seat in the Congress. But at the same time President Quirino 
had the Philippine military continue operations against the Huks. Finally in August 1948, 
Luis Taruc left Manila and openly declared armed revolt against the Philippine 
government.  
The political and military strength of the Huk movement peaked between 1949 
and 1951. The violence and corruption associated with President Quirino’s reelection in 
November 1949 served to greatly increase support for the Huks among the peasants of 
Luzon. By September 1950 the Huks were in virtual control of Central Luzon, often 
referred to as Huklandia. In 1950 the Huks also changed the movement’s name to 
Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan, the “People’s Liberation Army” (HMB).  
Two events are attributed to the Huk movement’s loss of momentum in early 
1951 that ultimately led to their defeat. The first was President Quirino’s appointment of 
Ramón Magsaysay, as the Secretary of National Defense in September 1950.  Magsaysay 
was given the responsibility of reorganizing all Philippine security forces into an 
effective counterinsurgency force. The second was in April 1949, the death of Aurora 
Quezon, ex-President Quezon's widow, and of her family during a Huk ambush of the 
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convoy they were traveling in. Mrs. Quezon’s death reduced support from the local 
populace for the Huk movement.  
William Chapman notes that insurgent operations by the Huks during the 
Japanese occupation attained a legendary status among the local populace of Central 
Luzon by the end of World War II.105 The Huks in February 1942 are estimated to have 
numbered 300 and by September to have increased their force to 3000. The Huk 
movement peaked at 12,800 personnel in 1950. A series of defeats then reduced the force 
to an estimated 4,000 by October 1952.106  Luis Taruc, who had held the post of 
Commander-in-Chief continuously since the activation of the Huks in 1942, was relieved 
following a series of significant defeats by the counterinsurgent forces.  Eduardo Lachica 
argues that Luis Taruc was worried about needlessly shedding the blood of his followers. 
For this reason Taruc, in 1954 surrendered to the Philippine government rather than 
continue on what he believed to be a suicidal course for the Huk movement, and by the 
following year the insurgency was no longer a threat to the Philippine government, as the 
remaining Huk leaders were either killed, captured or forced to surrender.107 
2. Insurgency Strategy 
In August 1948, the insurgent leaders of the Hukbalahap movement did not 
believe that the necessary conditions existed for initiating a successful insurgency. The 
Huk leaders felt that they must focus on three areas in order to set the proper conditions 
for initiating a successful insurgency. First, the Huk’s civilian mass base had to be 
expanded. Second, peasants and workers had to be convinced that armed struggle was the 
only remaining option. Third, the Huk military and political organization had to be 
improved and expanded. The numerous missteps, especially the mistreatment of the 
peasants by the military, provided much indirect help to the Huks in convincing the 
populace to support the armed revolt. The historian Robert R. Smith argues that the 
corruption of the elections of 1949 left the peasants with no doubt that their only hope for 
change was through armed revolt. The objectives of the Huk insurgent leaders were to 
use military force to overthrow the corrupt Philippine government, and then to establish a                                                  
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communist people’s democracy. With the continuing improvements in the Huk’s military 
and political organizations insurgent leaders expected to topple the Philippine 
government by the end of 1951.108  
Smith’s research identified that insurgent tactical operations consisted primarily 
of raids and ambushes. The Huks executed three types of raids: (1) assaults against 
Philippine Army positions; (2) raids in urban areas with the objective of liquidating 
village mayors and other government officials; and (3) standard offensive operations to 
intimidate the civilian populace. The Huks normally chose suitable terrain for ambushes. 
Mountainous or hilly terrain with thick vegetation which provided easy concealment and 
safe withdrawal was the most desirable. The Huks usually focused on small government 
detachments or supply convoys, but would ambush much larger Philippine government 
forces if the terrain and situation facilitated a safe and rapid withdrawal from the 
engagement area. Emphasizing mobility the Huks employed the hit-and-run technique in 
both ambushes and raids. This technique enabled the Huks to avoid major clashes and 
retain the initiative. By withdrawing rapidly, they kept their limited forces intact and 
discouraged the Philippine forces when their pursuits proved fruitless. Sabotage was 
rarely used by the Huks out of fear of alienating the populace. They also did not wish to 
destroy communications facilities that they used themselves, and more importantly 
lacked the training and expertise to execute sabotage operations effectively.109 
The use of terrorist attacks by the Huk movement was sporadic after the liberation 
of the Philippines, primarily due to the Huk leaders debating the wisdom of the use of 
terrorism as a tactic. The Huk movement initially used terrorist attacks against individual 
vehicles and individuals traveling in Huk controlled areas to demonstrate to the local 
populace the strength of the Huk movement. The use of terror as a tactic against 
individual vehicles and individuals was re-examined by the Huk movement leadership 
after the public condemnation of the death of the widow of ex-President Quezon during a 
Huk ambush in April 1949. Following the 1949 election the Huk movement did intensify 
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terrorist attacks on villages. The scholar Andrew R. Molnar posits that these attacks 
focusing on villages were intended to extend the area under Huk control and to 
demonstrate to the local populace the movement’s aversion to landlords.110 
3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
In 1945 American forces moved to disarm Huk units in Central Luzon, removed 
local governments organized by the Huks, and arrested many of the high ranking Huk 
leaders such as Luis Taruc. During the years 1946 to 1950, the Philippine government 
was able to marshal only 24,000 poorly equipped paramilitary police of the Department 
of Interior’s Constabulary against the Huk movement. Molnar argues that the Philippine 
regular Army forces until 1951 were ill-equipped, unorganized for sustained combat, and, 
most importantly, primarily staffed by inept and corrupt officers, and therefore it played 
only a minor role in the counterinsurgency until late 1950.111  
President Quirino appointed the 43 year old congressman, Ramón Magsaysay, as 
the Secretary of National Defense in September 1950. With no formal military training, 
but an extensive background in guerrilla warfare, he immediately took charge of 
Philippine counterinsurgency operations and began to reorganize the entire security 
forces of the Philippines. Then Magsaysay ordered the Police Constabulary placed under 
Army control on 23 December 1950. Lawrence M. Greenberg, an expert on the 
Hukbalahap insurgency, points out that this organizational and command relationship 
was to remain in effect for the duration of the insurgency and was ultimately critical to 
the execution of successful counterinsurgency operations.112 
Magsaysay’s efforts to develop an effective counterinsurgency force were greatly 
assisted when the United States sent to the Philippines a Joint U.S. Military Assistance 
Group (JUSMAG). The JUSMAG provided not only much needed expertise, but more 
importantly substantial loans to help Magsaysay implement his desired 
counterinsurgency programs.  Financing from the United States enabled Magsaysay to 
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implement social and civic programs primarily focused at the Huk’s stronghold, Central 
Luzon.  
The year of 1950 was to mark the apex of the Huk Rebellion’s strength. In 1951 a 
revamped Philippine Army with improved leadership, organization, and equipment 
gained the initiative. With the more effective counterinsurgent forces “killing Huks at the 
rate of 40 to 50 a week”113 the insurgents were becoming demoralized. The Huks were 
constantly on the run. Failure by the Huks to expand their movement beyond the Central 
Plains of Luzon enabled the counterinsurgent forces to concentrate their forces on that 
area. The Huks also now faced a more effective Philippine counterinsurgency force: a 
better trained force, generally led by competent military leaders. 
Andrew R. Molnar argues that the key to Magsaysay’s successful 
counterinsurgency efforts was his directive requiring the Philippine military to perform 
civic and social welfare missions. These missions were in addition to on-going military 
operations against the Huks. The Philippine forces were able to develop cohesion and 
integrate all military, government, and non-governmental operations by assigning a civil 
affairs officer to every military unit. These officers also maintained liaison with civilian 
home guard units and local barrio police officials.114 After Magsaysay defeated President 
Quirino in the 1953 Presidential election, he continued to effectively expand his 
counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks.  
4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
 a.  A Cause to Fight For 
The Huk movement exploited the issues of land reform and government 
corruption to create two causes that the populace could support. Land reform was the 
major issue which the Huks were able to effectively exploit to gain the support of the 
populace in the Central Plains of Luzon. This cause was primarily focused on the rural 
agrarian class peasants, and held little appeal to the urban class. In describing the “Land 
Problem,” Luis Taruc wrote: 
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Thus, for centuries, “land for the landless” has been the peasants’ cry, and 
the peasants’ hunger for land has been our nation’s most pressing problem. 
This has led to the common saying among our people that social justice 
can be achieved only by one of two ways: either a land reform or 
revolution. Our history of the past four centuries is one of successive 
uprisings, and their basic cause has always been the peasants’ hunger for 
land.115 
The corruption of the Philippine government was an issue that had wider 
appeal with both the rural and urban populaces perceiving extensive government 
corruption. Initially the harsh actions taken by the Philippine government against the 
Huks were perceived as unjustified by the populace of the Central Plains of Luzon. Their 
aggressive actions versus the Japanese established a hero status for the Huks among the 
general populace of Central Luzon. The hostility of the American forces toward the Huks 
during the closing months of the liberation of the Philippines in 1945 served to only 
increase support for the Huk movement. The 1949 elections were a confirmation to the 
populace of the widespread corruption of the Philippine government. At all levels it was 
filled with those who had collaborated with the Japanese and members from resistance 
groups that did not take aggressive action against the Japanese occupation forces.   
Both of these causes were greatly weakened by Magsaysay’s aggressive 
economic, political, social, and military reforms between 1951 and 1954. Because most 
of the Huk support came from the agrarian peasant class, Magsaysay initially focused 
both civic and military actions on agrarian reforms. Near the end of 1950 the Economic 
Development Corps (EDCOR) program was initiated by the Philippine government. This 
program’s objective was to rehabilitate and resettle Huk prisoners and their families with 
the goal of inducing defections from the Huks. Andrew R. Molnar posits that the 
psychological effect of the EDCOR program on the Huk movement and the populace was 
great. This program provided Huk members with an alternative to fighting and the 
populace gained new respect for the government. Huk defections due to this program 
resulted in increased intelligence for counterinsurgency forces.116   
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During the 1951 elections Magsaysay took extraordinary efforts to 
guarantee Philippine voters that their voting rights were protected. Reforms to increase 
the legitimacy of the Philippine government in the words of Andrew R. Molnar, “led to 
the turning of the tide of public opinion toward the government.”117 By 1952 
Magsaysay’s judicial reform efforts had also impacted the ability of the Huks to exploit 
the land reform issue as a cause for continuing the insurgency. In cases involving the 
charge of exploitation by landowners, peasants were offered counsel at government 
expense, if so desired.  
Though the Huks initially had a significant advantage in the prerequisite 
for a successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, primarily due to government missteps to 
include mistreatment of peasants and corruption, this advantage was wiped away by the 
social, civic, and military policies of Magsaysay. The success of Magsaysay’s policies in 
Central Luzon, coupled with the deterioration of the Huk’s treatment of the populace 
resulted in this prerequisite becoming a limited disadvantage for the Huks by 1954.   
 b. Local Populace Support 
The Huk movement’s strength lay in its mass base of rural agrarian 
peasants in the Central Plains of Luzon. The Confederation of Peasants (PKM) was one 
of the principal mass-support bases of the Huk insurgent movement from 1946 to 1954. 
The Central Plains of Luzon with its social and cultural conditions proved to be a very 
hospitable environment for the Huks, but the Huk leadership failed to understand that the 
urban populace was less likely to support their causes.  
Several government missteps helped the Huk movement gain the popular 
support of the populace. The assassination of the Feleo, a Huk leader, by armed men in 
Philippine Military Police uniforms in August 1949 added to the growing discontent with 
the Philippine government. Shortly after the assassination of Feleo, President Roxas 
announced his “iron fist” policy. This policy was to destroy the Huk movement in sixty 
days, but it also took strong measures against the peasants of Luzon, which resulted in 
increased support for the Huk movement.  The overtly corrupt national elections of 1949 
confirmed peasant perceptions that the Philippine government was corrupt.   
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In Huk controlled areas supplies such as food were provided by the local 
populace. Most weapons that the Huk movement utilized were obtained during World 
War II. Additional weapons and ammunition were captured or purchased through bribes 
from government security forces. Molnar has identified that as Magsaysay’s 
counterinsurgency efforts became more effective the Huks were forced to resort to 
raiding the populace for needed supplies. 118  
The Huks lost the support of the local populace following the fraudulent 
1949 elections because of an over reliance on needless violence as a method of coercion.  
A key incident was the death of Mrs. Aurora Quezon, the widow of the late president, her 
daughter, and son-in-law in a Huk ambush. With increased terrorism by the Huks the 
populace of Central Luzon fled to the major cities for security.  
Efforts to expand the Huk movement beyond the Central Plains of Luzon 
were generally met with failure. One of the reasons for the failure to expand was the fact 
that supporters and members of the Huk movement primarily spoke Pampango. The 
Pampango speaking area was limited to the fertile plain of the Central Plain of Luzon. 
Audiences of non-Pampango speakers were not receptive to the Huk members trying to 
articulate their cause. The Huk Rebellion expert, Kerkvliet, also argues that a second 
reason was the fact that the Huks usually sent their most poorly trained and undisciplined 
members on expansion missions.119  
A general battle weariness among the members of the Huk movement and 
supporters had set in by early 1951. Supporting the insurgency was a serious strain on the 
populace of Central Luzon. By 1952 peasants were complaining about sharing their 
limited food resources with the Huks. The Huks were forced to resort more and more to 
coercion in order to acquire needed supplies; thus, hurting the people they were supposed 
to be protecting, and alienating supporters. 
The Huk movement initially had a significant advantage in the prerequisite 
for a successful insurgency, local populace support, primarily due to government 
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corruption, mistreatment of the peasants, and the perception among the populace of unfair 
treatment of the Huks following the occupation. The success of Magsaysay’s social, 
civic, and military policies in Central Luzon, coupled with the deterioration of the Huk’s 
treatment of the populace resulted in this prerequisite becoming a significant 
disadvantage for the Huks by 1954.  
 c. Weakness in the Authority 
Until the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay, as the Secretary of National 
Defense in September 1950, the Huk insurgent movement was able to develop 
unimpeded by the corrupt and incompetent Philippine government. A faulty Philippine 
government policy of empowering the local populace to make decisions reference 
battling the insurgency locally enabled the Huks to continue to retain the initiative. The 
Huks had infiltrated the Philippine government at the local level to the point that in Huk 
controlled areas the police and municipal administrators worked for the Huk movement. 
In these areas the Huks had assumed many of the functions of the state; administration, 
collecting taxes, schools, and courts to establish justice. The Huks also had limited 
control of several fringe areas. The scholar Molnar argues that by day these areas were 
controlled by the Philippine government, but at night the Huks were in control.120  
The Philippine government at all levels could be accurately described as 
weak in its efforts to combat the Huk movement prior to Magsaysay’s appointment. 
Magsaysay’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of the Philippine counterinsurgency 
forces, coupled with several effective civic and social welfare projects, and judicial 
reform, greatly increased the local populace’s confidence in the Philippine government. 
The research of Kerkvliet shows that by 1952 government forces were able to cause 
greater damage to the Huk movement, while simultaneously reducing the mistreatment of 
peasants by government forces.121 
The Huk movement initially had a significant advantage in the prerequisite 
for a successful insurgency, weakness in the authority, due to wide-spread government 
corruption, mistreatment of the peasants, poor economy, and a military that was poorly 
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led and organized to combat an insurgency. The appointment of Magsaysay as the 
Secretary of National Defense in September 1950 was the beginning of the end for the 
Huk movement. The Huks proved to be unable to deter the positive influence of 
Magsaysay on the government, constabulary, military, and most importantly the 
populace. By 1954 Magsaysay had improved the government and military to the point 
that the perception was that both had greatly improved. This was coupled with the fact 
that the tide had significantly turned on the Huk movement militarily. Therefore, by 
1954, this prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage for the Huks.  
 d. Geographic Conditions 
The Philippines is comprised of an archipelago of 7,100 islands with 
ninety percent of the land area concentrated on eleven islands. Luzon, Mindanao, and 
Palawan are three islands with the greatest concentration of populace. These islands as 
well as numerous smaller islands are all prone to earthquakes. The larger islands of the 
Philippines consist of largely mountainous terrain. This has created narrow coastal plains 
and interior valleys and plains. The Central Plain of Luzon is one of the largest 
contiguous lowland areas in the Philippines, stretching over 100 miles from Manila to the 
Lingayen Gulf, and averaging 40 miles in width.122  
Sanctuary, external support, resupply, and communications were all 
limited by the geography of the area of operations of the Huk movement. The ability of 
the Huks to establish sanctuaries was limited in the Central Plains of Luzon, because the 
geography was generally wide open and lacked adequate forests or dense jungles in 
which the Huks could easily seek refuge. External support was limited by the fact that the 
Huk movement lacked access to ports. Internal resupply of the Huk movement from the 
Central Plains of Luzon to the mountains would be severely limited when 
counterinsurgency forces effectively blocked these routes. Finally, Robert R. Smith 
argues that the geography of the Philippines forced the Huk movement to set up a 
complicated and vulnerable clandestine communications system.123 Dependence on this 
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vulnerable system of couriers was to greatly affect the information advantage the Huks 
retained until October 1950.  
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a 
significant disadvantage for the Huk movement throughout the insurgency. Initially the 
government was too disorganized and ineffective to take advantage of this, but by 1954, 
with the improvement in government counterinsurgency efforts, this disadvantage was to 
become a major factor in the defeat of the Huk movement.  
 e. External Support 
There is no evidence that the Huk movement received any significant 
external support. It is believed that Communist China may have provided one or two 
military advisors for a short period, but no significant material was forwarded in support 
of the insurgency by the Chinese. China did smuggle in a significant amount of printed 
propaganda in support of the Huk. It is also reported that the Chinese Communist Party of 
the Philippines may have distributed as much as $200,000 from China to the Huks.124  
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external support, was a 
significant disadvantage for the Huk movement throughout the insurgency. This 
significant disadvantage did not greatly impact the Huk movement until the effectiveness 
of the Philippine government and military began to improve.  
 f. Information Advantage 
The Huks were victims of a disinformation campaign that may have set 
the stage for the insurgency. The USAFFE guerilla organizations, which had taken little 
active action against the Japanese occupation, had fed negative intelligence estimates 
reference the Huks since 1943 to the U.S. Pacific Command. The landlords and political 
elites in Central Luzon were also enemies of the Huks. Most of the landlords and political 
elites did not actively resist the Japanese occupation as the Huks had. Worse most of 
these landowners and political elites had collaborated with the Japanese. With the 
liberation of the Philippines by U.S. forces these same landowners and political elites 
quickly switched their support and were not punished. The fact that these collaborators 
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were now essentially in control of rebuilding the Philippine government created friction 
between the Huks and the Philippine government.  
The objectives and targets of Huk propaganda campaigns were to vary 
during the insurgency. According to Molnar, common Huk propaganda themes included: 
land reform; corruption and injustice of the federal government; and charges of U.S. 
imperialism and colonialism. All of these propaganda themes were very effective among 
the Philippine populace, except the anti-U.S. themes.125 The capture in 1952 of the 
American Communist, William Pomeroy, the Huk propaganda chief, was a coup for 
counterinsurgency forces, and severely hampered all future Huk propaganda campaigns.  
Effective propaganda targeted at the recruitment to the cause of the Huks 
was limited to the Pampango-speaking areas. Though the Philippines is ethnically 
homogenous there are at least eight major lingual groups and there are other variations in 
social customs, traits and attitudes. Lachica believes that this could explain why Huk 
efforts to spread the rebellion to other areas of the Philippines were repeatedly met with 
failure.126 
The Huk movement had excellent information on the Philippine 
government and counterinsurgency efforts, but the historian Smith argues that the 
adequacy of the Huk collection system was most likely overestimated by 
counterinsurgent forces.127 The Huk movement transmitted information primarily by 
courier systems. Kerkvliet, argues that during the insurgency the Huks never had enough 
couriers to make their communications system as effective as desired.128 The 
vulnerability of this courier system was to be exposed in October 1950. The information 
advantage shifted to Magsaysay’s counterinsurgent forces on 18 October 1950 with the 
capture of the entire Politburo operating inside Manila. A Huk informant had identified 
the communist apparatus to the counterinsurgency forces. The loss of the entire Politburo 
operating inside Manila deprived the Huk movement the critical ability to communicate 
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with its urban supporters in Manila. Documents which described in detail how the Huk 
organization was managed and operated were captured. Worse, personnel records 
including complete rosters of active members, sympathizers, and other passive supporters 
were captured. Unable to communicate with their urban supporters the Huk movement 
quickly lost the initiative. The lack of information was to result in the Huk leadership 
becoming isolated in the mountains.  
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information advantage, was a 
significant advantage for the Huk movement until the 18 October 1950 capture of the 
entire Politburo operating inside Manila. The capture of this cell, with a significant 
amount of personnel and organizational information, resulted in a significant loss of 
morale within the Huk movement.  More importantly the Huk movement had lost their 
significant advantage in information in Central Luzon. With the identification of the 
vulnerability of their courier system of communications and the resultant loss of initiative 
by the Huk movement, this prerequisite was now a significant disadvantage for the Huks.  
5. Conclusion 
The Huk insurgency was almost successful. A corrupt and ineffective Philippine 
government enabled the Huk movement to grow and gain support. The Huk movement’s 
defeat in 1954 stemmed from several factors rather than any one cause.  Two of these 
factors the Huks had little or no control over: (1) the improved morale, efficiency, and 
capability of the Philippine government and security forces after September 1950 due to 
the appointment of Magsaysay; and (2) American financial aid in support of Magsaysay’s 
social and civic policies aimed at defeating the insurgency.  
There were numerous factors that the Huk movement had control over: (1) greatly 
reducing the support of their mass base of support in Central Luzon by resorting to 
needless violence and confiscating required supplies as the government’s 
counterinsurgency efforts became more effective; (2) failure to retain external support 
throughout the insurgency; (3) an over-dependence on a vulnerable courier system of 
communication resulting in the loss of the information advantage; and (4) failure to 
effectively expand the struggle outside of Central Luzon.  
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Figure 9.   Philippines (Huk Rebellion)  Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency Chart 
 
Using a Likert scale to examine the Huk Rebellion against the prerequisites for a 
successful insurgency it becomes obvious that the Huks initially had four significant 
advantages: a cause to fight for, local populace support, weakness in the authority, and 
information advantage.  The Philippine government under the leadership of Magsaysay 
was able to set the conditions such that three prerequisites: local populace support, 
weakness in authority, and information advantage, were transformed to significant 
disadvantages by 1954. The Huk Rebellion also was unable to prevent the Philippine 
government from transforming the prerequisite, a cause to fight for, from a significant 
advantage to a limited disadvantage for the insurgency. The only reason that this 
prerequisite is not a significant disadvantage for the Huk movement is because the issues 
between landowners and peasants, though greatly reduced by policies under Magsaysay, 
were not completely solved. Two of the prerequisites – geographic conditions and 
external support – were both significant disadvantages for the Huk movement throughout 
the insurgency.   
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Figure 10.   Malaya (1948-1960) 
(From Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume I The Experience in Asia by 
D. M. Condit, 1967 440.) 
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D.  MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948-1960) 
1. Background 
Following the Japanese occupation of Malaya, 1942-1945, the British established 
the semiautonomous Federation of Malaya in 1948 in response to a growing nationalist 
movement. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), sensing weakness and a lack of will 
in the British, opted to commence armed conflict against the British and took to the 
jungles. Britain declared a state of emergency on 18 June 1948 in order to quell the 
communist insurgency. The conflict was to last until 1960. Initially called the “Anti-
Bandit Campaign,” the Malayan Emergency was a contest of wills with the MCP, with its 
predominantly ethnic Chinese communist membership on one side and the Malayan 
government, British, and Commonwealth forces on the other side.   
Insurgent Forces
MCP Malayan Communist Party 
MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
MPABA Malayan People’s Anti-British Army
MPLA Malayan People’s Liberation Army
MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army
Counterinsurgent Forces
Government of Malaya
British 
Commonwealth{The numerous name changes of the military arm of the MCP in 
chronological order
 
Figure 11.   Malayan Emergency Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Forces 
During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the MCP formed guerrilla units called 
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which were trained and equipped 
by the British.  The MPAJA was to have very little effect on the Japanese occupation 
forces, opting instead to focus most of their efforts on eliminating political rivals. The 
scholar Bert H. Cooper argues that though having little effect on the Japanese occupation, 
“the MCP took full advantage of the opportunities afforded by the war to emerge in 
Malayan Chinese eyes as the liberator of the country.”129 
The rapid recovery of the Malayan economy after World War II, largely due to its 
abundant resources which were in high demand globally, created a situation where the 
MCP was losing all the prestige and influence it had gained immediately after the 
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occupation. Cooper posits that the communists realized that Malaya’s prosperous 
peacetime society was destroying the MCP’s cohesion and revolutionary élan.130  
With the country of Malaya recovering from the ravages of Japanese occupation, 
the British formed the Federation of Malaya in February 1948. The Federation of Malaya 
was dominated by the Malay ethnic portion of the populace. The Chinese minority felt 
that they were discriminated against in the areas of land ownership, citizenship, and 
political representation. To the MCP, the establishment of the Malay-dominated 
Federation was another indication of the wider British strategy of containing 
communism.   
 The General Secretary of the MCP, Chen Peng, in 1948, estimated that the 
British were in a weak position. He based this assumption on the fact that the British 
economy was weak, the withdrawal of Britain from India, and the fact that the British 
public was war weary. The scholar Larry E. Cable argues that what Peng failed to 
understand was that Malaya’s natural resources, especially rubber and tin, were critical 
sources of revenue for the British.131 Bert H. Cooper confirms the importance of 
Malaya’s resources when he wrote, “Malaya’s rich rubber plantations and tin mines 
produced almost half the world output of rubber and around one-third of the world’s tin, 
paying for the country’s imports of food and manufactured goods.”132  
With a rapidly expanding Malayan economy eroding the MCP’s cohesion and 
revolutionary élan, the establishment of the Malay-dominated Federation as part of the 
British wider strategy of containing communism, and believing that the British were in a 
weak position, Chen Peng decided that armed conflict was the only way to bring the 
communist revolution to Malaya. 
2. Insurgency Strategy 
In December 1945, the MPAJA avoided total disarmament by the British by 
pretending to demobilize. The MPAJA in preparation for anticipated future operations 
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had maintained personnel rosters and hidden supplies. The MPAJA also maintained a 
functioning shadow organization that could be activated when the conditions were right.  
The MCP’s strategy was to use protracted insurgent warfare to defeat the will of 
the British to maintain control of Malaya. The counterinsurgency expert Julian Paget 
argues that the MCP’s campaign was based on three phases: (1) organize an insurgent 
movement to paralyze Malaya’s economy and tie down and demoralize the Malayan 
security forces; (2) establish communist controlled “liberated areas” from which 
communist forces could operate during the final phase of the campaign; and (3) create a 
“liberation army” as the populace rallied to their cause and defeat the British.133 The 
MCP had very limited success in the first phase and completely failed to reach the 
subsequent phases of the campaign.  
At the tactical level, the communists’ operations were based on terror: 
assassination, kidnapping, blackmail, sniping, intimidation, threats, arson, and sabotage.  
The communists utilized primarily hit-and-run attacks, focusing on softer targets such as 
the rubber plantations, mines, or isolated police stations.   
In the spring of 1948 the newly established Malayan People’s Anti-British Army 
(MPABA) executed a campaign of terror against mines and rubber plantations. Following 
the assassination of three British rubber planters at Sungai Siput, Perak on June 16, 1948; 
British authorities proclaimed a state of emergency on June 17, 1948 in order to deal with 
the communist insurgency. This forced the MCP to return to the jungle and reorganize for 
insurgent warfare. The MPABA changed its name first to the Malayan People’s 
Liberation Army (MPLA), and then later the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). 
The MRLA and the Min Chung Yuen Thong (Min Yuen), the civilian support element, 
was the MCP’s guerrilla army. The MRLA never exceeded 6,000 in strength, and the Min 
Yuen estimated strength ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 active participants throughout the 
conflict.134  
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According to scholar James E. Dougherty, with populace support declining the 
MCP issued a directive dated October 1, 1951 which  
ordered all members to desist from the following practices: seizing 
identity and ration cards, burning new villages, attacking post offices, 
reservoirs, and other public facilities, derailing civilian trains, burning 
religious buildings and Red Cross vehicles, and committing sabotage 
against the major industries, thereby causing workers to lose their jobs.135 
The MCP had concluded that their use of indiscriminate terror was no longer effective. 
The MCP shifted tactics to a more discriminate use of terror aimed primarily at British 
military forces and facilities.  
 Unable to create a united front including the Malays and Chinese, the MCP in 
1955 offered to make a negotiated peace with the British. The British insisted on the 
unconditional surrender of all guerrillas and only offered to pardon individual guerrillas. 
There would be no amnesty offered to the MCP as a whole. Finding the terms 
unacceptable Chen Peng sought sanctuary along the Malaya-Thailand border.  
3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
The British counterinsurgency strategy developed in three phases. The first was 
the conventional phase, 1949 to June 1950. The second phase was the Briggs Plan, June 
1950 to 1960. The third phase was the transition to independence. 
The British discovered in 1949 that the combination of jungle and mountainous 
terrain in Malaya made quick deployment of large bodies of troops to remote locations 
impossible. The initial attempt to use a strategy of conventional warfare against the MCP 
had little effect on the insurgent’s strategy.  
In April 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of 
Operations for Malaya, with operational control over all civil and military forces in 
Malaya. Scholar Robert B. Asprey argues that Briggs “recognized that the key to the 
situation lay in winning support of the civil population or at least in depriving the 
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guerrillas of that support.”136 On June 1, 1950, he implemented what was to become the 
“Briggs Plan.” The four principles of the Briggs Plan were: (1) separation of the 
insurgents from the populace; (2) unity of effort; (3) quality intelligence; and (4) small 
unit operations.  
In order to separate the insurgent from its populace support, Briggs ordered the 
relocation and resettlement of almost 500,000 Chinese squatters from along the fringes of 
the jungle to one of the 400 “New Villages.”  Security of the “New Villages” was 
initially provided by the government, and then transitioned to a Home Guard made up of 
residents of the “New Village.” The Home Guard encouraged active participation of the 
populace in the counterinsurgency efforts.  
In February 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner 
and Director of Operations in Malaya thus ensuring unity of effort between the civic and 
military commands. By this point the Briggs Plan had established enough security with 
Malaya that Templer could focus on dismantling the MCP as an organization. At this 
point British forces now took the fight to the communists strongholds in the jungles with 
some success. Templer also instituted the establishment of White Areas. Once it was 
determined within a Malayan district that communist forces had been destroyed and the 
MCP effectively undermined politically, the district was designated a White Area and all 
Emergency restrictions were lifted. If the MCP were to become effective in a White Area 
all Emergency restrictions would be immediately put back into effect. In a testament to 
the success of this program, not one of the White Areas returned to Emergency 
restrictions. In 1960, with Chen Peng hiding along the Malaya-Thailand border and the 
last two districts in northern Malaya declared White Areas, thus ended the Malayan 
Emergency.   
4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
a.  A Cause to Fight For 
The MCP attempted to rally the local populace to two causes: (1) 
independence from colonial rule; and (2) Chinese minority grievances. The first cause, 
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independence from colonial rule, was an attempt to win over the majority of the populace 
which was Malay. The MCP was unable to effectively gain the support of the populace 
for this nationalist anti-British cause, since the British were working with the Malayan 
government to gain their independence. The second cause, Chinese minority grievances, 
appealed to the Chinese segment of the populace, but had no hope of rallying the Malays 
to join the MCP’s fight. This cause was effectively addressed by the Malayan 
government and the British, when the basic grievances of the Chinese minority, land 
ownership and representation within government, were dealt with to the general 
satisfaction of the Chinese populace. 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, was a 
significant disadvantage for the MCP from the very beginning of the Malayan 
Emergency. The communists were depending on exploiting a nationalist anti-British 
sentiment among the Malays, which was not there. And the British and Malayan 
government prevented the MCP from exploiting the basic grievances of the Chinese 
minority by dealing with the issues in a systematic approach that satisfied the Chinese 
minority.  
b. Local Populace Support 
The population was approximately 5.3 million at the start of the 
Emergency in 1948. The ethnic breakdown of Malaya was 49 percent Malay, 38 percent 
Chinese, 11 percent Indian and Ceylonese, and slightly more than 1 percent aboriginal 
tribesmen. There were also 12,000 European expatriates working mostly as rubber 
plantation owners or tin mine managers. Counterinsurgency expert John A. Nagl has 
identified that the Malayan army and police force was led by British officers and 
populated almost entirely by Malay persons.137 The scholar Cooper also identified the 
interesting dynamic that the Chinese populace concentration in the urban areas of Malaya 
was so great that they outnumbered the dominant Malay populace in urban areas.138 
The MCP failed to win the support of the populace for several reasons. 
First, the MCP was seen as primarily a Chinese movement. Second, the communists                                                  
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failed to understand that the Malays were not discontent with British rule. Third, the 
MCP alienated the populace with their policy of trying to bring the Malayan economy to 
a halt. This policy only served to increase unemployment because of the assassinations or 
destroyed critical infrastructure. Fourth, the political solution offered by the MCP was a 
communist state, which had no appeal to the general populace.   
Because the MCP was seen as a communist Chinese movement, it 
alienated itself from the other ethnic groups, which greatly impacted recruitment. Though 
the MCP was predominantly a Chinese movement, it never received the support of the 
majority of the Malayan Chinese. Ethnic divisions within Malaya prevented the MCP 
from gaining local populace support. Members of the MCP were predominantly Chinese, 
a significant minority in Malaya. Efforts by the MCP to reach out to other parties for 
support were completely ineffective. 
Because of the global demand for its resources, especially tin and rubber, 
Malaya was able to recover from World War II more rapidly than most countries. Bert H. 
Cooper argues that by 1948 the postwar economic difficulties, such as food shortages, 
inflation, and the black market, were settled; and, the populace of Malaya actually 
enjoyed one of the highest living standards in Asia. This economic improvement severely 
hampered MCP recruitment efforts.139 The initial policy of the MCP to target the 
economy of Malaya was to have a detrimental effect on the populace. Because of lost 
jobs or wages due to MCP terrorist actions populace support was lost.  
The resettlement of approximately 500,000 Chinese squatters effectively 
separated the MCP from current and future supporters. The Chinese squatters who lived 
on the edges of the jungle supplied food. Relocation of the squatters greatly impacted the 
communists’ ability to resupply and to gain critical information required to retain the 
initiative. Because of this the communists had to attempt to grow their own food, which 
required manpower, and was susceptible to discovery and destruction by British forces.  
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Thus, the communists were effectively separated from the populace and in the words of 
the scholar Anthony Crockett, their “logistic problem was infinitesimal compared to that 
of British troops.”140 
The MCP initially had a limited advantage in the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, local populace support, primarily due to their ability to return to 
the organization that they had developed during the Japanese occupation and the 
accessibility of the Chinese squatter populace. By 1955, primarily due to the Briggs Plan, 
this prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage for the MCP. 
 c. Weakness in the Authority 
The MCP initially had a limited advantage in the prerequisite for a successful 
insurgency, weakness in the authority, due to the disorganized government of the 
Federation, and the British attempt to fight the insurgents conventionally. Because of the 
successful implementation of the Briggs Plan and Templar’s White Areas, this 
prerequisite was a significant disadvantage for the MCP by 1955.  
 d. Geographic Conditions 
Malaya is a peninsula of approximately 50,500 square miles, which is 
slightly larger than the state of New Mexico. Sharing its only land border to the north 
with Thailand, Malaya was essentially an island state. In 1948, 80 percent of the territory 
of Malaya was uncultivated jungle, forest, and swamp.141 Running north to south the 
length of the interior of the peninsula are mountain ranges reaching heights up to 7,000 
feet.  
The relative smallness of Malaya enabled the British to isolate the country. 
The British navy was able to isolate Malaya on three sides by controlling the Malayan 
coast, and the Government of Thailand closed the fourth side. Though the communist 
forces could operate near the border of Thailand, the government of Thailand was not 
receptive to communist forces entering their territory.  
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The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a 
significant disadvantage for the MCP throughout the insurgency. The isolation caused by 
geographic conditions and the efforts of the British forces ensured that external support 
would be extremely difficult.      
 e. External Support 
The Malayan communists received little external support. It is believed 
that Chinese officers arrived in early 1950, but did not stay long. With Thailand forming 
the only land border and not supporting the MCP’s cause, the Malayan communist forces 
had no sanctuary. With no secure base outside Malaya the MCP was unable to safely 
reorganize, resupply, or train. International political support for the MCP’s insurgency, 
also did not exist. The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external support, was a 
significant disadvantage for the MCP throughout the insurgency.  
 f. Information Advantage 
Due to a lack of radios, the communist forces primarily depended upon a 
system of couriers for transmitting information. This courier system proved to be 
cumbersome, slow, vulnerable, and generally unsuccessful. Because of counterinsurgent 
efforts, by 1951, a message could take up to a year to deliver.  
According to Bert H. Cooper, in order to compensate for the lack of 
effective communications, the MCP adopted a quota system for assigning military 
operations. Once a year, the MCP Politburo would establish quotas for each type of 
military operation to be executed throughout Malaya over the next year. Based on the 
overall quotas for Malaya, quotas were then assigned to each state and district. Though 
the quota system did enable the MCP to continue insurgent operations for over a decade, 
it proved to be inefficient. Over time, communist commanders began to focus on 
overfilling the easier military operations, in order to compensate for failing to execute the 
more dangerous military operations. Also, under this system each communist commander 
was able to pick and schedule the operation of his choosing. Though this decentralized 
military operation quota system helped overcome the MCP’s inefficient communications, 
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it also ensured that the MCP was unable to synchronize, mass, or sustain its operations to 
create more effective long-term damage on the counterinsurgency forces.142  
The MCP initially focused all of their psychological operations on the 
Chinese minority. Realizing that they needed a united front consisting of all the ethnic 
groups in order to have a chance at success, the MCP attempted to expand their 
psychological operations to target the Malays and Indians. Overall the MCP’s 
psychological operations added little value to reinforcing or expanding the insurgency.  
The impact of the resettlement program, the improved ability of the Police 
Special Branch to infiltrate Chinese squatter communities, and effective British 
psychological operations aimed at encouraging insurgents to surrender, was disastrous for 
the MCP. The resettlement of approximately 500,000 Chinese squatters from along the 
jungle fringes effectively took the initiative away from the MCP. By separating the 
populace from the MCP the British were able to severely hamper the communists’ ability 
to gather intelligence and transmit information.  
According to the scholar Robert W. Komer, the Police Special Branch’s 
ability to penetrate the Chinese squatter communities and gather intelligence was critical 
to counterinsurgent operations. The Police Special Branch’s local knowledge and 
continuity enabled the government to build an intelligence file on almost every insurgent. 
Information programs by the Malayan and British governments were utilized effectively 
to inform the Malayan people on policies and programs.143        
The British executed a psychological operations campaign to urge 
defection of individual guerrillas. The British program utilizing the “voice aircraft” was 
credited with much of the success of the defection program. In 1953, more than 350 
defectors were reported.144  
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The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information advantage, was a 
significant advantage for the MCP initially. The MCP had well established 
communication networks that they had developed during the Japanese occupation. But, 
with the implementation of the Briggs Plan and the resettlement of the Chinese squatters, 
the communists quickly lost the information advantage and the ability to retain the 
initiative. By 1955, this prerequisite was a significant disadvantage for the MCP.  
5. Conclusion 
The MCP’s defeat by 1960 was due to several factors: (1) the MCP never 
developed a viable cause that would gain not only the popular support of the Chinese 
minority, but the other ethnic groups; (2) failure to retain external support throughout the 
insurgency; (3) an over-dependence on a vulnerable courier system of communication 
resulting in the loss of the information advantage and the initiative; and (4) failure to 
effectively counter both the Briggs Plan and Templar’s White Areas.   
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Figure 12.   Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency 
Chart 
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Using a Likert scale to examine the Malayan Emergency against the prerequisites 
for a successful insurgency it becomes obvious that the communists initially had only one 
significant advantage, an information advantage.  The communists also had a limited 
advantage in two prerequisites: local populace support and weakness in the authority. It is 
important to note that the communists also had three significant disadvantages at the start 
of this insurgency: a cause to fight for, geographic conditions, and external support. 
Primarily due to the Briggs Plan and Templar’s White Areas, all prerequisites for a 
successful insurgency were determined to be significant disadvantages by 1955. 
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Figure 13.   Kenya, Showing the Mau Mau Affected Area (1952-1960) 
(From State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau by Fred Majdalany, 1963, 2.)
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E.  KENYA EMERGENCY (1952-1960) 
1. Background 
Referred to as the Kenya Emergency by the British this conflict is also referred to 
as the Mau Mau Rebellion or Mau Mau Revolt. The Kenya Emergency was an 
insurgency initiated by Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu tribesman, against the British colonial 
power from 1952 to 1960. The core of support for the insurgency was formed from the 
Kikuyu tribe, which according to the historian Michael Carver, “was the largest and the 
most intelligent and industrious tribe and they occupied the key central area running 
north from Nairobi for about a hundred miles on the eastern side of the Aberdare 
Mountains.”145 The figure below lists the major political and military insurgent and 
counterinsurgent forces involved in the Kenya Emergency.  
Insurgent Forces
KCA Kikuyu Central Association
KAU Kenya African Union
Mau Mau
Counterinsurgent Forces
Colonial Government of Kenya
British 
Home Guard
Psuedo-gangs
 
Figure 14.   Kenya Emergency Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Forces 
Several issues led to the emergence of rebellion in Kenya among the indigenous 
populace toward the British colonial government. The primary issues were economic, 
social, education, religious beliefs and practices, friction between European settlers and 
the indigenous populace, and land. The issue of land was to have the greatest influence 
on the rebellion. At the heart of the land issue was the inequities created between the 
European settlers and the indigenous populace by the colonial government’s concepts of 
land ownership and farming practices. 
Before World War I there was virtually no political activity in Kenya. The 
Kenyan political conscience manifested itself in Nairobi shortly after the end of World 
War I in the form of two opposing groups. The first African group was opposed to the 
colonial system and organized to agitate about wages. The second African group was 
prepared to work within the colonial system in order to protect African rights in the 
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country areas. The British naturally supported this more responsible group, and the first 
group collapsed and a few years later was replaced by the Kikuyu Central Association 
(KCA) in 1924. According to the counterinsurgency expert Frank Kitson, the KCA 
combined the ideas of opposition of the colonial system and the ancient culture of the 
Kikuyu tribe.146 The KCA was banned and forced underground by the colonial 
government in 1940, and in 1945 a new nationalist organization, the Kenya African 
Union (KAU), formed from the remains of the KCA. Michael Carver argues that the 
KAU was a legal political organization that was completely infiltrated by ex-members of 
the banned KCA organization.147  
Jomo Kenyatta, who returned from England in 1946, was elected president of the 
KAU in 1947. In February 1951, extremists seized control from the moderates of the 
KAU by rigging the election. The KAU then focused on the critical logistics of an 
insurgency: obtaining arms and recruiting supporters for their cause. By 1952, almost the 
entire Kikuyu tribe supported outright opposition of the British colonial government in 
order to expel Europeans and Asians from Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta was arrested by the 
colonial government on charges of organizing the Mau Mau in October 1952. Sentenced 
on 8 April 1953 he remained in prison until 1959. Whether Jomo Kenyatta was 
responsible for organizing the Mau Mau is still disputed, but there is no doubt that his 
arrest and imprisonment added to the violence of the conflict.  
On 6 October 1952, Sir Evelyn Baring assumed the post of Governor. He quickly 
assessed that the British faced a serious threat from the Mau Mau. This assessment was 
confirmed by the assassination of the respected senior Kikuyu Chief Warukiu on 9 
October 1952. Chief Warukiu had recently criticized the Mau Mau’s violence against the 
colonial government. On 20 October 1952 Governor Baring declared a state of 
emergency in Kenya, and the British government sent more troops to Kenya to help fight 
the Mau Mau.  
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2. Insurgency Strategy 
In 1948 British and local authorities began to hear reports reference the activities 
of a secret Kikuyu organization called the Mau Mau. The scholar D. M. Condit argues 
that though the British believed that the leaders of the KAU and the Mau Mau were one 
and the same, in August 1950, the government declared that only the Mau Mau 
organization, not the KAU, was illegal.148 The Mau Mau organization was not a 
communist movement. In the words of Robert B. Asprey, this movement “fed on a weird 
admixture of religious-tribal cultism while performing violent deeds particularly 
abhorrent to the Western world.”149 The movement operated primarily through two 
organizations: the KAU and the Mau Mau. According to Michael Carver, the Mau Mau 
“was the strong-arm paramilitary organization, combining the functions both of warrior 
and witch-doctor.”150  
The Mau Mau insurgents never publicly defined their aims. It is believed that 
their important aims were to recover Kikuyu land stolen by the Europeans, obtain self-
government, destroy Christianity and restore ancient customs, and drive out or subjugate 
all foreigners from Kenya. There is also very little certainty about what the Mau Mau 
leaders’ planned insurgency strategy really was. It is generally accepted that the strategic 
intent of the Mau Mau leaders was to utilize either outright violence or civil disobedience 
as the means for achieving African supremacy.       
The traditional Kikuyu practice of oathing, the taking of verbal oaths of loyalty to 
a cause or religion, was exploited by the Mau Mau organization. According to Frank 
Kitson, the Mau Mau were able to use oathing to unite followers and gain popular  
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support.151 The Mau Mau, in the words of Kitson, “having summoned a supernatural 
power the people taking the oath would swear to unite together in their efforts to promote 
their cause.”152 
3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
At the start of the Kenya Emergency, the British colonial government was 
unprepared to fight an insurgency. The British, actively engaged with the Malayan 
Emergency, considered Kenya a sideshow, limited in scope and duration. Unlike the 
insurgency in Malaya, which impacted the entire peninsula, the Kenya insurgency was 
confined to a small area of approximately two thousand square miles. While the state of 
emergency lasted for just under eight years, the historian Charles Allen argues that the 
counterinsurgency fighting was essentially three years followed by a fourth year of 
mopping up.153  
The scholar Anthony Clayton argues that it is evident that from the start of the 
emergency both the government and the military agreed upon one thing, that the “Mau 
Mau had to be suppressed; political negotiations were totally inconceivable.”154 
According to D. M. Condit, the British counterinsurgency strategy in Kenya sought to 
achieve four objectives: (1) regain and control Mau Mau controlled areas; (2) pacify and 
control the local populace, especially the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu; (3) rehabilitate 
known and suspected Mau Mau, including hardcore members; and (4) institute political 
and economical reforms setting the conditions for settlement of outstanding issues.155   
The government’s initial reaction to the Mau Mau insurgency was largely 
political and police enforcement in nature. The Mau Mau organization was declared 
illegal in August 1950 and several persons were arrested and tried for being members. 
Believing that Kenyatta was the leader of the Mau Mau the government tried and 
                                                 
151 Kitson, Bunch of Five, 7-9. 
152 Kitson, Bunch of Five, 8. 
153 Charles Allen, The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989 (Great Britain: Michael 
Joseph, Ltd., 1990), 125. 
154 Anthony Clayton, Counter-insurgency in Kenya 1952-60: A Study of Military Operations against 
the Mau-Mau (Nairobi: Kenya Litho Ltd, 1976), 1. 
155 Condit, “Kenya (1952-1960),” 288. 
  89
convicted him in early 1953. Kenyatta spent the entire emergency imprisoned. Many 
argue that what ever Kenyatta’s motives or role in the insurgency had been prior to 
October 1952, his imprisonment rendered him unable to control events after that date. 
The escalation in violence by the Mau Mau after this date may have been due to 
Kenyatta’s imprisonment. The Mau Mau continued to gain influence and grow in 
numbers and now there were no respected leaders that could moderate the Mau Mau 
organization’s leanings toward violence. This and numerous other governmental short-
falls and missteps resulted in the British not having the initiative at the outset of the 
Kenya Emergency on 20 October 1952.  
In June 1953 General Sir George Erskine arrived and took up the post of 
commander of the newly organized East Africa Command. This new command reported 
directly to England. Erskine was to hold this position until May 1955. Eskine during this 
time was to plan and execute several operations that were to lead to the defeat of the Mau 
Mau. 
Operation Anvil commenced on 24 April 1954 and was executed to bring the city 
of Nairobi back under government control. Mau Mau informants were used extensively 
through out this operation and within two weeks, some 28,000 persons, almost half of 
Nairobi’s populace, had been screened. The information gathered during this operation 
enabled the British to finally understand the organizational structure of the Mau Mau in 
both the forests and Nairobi. Also, the passive wing of the Mau Mau was effectively 
disrupted, and thanks to gathered information, counterinsurgency forces could now 
prevent the reorganization of the passive wing. D. M. Condit argues that at this point the 
British had essentially cut off the majority of support to the Mau Mau organization 
operating in the reserves.156  
In mid-1953, in an attempt to regain control of the reserves from the Mau Mau, 
General Sir George Erskine designated the Kikuyu reserves "special areas." This 
designation enabled security forces to shoot anyone that failed to halt when challenged. 
The forests were then declared "prohibited areas;" any person found within these areas 
without proper clearance could be shot on sight. In late 1953 Operation Blitz used                                                  
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counterinsurgency forces to sweep the Aberdare forest. Such large military operations 
proved to be ineffective at finding, trapping and killing the Mau Mau in the forests. In 
June 1954, the British government began a policy of resettlement of the Kikuyu populace 
into villages. This policy of “villagization” enabled the government to simultaneously 
protect government supporters and to more effectively limit support to the Mau Mau. In 
January 1954 Operation Hammer, a large sweep operation of the forests of the Aberdare 
Mountains, netted few insurgents. Moving the operation to the Mount Kenya area, 
counterinsurgency forces were able to capture numerous Mau Mau and killed twenty-four 
of fifty-one of the Mau Mau leaders. Operation Hungerstrike, a food denial operation was 
conducted in mid-1955. This operation proved to be much more effective at disrupting 
the Mau Mau organization than the large military sweeps.  
Ex-Mau Mau and allied Africans were used by the colonial government to create 
pseudo-gangs. Pseudo-gangs were primarily composed of de-oathed and turned Kikuyu 
tribesmen. Several of the pseudo-gangs were actually led by white British officers. These 
units enabled the British to effectively infiltrate the Mau Mau organization. By the end of 
1955, twenty-four out of the fifty-one principal terrorist leaders of the Mau Mau were 
killed, most by pseudo-gang operations.157 The use of pseudo-gangs proved to be a 
highly successful strategy for the British.  
In an effort to use a carrot-and-stick approach, the government in 1955 declared 
an amnesty, which absolved Home Guard members from prosecution and gave members 
of the Mau Mau an opportunity to surrender. On 20 May 1955 the last peace talks with 
the Mau Mau were deemed unsuccessful.  Counterinsurgency forces executed offensive 
operations using pseudo-gangs against a demoralized Mau Mau organization that was 
extremely low on supplies, especially weapons and ammunition. It is estimated that only 
500 rebels remained by September 1956. The last Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, was 
wounded and captured by Kikuyu Tribal Police on 21 October 1956 in Nyeri, and was 
subsequently hanged in early 1957. Though the capture of Dedan Kimathi marked the  
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effective end of the Mau Mau Rebellion, the state of emergency in Kenya remained in 
effect until January 1960, and several die-hard Mau Mau members remained in the 
forests until 1963. 
4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
a.  A Cause to Fight For 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, was 
initially a significant advantage for the Mau Mau. The Mau Mau successfully combined 
oathing and the land issue to develop an issue that would drive the insurgency. D. M. 
Condit argues that this cause was credible to the Kikuyu because even within the Kikuyu 
reserve, “the Kikuyu felt insecure, for unlike the Europeans they held no legal titles, and 
they feared further encroachment.”158 Furthermore, many of the Kikuyu believed that the 
return of their land would automatically solve their economic problems. Wunyabari O. 
Maloba, an expert on the Mau Mau, argues that the colonial government’s program of 
rehabilitation of captured Mau Mau was essential to undermining the Mau Mau.159 This 
program, coupled with political, economic and social promises made by the colonial 
government, effectively reduced this prerequisite to a significant disadvantage for the 
Mau Mau by 1955.  
 b. Local Populace Support 
The populace of Kenya at the time of the Kenya Emergency was 
approximately eight and one quarter million people,160 and was divided among forty to 
eighty tribes depending on the criteria used.161 According to D. M. Condit, of these tribes 
the Kikuyu was the largest tribe and considered to be the most advanced in Kenya.162 
The combination of the imprisonment of Kenyatta in April 1953 and counterinsurgency 
operations by the government, created a feeling of desperation in the Central Province, 
the White Highlands, Nairobi, and other areas with high concentrations of Kikuyu 
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tribesmen. Wunyabari O. Maloba posits that the Mau Mau effectively exploited the 
resultant fear, panic, and anger among the Kikuyu tribe in order to set the conditions for a 
violent and open revolt against the colonial government.163 These conditions, combined 
with the efforts of the Mau Mau organization’s passive wing, and the exploitation of 
oathing, resulted in the Mau Mau having a significant advantage in the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, local populace support.  
According to D. M. Condit, the passive wing of the Mau Mau 
organization, estimated to have involved 30,000 active members, is credited with much 
of the organization’s initial strategic success. The passive wing’s objective was to gain 
support, especially Kikuyu, for the Mau Mau movement. The passive wing supplemented 
the KAU’s political activities with propaganda, oathing ceremonies, fund collection, and 
acquiring weapons.164  
Initially oathing was used by the KAU to attract political supporters, but 
later oaths were used to coerce members to commit violence in the name of the cause. 
Frank Kitson argues that as the tribal elders worked to influence the members of their 
tribe to reject the violence encouraged by the KAU and Mau Mau organizations, the oath 
process was exploited by the KAU and Mau Mau to push members of the tribe outside of 
the influence of the tribal elders. 165  It is estimated that in October 1952, approximately 
twenty percent of the Kikuyu tribe were believed to have been oathed by the Mau Mau, 
and by 1953 it was believed that it had increased to seventy or eighty percent.166  
The Massacre at Lari by the Mau Mau and several successful 
counterinsurgency operations were to greatly affect the local populace support 
prerequisite for the Mau Mau organization. According to the Mau Mau expert Fred 
Majdalany, the massacre at Lari on 26 March 1953 “was the definitive horror by which 
every other act of Mau Mau would be measured.”167 The Mau Mau lost much of the 
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support of the local populace and the Kikuyu began to more freely offer information to 
the counterinsurgency forces. The Mau Mau had gone too far in their acts of violence. 
Another blow to the level of populace support to the Mau Mau was 
delivered by Operation Anvil in April 1953. Robert B. Asprey argues that though this 
operation was “criticized, particularly from liberal sources, as unduly harsh, it 
accomplished its mission: It broke up the Mau Mau support organization in Nairobi and 
Kiambu, which never recovered. It also eliminated a great deal of crime within the city, 
and, further, it yielded valuable intelligence.”168 It separated the populace from the Mau 
Mau organization.  
Though the Mau Mau initially had a significant advantage in the 
prerequisite for a successful insurgency, local populace support, primarily due to their 
cause, oathing, and counterinsurgency operations, by 1954, primarily due to the Massacre 
at Lari, and Operation Anvil, this prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage for 
the Mau Mau. 
 c. Weakness in the Authority 
The Mau Mau initially had a significant advantage in the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, weakness in the authority, due to the disorganization, 
ineffectiveness and lack of leadership within the colonial government of Kenya. The 
colonial government was determined to be weak, because though confronted with 
intelligence that the Mau Mau were a growing threat, the governors chose to disregard 
intelligence estimates. Initial assessments of the Mau Mau threat were not acted upon due 
to the inadequate governmental organization to access and react to this type of 
intelligence, and Sir Philip Mitchell, the governor until the summer of 1952, did not agree 
with these assessments. The leadership of Governor Baring in 1952 and the assignment of 
General Sir George Erskine as the commander of the East Africa Command in June 1953 
strengthened the colonial government and counterinsurgency forces so that this 
prerequisite quickly became a significant disadvantage for the Mau Mau by 1954.  
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d. Geographic Conditions 
Kenya is a fertile coastal country which lies directly on the equator and 
borders the Indian Ocean. Kenya measures approximately 30,000 square miles, ranging 
in elevation from sea level to 17,000 feet at the top of Mount Kenya. The terrain of 
Kenya consists of jungles, mountains, scrublands, and fertile farming lands and pastures. 
The capitol city, Nairobi, is situated in the center of the country. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Central Kenya, Mau Mau Affected Area, Showing Forest and Mountain 
Terrain Where Most Operations Took Place 
(From State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau by Fred Majdalany, 1963, 155.) 
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The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a 
significant advantage for the Mau Mau during the initial stages of the insurgency. It was 
determined the forests were safer than the reserves. The forests offered the hope of 
protection and food, and thus the ranks of the Mau Mau grew. The forests became the 
main base areas from which to organize and prepare operations against the government. 
The Mau Mau expert Maloba argues that the forest initially offered security such that it 
was a sanctuary from which they reorganized, trained, and prepared for operations.169 
This prerequisite was to become a significant disadvantage for the insurgency by mid-
1955. The fact that the Kenya insurgency was confined to a small in-land area of 
approximately two thousand square miles enabled the British to focus both their political 
and military efforts.  
 e. External Support 
The Mau Mau lacked any major external source of support. International 
political support for the Mau Mau insurgency also did not exist. With the British 
controlling the borders of Kenya, and little effort made by the Mau Mau to gain external 
support, the insurgency was forced to look internally for ammunition and arms. 
According to D. M. Condit, it is estimated that the Mau Mau were only able to acquire or 
manufacture one weapon for each nine men. The rest were forced to depend upon the 
panga, a machete-like weapon.170 The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external 
support, was a significant disadvantage for the Mau Mau throughout the insurgency.  
 f. Information Advantage 
Initially the prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information 
advantage, was a significant advantage for the Mau Mau. A lack of information on the 
Mau Mau movement was to frustrate the authority. The authority lacked a clear 
understanding of the Mau Mau organization and its goals. Unable to understand the Mau 
Mau movement initially the authority did not effectively impede the spread of the Mau 
Mau propaganda. This initial lack of intelligence was primarily due to an ambivalent 
governor, who failed to heed the warnings of his commissioner of police. According to 
D. M. Condit, in 1952, the commissioner of police for Kenya determined that “something 
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in the nature of a general revolt against European settlement and policy of Government 
has been planned, and … the plan has already begun to be put into effect.”171 This 
assessment was not acted upon due to the inadequate governmental organization to access 
and react to this type of intelligence, and Sir Philip Mitchell, the governor until the 
summer of 1952, did not agree with this assessment. When his replacement, Sir Evelyn 
Baring, took over in September 1952, it was not long before he realized that the 
government was facing an insurgency.   
The Mau Mau’s psychological operations campaign was key to controlling 
the populace through terror and was also critical to recruitment. This campaign was 
effective due to the volatile combination of politics, propaganda, and oathing.  
The Mau Mau wrote messages using an elaborate code and developed a 
postal system with hidden letter boxes which enabled their organization to effectively 
communicate with Kikuyu in Nairobi and the reserves. This system enabled the Mau Mau 
to initially have almost complete intelligence on British movements. Other than using 
terror to coerce the populace not to pass information to the government, the Mau Mau did 
little to decrease the information capabilities of the colonial government or 
counterinsurgency forces. D. M. Condit argues that an example is the fact that “telephone 
and telegraph wires, though highly vulnerable to sabotage, were seldom cut and then 
usually only in raids on a single home.”172  
Another information advantage for the Mau Mau was the language barrier. 
Very few white settlers spoke the Kikuyu language and interpreters were very limited. 
This made collecting information extremely difficult for the colonial counterinsurgency 
forces initially. This language barrier was to be mitigated by the by the pseudo-gangs and 
from the Home Guards, security forces for the Kikuyu villages. Information provided 
from these two sources was utilized to identify active supporters of the Mau Mau; thus, 
taking the initiative away from the Mau Mau.  
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The capture of Waruhiu Itote, a.k.a. General China, one of the major Mau 
Mau generals, on 15 January 1954 resulted in a decisive shift in the information 
advantage from the Mau Mau to the counterinsurgency forces. During interrogation 
General China revealed the location of his headquarters in Mount Kenya and more 
importantly he revealed the command structure of his forces which stretched from the 
reserve to Mount Kenya. He revealed the organizational structure of his forces and 
detailed information on the arms and ammunition situation of the Mau Mau. By mid-
1954, this prerequisite was a significant disadvantage for the Mau Mau. 
5. Conclusion 
D. M. Condit argues that the Mau Mau’s choice of open violence in opposition to 
the colonial government was illogical for the following reasons: (1) the inland 
geographical location of the Kikuyu tribe; (2) British control of Kenya’s borders; and (3) 
the lack of any major external source of support.173 Though the movement failed 
militarily, it is credited with creating the social unrest that further divided the white 
colonial settlers in Kenya and the British government that ultimately led to the 
independence of Kenya in 1963. Furthermore, many Africans, and the surviving Mau 
Mau believe that they forced the British timing of turning independence of Kenya over to 
the Kenyan populace. 
                                                 
173 Condit, “Kenya (1952-1960),” 280. 
  98
 
Information Advantage
External Support
Geographic Conditions
Weakness in the Authority
Local Populace Support
A Cause to Fight For 
Prerequisites for a 
successful insurgency Ini
tia
l
Fin
al
Significant Advantage
Limited Advantage
Limited Disadvantage
Significant Disadvantage
Legend
 
Figure 16.   Kenya Emergency (1952-1960) Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency 
Chart 
Using a Likert scale to examine the Kenya Emergency against the prerequisites 
for a successful insurgency, it is observed that the Mau Mau initially had a significant 
advantage in all prerequisites, except external support, which was a significant 
disadvantage for the Mau Mau. All the prerequisites for a successful insurgency were to 
be significant disadvantages for the Mau Mau by mid-1954.  
It is important to note that though the Mau Mau movement failed militarily many 
argue that they may have still won politically. Jomo Kenyatta would go on to become 
independent Kenya's first Prime Minister (1963–1964) and President (1964–1978). Once 
imprisoned by the colonial government under the suspicion of being the leader of the 
Mau Mau movement he is now considered the founding father of the Kenyan Nation.
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Figure 17.   Dhofar (1962-1976) 
(From Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945 by Michael 
Dewar, 1990, 166.) 
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F. DHOFAR REBELLION (1962-1976) 
1. Background 
The Sultanate of Oman was a British protectorate from the 1870s to 1971. The 
Treaty of Seeb in 1920 established a sharing of power between the Imam and Sultan of 
Oman that would last until 1955. This treaty granted the Imam of Oman autonomous rule 
in the interior, where the tribes had pledged their allegiance to their religious leader, the 
Imam. The treaty also recognized the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan of Oman within 
the interior. Thus a situation was created where the Sultan of Oman controlled the capital 
city of Muscat, but had little influence or control over the interior of Oman.  This power 
sharing arrangement was fine until the discovery of oil greatly increased the importance 
of the interior regions of Oman. In order to create a secure environment in which to drill 
oil, the Sultan of Oman, Sa’id bin Taimur, began a campaign with the goal of gaining 
control of the interior of Oman. This campaign was to worsen the already tenuous power 
sharing relationship between the Sultan and the Imam. Tensions between the Sultan and 
the Imam were to result in the Jebel Akhdar war, in Arabic Jebel Akhdar means “Green 
Mountains,” an internal Oman conflict which lasted from 1957 to 1959. The Jebel 
Akhdar war saw the defeat of the forces of the Imam of Oman, which were backed by 
Saudi Arabia, by Omani forces loyal to the Sultan of Oman, which were greatly assisted 
by the British, especially the Special Air Service (SAS). It is interesting to note that many 
historians credit the Jebel Akhdar campaign in Oman with preventing the disbandment of 
the British SAS after the completion of the Mayalan Conflict. Following the Jebel 
Akhdar war, the Sultan of Oman terminated the 1920 Treaty of Seeb and outlawed the 
office of the Imam of Oman.   
During the Jebel Akhdar campaign Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur in 1958 had taken 
residence in the Dhofar provincial capital, Salalah. The Sultan was to rarely leave Salalah 
again. The scholar John Newsinger argues that of all of the provinces of Oman, the 
Sultan ruled Dhofar the most oppressively. The Sultan had an intense dislike for the 
Dhofari people, as illustrated by this comment made to Corran Purdon: “If you are out 
walking and meet a Dhofari and a snake, tread on the Dhofari.”174 The Sultan’s 
                                                 
174 John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (Great Britain: 
Palgrave, 2002), 140. 
  102
oppressive treatment of the Dhofari people was to set the conditions for rebellion in the 
Dhofar province. The historian John Townsend has noted that gradually, the tribal 
warfare, long part of the history of Dhofar, became organized opposition to the rule of the 
Sultan.175 The figure below lists the major political and military insurgent and 
counterinsurgent forces involved in the Dhofar Rebellion between 1962 and 1976, which 
was waged primarily in the Dhofar province of Oman. 
Insurgent Forces
DLF Dhofar Liberation Front
PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
PFLO Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
Counterinsurgent Forces
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman
SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces
SAS British Special Air Service 
Iranian
Jordanian Special Forces  
Figure 18.   Dhofar Rebellion Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Forces 
 
2. Insurgency Strategy 
In 1962 the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was organized by tribesmen from the 
interior of the Dhofar province. Initially the rebellion was nothing more than a sporadic 
campaign of mine laying, ambushes, and stand-off attacks. The withdrawal of British 
forces in 1967 from neighboring Aden, and the subsequent establishment of the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), a communist government, was to have a 
profound affect on the direction of the Dhofar rebellion. The strong ethnic ties between 
the Dhofari tribesmen and the people of southern PDRY greatly facilitated the PDRY’s 
take over of the Dhofar rebellion. Many of the insurgents from Dhofar were trained and 
equipped by the PDRY. These tribesmen then returned to Dhofar to indoctrinate their 
fellow tribesmen. The historian Michael Dewar argues that the PDRY sought to use the 
Dhofar insurgents in an effort to support their strategy of seizing first Oman, then the 
other oil rich Arabian states.176  
On 28 April 1966 the DLF attempted to assassinate the Sultan. This attempt 
resulted in the Sultan becoming a near recluse in his palace in Salalah. From his palace 
the Sultan was to continue to orchestrate harsh reprisals on the Dhofari populace. By the 
end of 1967 the forces were at a point of stalemate. The insurgents’ strength was such 
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that they now dominated the Jebel, but they were unable to seriously threaten the capital, 
Jelalah. In August 1968 the DLF became the People’s Front for the Liberation of the 
Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). By 1970 the PFLOAG was in control of almost 
the entire Dhofar province. A coup in July 1970 replaced the Sultan with his son, Qaboos. 
The development and execution of a new counterinsurgency strategy by Qaboos was to 
prove instrumental in the defeat of the insurgency. The successful implementation of 
Qaboos’ counterinsurgency strategy forced the insurgents to attempt a large-scale 
operation in order to boost morale of their men and credibility of their organization.  
On 18 July 1972 the insurgents, in an attempt to bolster the faltering morale of 
their troops, attempted to execute a conventional style attack on the settlement of Marbat 
illustrated below. The settlement of Marbat was situated forty miles east of Salalah 
 
Figure 19.   The Battle of Marbat, 19 July 1972 
(From Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945 by Michael 
Dewar, 1990, 171.) 
and less than two miles south of the Jebel. The Marbat garrison was manned with twenty-
five Dhofari Gendarme, thirty local firqa, thirty Askari warriors from northern Oman, and 
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ten SAS soldiers commanded by Captain Mike Kealy. It is estimated that the overall 
effective strength of this garrison was actually 76 men.177  
The DLF massed approximately two hundred and fifty tribesmen for what was to 
be the largest attack of the insurgency. Though outnumbered by more than three to one 
the garrison was able to repel the insurgent attack through the use of air support and the 
timely arrival of reinforcements in the form of eighteen SAS soldiers.  
As freedom of movement was slowly taken away and supply lines were severely 
impeded or even cut by 1974, the insurgents realized that they could not hope to continue 
the fight in the province of Dhofar. Attempts to expand the insurgency to northern Oman 
in 1972 and 1974, primarily through assassinations met with disaster. The insurgent cells 
were identified by Oman Intelligence Service and captured and tried. The leaders of the 
insurgency also began to realize that their cause was not well received in other areas of 
Oman and the support of the local populace in these areas could not be relied upon.   
3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
The Sultan’s initial reaction to the insurgency was to imprison tribesmen, destroy 
water wells, and generally increase the volume of harsh reprisals. By 1970 it had become 
apparent to the British that Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur was in danger of losing all of Dhofar 
to the insurgents. With the assistance of the British, the Sultan’s son, Qaboos, executed a 
virtually bloodless coup forcing Sultan Sa’id to relinquish power to his son on 23 July 
1970. The British viewed Qaboos, a Sandhurst graduate, as a more capable and 
progressive leader than his father.   
Qaboos requested military assistance from the British immediately following the 
successful coup. The British initially provided an SAS advisory team that would develop 
the counterinsurgency campaign for defeating the insurgents. The ever increasing 
revenues from oil enabled Qaboos to improve and expand the Sultan’s Armed Forces 
(SAF). Counterinsurgency scholar Leroy Thompson has noted that the SAF utilized 
British contract officers and the best enlisted soldiers were Baluchis contracted from 
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Pakistan.178 John Townsend has noted that with the assistance of the SAS advisory team 
a new strategy, which contained five separate elements, was approved by Qaboos: 179 
• The offer of a general amnesty to all those of his subjects who had opposed 
the Sultan. 
• The ending of the archaic status of the Dhofar province and its incorporation 
into the state of Oman.  
• Effective military opposition to those insurgents who did not accept the 
general amnesty offer. 
• A vigorous nation-wide development program targeted at improving the lives 
of the populace. 
• A diplomatic initiative with two aims: 
Aim #1: Having Oman recognized as an Arab state with a legal form of 
government. 
Aim #2: Isolating the PDRY from the support it was receiving from other 
Arab states.  
Qaboos moved quickly to mitigate the many abuses his father had committed on 
the Dhofari tribesmen. Most importantly Qaboos developed a civil campaign focused on 
improving the medical and educational facilities within the Dhofar province. Qaboos also 
offered amnesty for those Dhofari tribesmen that had been taking part in the insurgency 
against his father the Sultan. Even though the amnesty and civic programs were 
producing results, it was obvious that the insurgency had taken hold in the Jebel and only 
military operations would displace the insurgents. The combination of a string of 
successful counterinsurgency military actions on the Jebel and the fact that by mid-1976 
all five elements of Qaboos’ strategy were a success in the Dhofar province ultimately 
resulted in the defeat of the insurgency.   
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4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
a.  A Cause to Fight For 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, was 
initially a significant advantage for the Dhofari insurgents. John Townsend identified that 
the primary issue, which insurgents were able to gain local support for, was the Sultan’s 
very presence in Salalah and the feeling of personal oppression by the Dhofari people as 
a result of his oppressive and harsh attempts to subjugate them to his rule.180 The 
environment created by the Sultan in Dhofar was perfect for fomenting an insurgency to 
overthrow the government.  
The historian Townsend also noted that the DLF had very limited aims, 
and in a proclamation issued on 9 June 1965 they called for the  
liberating of this country from the rule of the despotic Al Bu Said Sultan 
whose dynasty has been identified with the hordes of the British 
imperialist occupation…This people has long suffered from dispersion, 
unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and disease…181 
This proclamation was simply in Townsend’s own words “the product of an economic 
and social frustration inflamed by mindless political oppression.”182 
  The strategy developed by Qaboos was to mitigate the issues described in 
this DLF proclamation. Qaboos focused resources and oil revenues on civil projects to 
effectively improve the lives of the populace of the Dhofar province and their attitudes 
toward the government. Townsend argues that by mid-1975 Dhofaris no longer 
considered themselves second-class citizens of the state of Oman, and had actually taken 
what many considered a disproportionate share of positions in the government of 
Oman.183 By 1972 the insurgency no longer had a significant advantage in this 
prerequisite, and by mid-1974 this prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage.   
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 b. Local Populace Support 
The insurgents, often using torture to coerce the local populace, did a poor 
job of winning the support of the Dhofar province populace. Ironically, the Sultan’s harsh 
reprisals were abhorred more by the Dhofari populace, and when combined with the 
strong tribal ties among the Jebelis it is easy to see why the insurgents were able to act in 
this way and still win significant support from the local populace. With the harsh 
conditions and numerous missteps of the Sultan, the insurgent forces initially had a 
significant advantage in the prerequisite for a successful insurgency, local populace 
support. 
The populace of Dhofar in the 1970s was estimated at 30,000 to 50,000.184  
The authority of Sultan Sa’id was limited to the confines of the long and narrow plain of 
which Salalah was the economic center and his influence in the mountains was extremely 
weak. The Sultan’s increased use of force in an attempt to destroy the insurgency 
following the 9 June 1965 proclamation enabled the DLF to require the necessary 
momentum to challenge the Sultan. Following an assassination attempt on the Sultan, on 
28 April 1966, a virtual blockade was imposed on the Jebel in retaliation. This action 
only served to increase the local populace’s support for the insurgency.  
The counterinsurgency scholar Leroy Thompson argues that   
Sultan Sa’id had purposely kept Oman as backward as possible to avoid 
corruption of western influences and modernization. In his efforts to 
safeguard his population from these perceived evils, the Sultan did not 
even allow those who left Oman for an education to return to the 
country.185  
He feared that their exposure to Western culture would lead to further unrest. Though 
Sultan Sa’id was accumulating oil revenues, he did not invest in the educational, medical, 
or social infrastructure of Oman, and especially not in the Dhofar province.     
In contrast, immediately following the coup and for the next five years, 
Qaboos placed great emphasis on economic, social, and infrastructure projects. After the 
Sultan’s neglect of the Dhofaris, it was easy to sway the support of the populace as 
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contractors appeared and began to build projects such as hospitals, schools, roads, houses, 
electricity supply and water supply. The insurgents lacked the capability to either match 
or stop these projects.  
Qaboos also implemented two other programs that affected the insurgents’ 
advantage in this prerequisite: amnesty and resettlement. Soon after the coup in July 1970 
Qaboos offered a general amnesty to all insurgents. Initially, at least 200 insurgents 
accepted the amnesty and most joined the Firqats.186 By the end of the Dhofar Rebellion 
almost 2000 insurgents had surrendered under this amnesty program.187 Qaboos also 
executed a successful resettlement program. The government was able to resettle many of 
the mountainous areas left vacant due to the insurgency. Many of these resettled areas 
were now guarded by the ex-insurgents, now re-armed and equipped and members of the 
SAS trained Firqats. By late 1973 this prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage 
for the insurgents.  
 c. Weakness in the Authority 
The Dhofari insurgents initially had a significant advantage in the 
prerequisite for a successful insurgency, weakness in the authority, because as John 
Townsend has noted, Sultan Sa’id’s “strategy – negative, repressive, punitive, 
unimaginative – was perhaps the greatest single source of strength to his enemies.”188 
The Dhofar Rebellion developed slowly, but the Sultan took no imaginative or preventive 
steps to slow the growth of the insurgency. Use of force and reprisal seemed to be his 
only strategy. Concessions, which may have stopped the insurgency in its infant stage, 
were not possible due to his immense dislike of the Dhofaris.  
The SAF conceded the Jebel to the insurgents from mid-June to mid-
September due to the monsoonal fogs. The SAF believed that the low visibility created 
supply problems that could not be overcome. In other words the government ceded the 
initiative to the insurgents for three months out of a year; failing to even to try to impede 
the insurgents’ resupply efforts and freedom of movement. Villages and positions that 
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had been lost to SAF forces were often re-occupied by unopposed insurgent forces during 
this three month pause. Starting in 1971 the insurgents lost this advantage. Using many of 
the ex-insurgents that had taken advantage of the amnesty program, the government 
occupied numerous posts in the mountains during the monsoonal fogs and greatly 
impeded the insurgents’ flow of supplies.  
With supply lines being increasingly interdicted by the government and 
morale dropping within the insurgent forces, the decision was made to execute what was 
to be the insurgency’s largest assault of the conflict. Hoping to show the weakness of the 
government the settlement of Marbat was chosen. The insurgent forces were unable to 
recover from their defeat at the Marbat settlement on 18 July 1972; and they were unable 
to ever organize enough forces to execute a similar attack for the rest of the conflict.  
The change in leadership of Oman following the bloodless coup of the 
Sultan was to prove disastrous for the insurgency. With Qaboos assuming power and 
successfully implementing all five elements of his new strategy for defeating the 
insurgency, this prerequisite was to become a significant disadvantage for the insurgency 
by late 1972.    
 d. Geographic Conditions 
The Sultanate of Oman occupied 82,000 square miles and was situated 
between South Yemen and the Gulf of Oman. The Dhofar province is the southern-most 
province of the Sultanate of Oman, and is separated from the rest of Oman by five 
hundred miles of desert. The coastal plain of the Dhofar province is dominated by the 
Jebel, mountainous terrain which is ideal for an insurgency. Michael Dewar accurately 
described the Jebel Akhdar as “one of the greatest natural fortresses in the world, a sheer 
limestone massif forty to fifty miles in length and twenty miles wide with peaks rising 
nearly 10,000 feet.”189 Caves and gullies perfect for insurgent warfare are found in 
abundance. The figure below illustrates how dominant the Jebel was on the geography of 
the Dhofar province and the capital, Salalah.  
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Figure 20.   Dhofar with the Jebel Highlighted 
(From Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945 by Michael 
Dewar, 1990, 169.) 
 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a 
significant advantage for the insurgency initially. The new state, the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY), offered sanctuary for insurgents just across the border. 
Insurgents trained in PDRY then infiltrated back into Dhofar. The border between the 
Dhofar province of Oman and the PDRY was undeveloped country that few traveled. The 
harshness and isolation of the terrain along the border enabled the insurgents to sustain 
themselves logistically with supplies and trained recruits. Unable to stem this flow of 
supplies and recruits the insurgents had the initiative.     
Then in March 1974 the Hornbeam Line was constructed by British and 
Jordanian engineers under the protection of an Omani battalion. The Hornbeam Line 
consisted of a line of mines and wire that ran from the coast fifty-three kilometers inland. 
It was constructed ninety kilometers from the border of PDRY. Accelerating 
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counterinsurgent operations following the completion of the Hornbeam Line resulted in 
the isolation of insurgent forces in a small area along the PDRY border. By May 1975, 
the manmade Hornbeam Line had helped mitigate the insurgent forces’ advantage in 
geography making this prerequisite a significant disadvantage for the insurgents. This 
structure had effectively restricted resupply to the insurgent forces located in central and 
eastern Dhofar.  
 e. External Support 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external support, was a 
significant advantage for the insurgency initially. The insurgents received external 
support from PDRY, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, China, Libya, Soviet Union, and Cuba. The 
PDRY provided sanctuary, training, and supplies for Dhofari insurgent forces. At the 
peak of the rebellion four companies of PDRY regulars had been operating in support of 
the insurgency within Dhofar, but by October 1975 this support was withdrawn.190  
This external support was to be off-set by the external support provided to 
the Oman government primarily in the form of troops and expertise. The support 
provided to the government of Oman was to prove instrumental in the defeat of the 
insurgency. The British SAS was tasked with organizing, training, and leading the 
Firqats, the Dhofari counterinsurgency force. Much of this force was made up of 
converted insurgents. Leroy Thompson has noted that at the same time “Royal Engineers 
and medical personnel worked closely with the SAS on civic action programmes to win 
the hearts and minds of the Jebelis.”191 British pilots also organized and flew in the 
newly established Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF).  
The counterinsurgent forces were able to greatly impede the flow of arms 
to the PFLO in 1972 when the Shah of Iran persuaded China to curtail their aid to the 
insurgents. In 1972 Jordan provided an infantry regiment and in 1973 Iran provided 1500 
troops.192 Successful operations by Iranian troops in December 1974 and January 1975 
were instrumental in setting the conditions which enabled the SAF to capture the village 
                                                 
190 Dewar, Brush Fire Wars, 176. 
191 Thompson, Ragged War, 50. 
192 Dewar, Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945, 170. 
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of Rakhyut, the last settlement held by insurgent forces in Dhofar. By late 1972 this 
prerequisite was quickly becoming a significant disadvantage for the insurgents. 
f. Information Advantage 
Initially the prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information 
advantage, was a significant advantage for the insurgency. The actions of the Sultan were 
the best propaganda tool that the insurgents could have dreamed of. With conditions 
already extremely tyrannical and harsh in Dhofar, the Sultans unimaginative and 
predictable reprisals were used to reinforce and emphasize the validity of the insurgents’ 
cause.  
 Transistor radios were used effectively as part of the insurgent 
propaganda campaign. Leroy Thompson has noted that Radio Aden transmitted 
propaganda across the entire Jebel in support of the PFLO.193 After Iranian forces 
occupied the road from Salalah to Thumrait in December 1973, with the permission of 
the government of Oman, much of the insurgents’ propaganda effort was focused on 
retaking this critical road. The propaganda war over this road was to be won by the 
government. Soon after gaining control of the road, the road was modernized with 
blacktop; thus, restoring the freedom of movement of the populace and the hope of an 
economic improvement due to potential commerce.      
The government’s campaign to encourage insurgents to defect greatly 
impacted the insurgency. The change in the regime’s attitude toward the populace 
encouraged fence-sitters such as Mohammed Suhail to surrender. Formally a soldier in 
the Trucial Oman Scouts, he was co-opted to work in the Sultan’s Intelligence Staff. 
Much like the pseudo-gangs of Kenya, ex-insurgents were to provide the critical 
intelligence needed to defeat this insurgency. The initial advantage provided by this 
prerequisite to the insurgency was lost in December 1973, and became a significant 
disadvantage by mid-1974. 
5. Conclusion 
The communist insurgency in the Dhofar province was completely defeated by 
the government of Oman. Though faced with serious initial setbacks, the government of 
                                                 
193 Thompson, Ragged War, 50. 
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Oman was able to overwhelm the insurgency primarily due to the British orchestrated 
coup of the Sultan, the competent leadership of Qaboos, and the extensive external 
support received by the government. This insurgency was unable to overcome the 
externally supported government of Oman, even when the Sultan only controlled the 
capital, Salalah.      
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Figure 21.   Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976) Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency 
Chart 
 
Using a Likert scale to examine the Dhofar Rebellion against the prerequisites for 
a successful insurgency, it is observed that the insurgents initially had a significant 
advantage in all prerequisites. All the prerequisites for a successful insurgency were to be 
significant disadvantages for the insurgents by mid-1974.  
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Figure 22.   Bolivia 
(From The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Ché Guevara and other Captured Documents by 
Daniel James, 1968, 10.) 
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G.  BOLIVIA (1966-1968) 
1. Background 
Ernesto “Ché” Guevara was born in 1928 to an aristocratic family in Argentina. In 
1948 he attended the University of Buenos Aires and eventually finished medical school. 
During his subsequent travels throughout South and Central America, Guevara 
experienced revolution and insurgency. He gained experience and knowledge when he 
observed the mobilization of Bolivian workers after the 1952 revolution, and the U.S. 
backed overthrow of the Guatemala revolutionary government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. 
Because of the latter event Guevara became a dedicated fighter against U.S. imperialism 
in Latin America. Guevara later met Fidel Castro in Mexico as he prepared for an 
insurrectionary war against the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. In Mexico he studied 
Marxism and became an ideological communist. In 1956 he traveled to Cuba with Castro 
and then in 1959, following the Cuban Revolution, he became a Cuban citizen.  In 1965 
he left Cuba to spread the revolutionary struggle. Guevara chose Boliva to launch a 
revolution.  
Guevara became disillusioned with life in post-revolutionary Cuba, and was 
convinced that South America was ideal for waging revolutionary war using the foco 
concept. The Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and his long time friend, Guevara, hoped to 
turn South America into another Vietnam for the United States with Bolivia at the center 
of the conflict. They both believed that if they could start a revolution in Bolivia that 
forces from the United States would be sent to support the Bolivian government. The 
presence of American forces in Bolivia would agitate its neighbors and the revolution 
could be spread through South America. Bolivia was to be the base from which 
revolution would be spread through out South America.  
In November 1964, Paz Estenssoro, who had ruled Bolivia since 1952, was 
replaced by Generals Alfredo Ovando and Rene Barrientos. With Bolivia now under the 
rule of military dictators, Guevara believed that igniting a revolution in Bolivia was 
possible. In 1965 the French Socialist Regis Debray wrote, “Bolivia is the country where 
the subjective and objective conditions are best combined. It is the only country in South 
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America where Socialist revolution is on the agenda.”194 The general assessment among 
revolutionaries was that the conditions in Bolivia were sufficient for a revolution.  
2. Insurgency Strategy 
At the Tri-continental Conference held in Havana in 1966, the decision was made 
to set up a training center for guerrilla fighters in Boliva. Guevara’s representative at the 
conference argued that a national guerilla war had little chance of success and it was 
essential to set up a regional coordination at a minimum on the logistical and political 
fronts. Guevara’s plan called for an international base to be set up in Bolivia. Bolivia was 
primarily selected because it was geopolitically situated in the center of South America. 
From this base guerrilla columns could infiltrate into neighboring countries and spread 
revolution throughout South America. 
Guevara entered Bolivia in November 1966 via the La Paz airport. He was later 
joined by twelve other Cuban revolutionaries, who believed that they would form the 
initial foco of the revolution in Bolivia. Guevara’s force, the National Liberation Army of 
Bolivia (ELN), never exceeded more than fifty fighters through out the conflict. 
Guevara’s strategy was to apply his foco theory in Bolivia. Guevara believed that his 
experience in the Cuban revolution demonstrated that revolutionaries did not have to wait 
for the necessary conditions to be present in a country; that a revolutionary force could 
actually create the necessary conditions. 
The ELN was well equipped, in comparison to the Bolivian Army, initially thanks 
to Cuban financing. In February 1967 Guevara conducted the first operation from his 
base camp, a reconnaissance mission. During this mission Guevara’s security was 
compromised and the Bolivian military were now aware that he was in the country. 
Guevara’s forces initially achieved a number of successes on the tactical level, primarily 
ambushes, March to May 1967, but were being forced further and further into the 
inhospitable and isolated mountainous jungle.  
 
 
                                                 
194 Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution: Essays on Latin America (London: Ebenezer Baylis and 
Son, 1970), 38. 
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3. The Counterinsurgency Strategy  
The incompetence of the Bolivian military is the only thing that enabled Guevara 
to last as long as he did. Though Guevara had the initiative initially, the Bolivian 
military’s advantage in numbers and capabilities was to quickly tip the scales in their 
favor once the fighting began.  
External support was also provided by the United States to the Bolivian 
government which helped with developing the forces necessary for fighting an effective 
counterinsurgency against Guevara. The Central Intelligence Agency sent several 
operatives to Bolivia to aid with the search for Guevara. The United States Army signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the activation, organization, and training of 
the 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion on 28 April 1967. The assistance provided by this 
agreement was to result in an effective counterinsurgency force that tracked down and 
killed Guevara by October 1967.  
4. Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies 
a.  A Cause to Fight For 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, a cause to fight for, was a 
significant disadvantage for Guevara for the duration of the conflict. Guevara based his 
campaign in Bolivia on the cause – revolution throughout South America. This cause did 
not appeal to the Bolivian people and therefore gained little support. A cause based on 
land also did not garner the support of the populace. Bolivia had just had a revolution, 
and the government had ordered extensive land redistribution. The Indians in the region 
that Guevara was to operate did not consider themselves landless. The Bolivian military 
officer Gary P. Salmon argues that many of them had owned their land for generations 
and this region had largely not experienced the conditions of exploitation and servitude 
that western Bolivia had, and which resulted in the Agrarian Reform after the National 
Revolution in 1953.195  
 b. Local Populace Support 
Guevara’s forces had a significant disadvantage in the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, local populace support, throughout the conflict. There was not an 
                                                 
195 Gary P. Salmon, The Defeat of Ché Guevara: Military Response to Guerilla Challenge in Bolivia, 
trans. John Deredita (New York: Praeger, 1990), 38. 
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organization within the populace to supply the insurgents. The British counterinsurgency 
expert Frank Kitson observes that lack of local populace support prevented Guevara’s 
insurgency from obtaining the required recruits, food, medicine, and supplies.196 
Bolivian military officer Gary P. Salmon points out that the portion of the 
Bolivian populace that Guevara attempted to recruit to his cause were remote from power 
of the authority and were accustomed to relying on themselves. They were also the 
guardians of the recently discovered oil wealth. The development of the infrastructure of 
oil drilling and transporting and oil revenues had brought a new prosperity to this region 
of Bolivia. The economy of Bolivia at the end of 1966 was relatively favorable due to: 
increasing oil production, spreading agriculture, modest industrial expansion, and 
infrastructure work.197 Military historian David Rooney observed that though conditions 
in the tin mines were appalling for workers, and the Indians lived in poverty, there was no 
impoverished populace waiting to be liberated by Guevara.198  
Both Castro and Guevara had misled the leaders of the Bolivian 
Communist Party reference their true intentions for Bolivia. The Bolivians believed that 
the insurgency in Bolivia was to set the conditions for a future campaign in Argentina. 
According to David Rooney, when the Bolivian Communist Party leader, Mario Monje, 
learned that Guevara intended to lead the forces in Bolivia he said, “that when the people 
of Bolivia found out that the guerrilla movement was led by a foreigner; they would turn 
their back on it.”199 This rift between the BCP and Guevara was to result in the Bolivians 
providing very few soldiers. Guevara was also unable to go directly to the people for 
recruitment in the region since his men had learned Quechua instead of the local Indian 
language, Tupí-Guaraní. Lack of Bolivian recruits was to leave Guevara’s force always 
under strength.  
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 c. Weakness in the Authority 
Guevara initially had a limited advantage in the prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, weakness in the authority. This limited advantage was primarily 
due to the ineffectiveness of the authority and the fact that the authority did not know he 
was in Bolivia. Once the authority discovered that Guevara was in Bolivia this limited 
advantage quickly became a significant disadvantage. The fact that Guevara had 
incorrectly evaluated both the government and the level of populace support for the 
authority contributed to Guevara’s disadvantage.  
Gary P. Salmon argues that in the Bolivian Army in 1966 there was an 
educational and training divide between subordinate officers and their commanders. 
There had been some training for subordinates on insurgency, but at the higher levels of 
command insurgency was treated in a very superficial and theoretical manner. These 
higher level staffs were unwilling to consider other than conventional warfare, and did 
not comprehend what the appearance of the guerrilla focos in Bolivia meant.200 Though 
many believed the Bolivian Army to be incompetent it still had a far superior number of 
soldiers than the insurgents. Additionally, these soldiers had a significant advantage since 
they were familiar with the terrain upon which Guevara was operating and Guevara was 
not.   
According to Salmon, the Bolivian President, Rene Barrientos, was of 
Indian heritage and had the support of the populace. Since 1962, President Barrientos had 
conducted a domestic political campaign aimed at winning the support of the majority of 
the Bolivian populace.201 Guevara understood the strength of a movement brought to 
power through a popular vote when he wrote: 
Where a government has come into power through some form of popular 
vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of 
constitutional legality, the guerilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the 
possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.202 
                                                 
200 Salmon, Defeat of Che Guevara, 25. 
201 Salmon, Defeat of Che Guevara,  45. 
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Yet Guevara failed to heed his own advice and expected the local populace would not 
support the authority. As an outsider the local populace was most likely to support their 
Bolivian government and military over Guevara’s insurgent force.   
 d. Geographic Conditions 
Bolivia was a poor country that is strategically located in South America. 
Bolivia shares long and poorly secured borders with five other South American 
Countries: Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The geographical area affected 
by Guevara’s focus and counterinsurgent forces was relatively small. The prerequisite for 
a successful insurgency, geographic conditions, was a significant disadvantage for the 
insurgency from the start. The terrain was too rough for guerrilla warfare, and Guevara 
and his people were not familiar with the terrain, and worse the local authorities had a 
superior knowledge of the terrain.  
 e. External Support 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, external support, was a 
significant disadvantage for the insurgency from the very start and only got worse. 
External support for Guevara’s insurgent force could have come from primarily two 
sources; Cuba, and the Bolivian Communist Party. External support for Guevara’s efforts 
in Bolivia was to be greatly affected by Cuba’s dependence on Russia. The military 
historian Rooney observed that in July 1967, the Russian Prime Minister, Kosygin told 
Castro that “if Cuba did not withdraw support from Ché, the USSR would cease to 
support Cuba.”203  External support from the Bolivian Communist Party to fight an 
insurgency within their own country failed to materialize for several reasons. Frank 
Kitson argues that the BCP felt that Guevara had deceived them as to the true intention of 
his cause in Bolivia. Guevara demanded that he be in charge of the Bolivian forces, 
though he was an outsider. Guevara refused to acknowledge the Bolivian Communist 
Party because he intended to build a new party after victory, formed around his own 
focos.204  
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External support for the Bolivian government was also to prove 
detrimental to any chance of success that Guevara may have hoped for. The Bolivian 
government accepted U.S. support in the form of a sixteen-man team from the United 
States Special Forces. As discussed earlier this team was able to train and equip the 2nd 
Bolivian Ranger Battalion, which ultimately cornered, captured, and killed Guevara.  
 f. Information Advantage 
The prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information advantage, was a 
significant disadvantage for the duration of Guevara’s insurgency. This was due to 
primarily three factors: (1) a language barrier with the local Indians, (2) failure to win the 
support of the local populace, and (3) loss or failure of communications equipment.  
The local Indians in Bolivia did not speak Spanish and Guevara and his 
people had learned the wrong Indian dialect. Unable to communicate effectively with the 
local Indians only increased their suspicion of this outside force.  
Suspicious of Guevara’s party, the local Indians in the province withheld 
information from the revolutionaries, and provided information to the Bolivian 
government. Informants were a key factor in identifying the supply caches that Guevara’s 
insurgent force desperately needed. An informant was also responsible for the ultimate 
capture of Guevara.  The location of Guevara's encampment in October 1967 was 
provided by an informant to the Bolivian Special Forces.  
Guevara was unable to effectively communicate with his insurgent forces 
or with Havana. Communications were hampered by two critical factors: (1) that the two 
shortwave transmitters provided to him by Cuba were defective; and, that just months 
into the campaign in Bolivia the equipment used to decode messages from Havana was 
lost during a river crossing. There was a complete breakdown in communications 
capabilities both internally and externally.    
5. Conclusion 
Ernesto “Ché” Guevara’s belief that a revolution did not need to wait for the right 
conditions was a fatal flaw in Bolivia. Ironically Guevara wrote in his book, Guerrilla 
Warfare, that  
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it must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without 
which the establishment and consolidation of the first center [Popular 
forces can win a war against the army.] is not practical.205  
In hindsight it is obvious that Guevara had not correctly assessed either the current 
political or social situation in Bolivia. Though ruled by military dictators, the Bolivian 
people did not desire outsiders in their country to stir up revolution. Though 
circumstances many have been harsh in Bolivia, conditions were worse in neighboring 
countries, and the conditions for the Bolivian people had generally been improving under 
the current government. The scholar Henry B. Ryan keenly observed the critical fact that 
despite Bolivian fears, the United States did not Americanize the war.206 The United 
States effectively followed established counterinsurgency tenets to enable the Bolivians 
to secure their own state.  
In June 1967 the roughness of the terrain and lack of medicine and supplies 
resulted in Guevara becoming seriously ill. With a history of asthma it was predictable 
that the harsh conditions of the Bolivian Mountains would weaken Guevara’s body and 
ultimately lead to the desperate search for medicine and supplies that would end with his 
capture in October 1967.  
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Figure 23.   Bolivia (1966-1968) Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency Chart 
 
Using a Likert scale to examine the Ernesto Guevara’s insurgency in Bolivia 
against the prerequisites for a successful insurgency, it is observed that the Guevara had a 
significant disadvantage in all prerequisites except the prerequisite weakness in the 
authority from the very beginning and things only got worse.  
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Figure 24.   Initial Consolidated Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency Chart 
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Figure 25.   Final Consolidated Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency Chart 
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V. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an analysis of the findings based on the completed case studies of 
six of the eleven identified post-World War II failed insurgencies in Chapter IV. The 
consolidated results are shown in the figures on the preceding page. The initial and final 
conditions of the insurgencies reference the six prerequisites for a successful insurgency: 
(1) a cause to fight for, (2) local populace support, (3) weakness in the authority, (4) 
favorable geographic conditions, (5) external support during the middle and later stages 
of an insurgency, and (6) an information advantage, are shown in figures 24 and 25. Each 
prerequisite for a successful insurgency is examined with a focus on identifying trends. 
Trends will then be examined in order to identify insurgent vulnerabilities for 
exploitation in future insurgencies. Though duration is not an identified prerequisite for a 
successful insurgency, it has been determined that this topic can have a great impact on 
the ultimate outcome of an insurgency. For this reason, this chapter will end with a 
discussion on the topic of duration.  
B. A CAUSE TO FIGHT FOR 
Developing a viable cause that appeals to the populace is critical to an insurgency 
gaining the support of the populace. Three of six of the insurgencies did not effectively 
identify an existing issue and exploit it to create a cause that would appeal to the 
populace. In the Greek Civil War the leaders of the insurgency did not effectively 
identify an existing domestic issue and exploit it to create a cause that would appeal to 
the populace. Not only did the insurgents fail to identify any issue, their communist 
ideology conflicted with the Greek culture.  Insurgent leaders during the Malayan 
Emergency attempted to develop a nationalist anti-British sentiment among the Malays, 
which was not there.  What support the insurgents’ cause gained was mitigated by the 
British and Malayan government when they effectively addressed the grievances of the 
Chinese minority, the segment of the populace that provided the insurgency’s strongest  
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supporters. The cause, revolution throughout South America, which Ernesto Guevara 
developed for his Bolivian campaign, completely failed to appeal to the local Bolivian 
populace.  
 Three of the insurgencies did effectively identify an existing issue and exploit it to 
create a cause that would appeal to the local populace. These three insurgencies all had a 
significant advantage over the authority at the beginning of the insurgency, only to see 
this advantage taken away over time by effective counterinsurgent policies and actions. 
The Huk movement identified the issues of land reform and government corruption in 
order to create a cause that appealed to the populace. It is important to note that the land 
issue was more or less limited to the rural populace of Central Luzon, while the issue of 
government corruption had a wider appeal encompassing both the rural and urban 
populaces. Both of these causes were greatly weakened by aggressive economic, 
political, social and military reforms by the Philippine government. The insurgents during 
the Kenya Emergency developed an effective cause from the existing land issue that 
when combined with the process of “oathing” proved very effective. The colonial 
government was able to undermine the insurgents’ cause by aggressive economic, 
political, and social reforms. The insurgents during the Dhofar Rebellion were able to 
effectively exploit the existing issue of the harsh treatment of the Dhofari populace by the 
Sultan to create a credible cause. Replacing the Sultan and utilizing the oil revenues of 
Oman, the Sultan’s son, Qaboos, developed an aggressive program of civil projects 
which the insurgents were unable to overcome. Over time, as conditions in Dhofar 
improved under the new leadership of Qaboos, local populace support for the insurgents’ 
cause diminished.   
It is believed that a successful insurgency must have an issue that can be 
effectively exploited to create a cause. This issue does not have to be real; the populace 
must only perceive that the issue is real. It is not military force which will mitigate an 
effective insurgent cause. If an insurgency fails from the beginning to find issues that can 
be effectively exploited to create a popular cause, the authority must take care not to 
develop policies or take actions that might give the insurgency a cause. By identifying the  
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issues upon which an insurgent movement’s cause depends, the authority can then 
develop policies that will undermine the appeal of the insurgent cause to the local 
populace. 
C. LOCAL POPULACE SUPPORT 
The fight to control the populace is a primary characteristic of an insurgency. 
Success of both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces largely depends on their ability to 
win the local populace’s support for their respective causes. Three of the insurgencies 
(Huk Rebellion, Kenya Emergency, Dhofar Rebellion) initially had a significant 
advantage in the prerequisite of local populace support. One insurgency (Malayan 
Emergency) initially had a limited advantage. The Greek Civil War had a limited 
disadvantage, and Guevara’s insurgency had a significant disadvantage.  
The strong appeal of the Huk movement’s cause gave the insurgency a significant 
advantage in this prerequisite. Significant improvement in the authority, combined with 
an increase in senseless violence by insurgents in order to coerce the populace, resulted in 
this prerequisite becoming a significant disadvantage for the insurgency. The Mau Mau 
initially had a significant advantage in this prerequisite during the Kenya Emergency, 
primarily due to the appeal of their cause, oathing, and counter-productive 
counterinsurgency operations by the authority. By 1954, this prerequisite had become a 
significant disadvantage for the Mau Mau primarily due to their increased use of 
terrorism to coerce the populace and the authority’s successful Operation Anvil. Initially 
during the Dhofar Rebellion, the insurgents had a significant advantage in this 
prerequisite due mostly to tribal ties and the extreme maltreatment of the Dhofari 
populace by the authority. A change in leadership within the authority, and the 
development and implementation of an effective counterinsurgency campaign that 
focused on improving the lives of the Dhofari populace, resulted in this prerequisite 
becoming a significant disadvantage for the insurgency.  The insurgency during the 
Malayan Emergency initially had a limited advantage in the prerequisite for a successful 
insurgency, local populace support, mainly due to their ability to return to the 
organization that they had developed during the Japanese occupation and the accessibility  
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of the Chinese squatter populace. This prerequisite had become a significant disadvantage 
for the insurgent movement by 1955, in large part due to the authority’s implementation 
of the Briggs Plan. 
The Greek communist insurgent movement initially had a limited disadvantage in 
this prerequisite because of their alienation of the Greek populace. The populace was 
alienated because the insurgency’s cause did not appeal to them. The harsh treatment of 
hostages following the insurgent’s loss in the second round met with widespread 
disapproval in Greece. An increased use of terror to coerce the local populace resulted in 
this prerequisite becoming a significant disadvantage for the insurgency.  Guevara had a 
significant disadvantage in this prerequisite throughout his short campaign because there 
was a lack of a credible cause and an inability to communicate due to a language barrier. 
The authorities during the Malayan Emergency, Kenya Emergency, and Huk 
Rebellion, utilized some form of pseudo teams as part of their counterinsurgency 
campaign. Pseudo gangs operate most efficiently when the insurgent command and 
communications systems are weak. Pseudo gangs can provide human intelligence and 
other support operations to the authority. When an authority utilizes pseudo gangs as 
human intelligence collectors, care must be taken to avoid becoming involved in human 
rights violations. The authority must establish an effective system of incentives for a 
sufficient number of insurgents to defect. Once an insurgent has defected to the authority 
it is very unlikely that the insurgent will defect back to the insurgents. The scholar 
Lawrence E. Cline argues that if the insurgent admitted to defecting to the authority, it is 
very likely that the insurgents would kill such an individual.207  
Resettlement of large segments of the populace was part of the authority’s 
counterinsurgency strategy during the Greek Civil War, Huk Rebellion, Malayan 
Emergency, Kenya Emergency, and Dhofar Rebellion. The process of resettlement, often 
combined with relocation, can have a serious detrimental impact on the insurgents’ 
ability to control the populace. Historian Andrew Krepinevich argues that “the support of 
the people is a measure of the insurgents’ ability to control the people, whether through 
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their willing cooperation or as the result of threats, acts of terrorism, or the physical 
occupation of their community.”208 When planning operations, insurgent organizations 
must determine what effect they intend to achieve reference the populace. It is most 
likely that the insurgents have better knowledge of the target populace and social spheres 
of influence. With this knowledge, the insurgent planners can better identify a realistic 
level of effect for their campaigns. The insurgent planners can then create objectives with 
reasonable measures of effectiveness that support the insurgency’s overall campaign 
plan. Support from the populace is crucial for effective counterinsurgent intelligence. 
Finally the counterinsurgency expert Galula argues that “If it is possible to destroy the 
insurgent political organization by intensive police action, it is impossible to prevent the 
return of the guerilla units and the rebuilding of the political cells unless the population 
cooperates.”209 
D. WEAKNESS IN THE AUTHORITY 
Is the authority unable to prevent insurgent operations? Four of the insurgencies 
(Greek Civil War, Huk Rebellion, Kenya Emergency, Dhofar Rebellion) initially had a 
significant advantage and two of the insurgencies (Malayan Emergency, Bolivia) had a 
limited advantage in the prerequisite weakness in the authority.  By the final stage of all 
of the insurgencies this prerequisite was a significant disadvantage.  
The insurgents in the Greek Civil War had a significant advantage in this 
prerequisite due to the disorganization and incompetence of both the government and the 
military. British and American external support in the form of advisors, material, and 
financing decreased this prerequisite to a limited advantage by the end of the war. The 
Huk movement had a significant advantage in this prerequisite until an effective leader 
took control of the authority’s counterinsurgency campaign. Magsaysay’s positive 
influence on the government proved insurmountable for the Huk movement and this 
prerequisite became a significant disadvantage as the authority strengthened. The Mau 
Mau initially had a significant advantage in this prerequisite. Though the colonial 
government of Kenya was confronted with intelligence that the threat posed by the Mau 
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Mau movement was great, the governor chose not to act. This enabled the Mau Mau to 
maintain the initiative and grow in strength until the authority brought in new leaders. 
These new leaders were able over time to reduce this prerequisite to a significant 
disadvantage for the insurgency. The oppressive and harsh actions of the Sultan during 
the initial stages of the Dhofar Rebellion served to strengthen the insurgency and weaken 
the authority. The initial significant advantage that the insurgents maintained was reduced 
to a significant disadvantage mainly due to a leadership change. The Sultan was replaced 
by his son, Qaboos, who requested the external support of the British and with their 
assistance developed an effective counterinsurgency campaign using all the resources at 
his disposal.  
The insurgents during the Malayan Emergency initially had a limited advantage in 
this prerequisite primarily due to the authority’s disorganization and the British forces’ 
decision to fight the insurgency conventionally. Successful implementation of the Briggs 
Plan and Templar’s White Areas by the authority reduced this prerequisite to a significant 
disadvantage. Guevara’s insurgent forces initially had a limited advantage in this 
prerequisite. This limited advantage was short lived. Though the Bolivian authority was 
inefficient and unprepared to fight an insurgency, the discovery that Guevara was in 
Bolivia was enough to get the authority to focus their overwhelming resources. Guevara’s 
evaluation that he could gain an advantage over the authority in this case was incorrect 
mainly due to his poor analysis of the Bolivian government and the populace’s level of 
support for the government.  
Maintaining an advantage in this prerequisite enables an insurgency to more 
readily maintain the initiative. The recent U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual points 
out that “Insurgents succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government 
fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere.”210 Leadership changes in the 
authority proved critical in eventually establishing an advantage over the insurgency in 
this prerequisite in the Philippines’ Huk Rebellion, Malayan Emergency, Kenya 
Emergency, and the Dhofar Rebellion. These leadership changes enabled the 
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development of counterinsurgency campaigns that strengthened the authority and were 
able to prevent their respective insurgencies from sowing chaos and disorder.  
E. GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS 
An insurgent movement with its initial weakness is most likely to fail if it cannot 
get any help from the geography. Three of the insurgencies did initially have a significant 
advantage in geographic conditions. The insurgent movement in the Greek Civil War had 
a significant advantage in this prerequisite throughout the insurgency due to international 
borders and mountainous terrain. The insurgents were able to move freely across the 
Yugoslavian border until the third round and the Albanian and Bulgarian borders until the 
end of the war. This enabled the insurgent movement to establish sanctuaries outside of 
Greece, from which they could resupply, rearm, recruit, train, plan, and rest. The 
insurgents failed to take advantage of the terrain when they attempted in the third round 
to retain terrain against the authority’s numerically superior forces.  In the Kenya 
Emergency the Mau Mau movement initially had a significant advantage due to 
geographic conditions, but this advantage became a significant disadvantage as the 
authority focused both their political and military efforts on the small in-land area that the 
Mau Mau were isolated in by mid-1955. The authority was able to mitigate the 
insurgents’ initial advantage in knowledge of the terrain through effective training and 
more importantly the creation of pseudo-gangs from ex-Mau Mau members. The 
insurgent movement during the Dhofar Rebellion initially had a significant advantage in 
geographic conditions. The Jebel Akhdar from which the insurgents primarily operated 
was a natural fortress. The state bordering the Dhofar province, the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen, offered sanctuary for the insurgents. The authority was able to make 
geographic conditions a significant disadvantage for the insurgents by constructing the 
Hornbeam Line and accelerating counterinsurgent operations to isolate the insurgents and 
effectively cut their supply lines to insurgents in central and eastern Dhofar. 
Three of the insurgencies had a significant disadvantage in geographic conditions 
throughout the insurgency. The geographic conditions of Central Luzon were a 
significant disadvantage for the insurgent movement throughout the Huk Rebellion. 
Geographic conditions created vulnerabilities in the communications and resupply 
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systems that the insurgency depended upon. The insurgents during the Malayan 
Emergency were faced with a significant disadvantage due to the geographic conditions 
of Malaya. Though the abundance of mountainous and jungle covered terrain are 
desirable geographic conditions for an insurgency, the insurgency was at a distinct 
disadvantage for several reasons. Surrounded by water on three sides and the unfriendly 
Thailand border to the north, the insurgency was effectively isolated, thus complicating 
and/or limiting external support. Geographic conditions were a significant disadvantage 
throughout Guevara’s Bolivian campaign. The terrain was too rough, the insurgents were 
not familiar with the terrain, and worse the local authorities had a superior knowledge of 
the terrain.  
Authorities that develop counterinsurgency campaigns that take into account 
mitigating an insurgent force’s advantage in terrain can take this advantage away from 
the insurgents over time. The authority must be creative in dealing with geographic 
conditions. The Hornbeam Line and pseudo-gangs are two examples of how creative 
counterinsurgent leaders can mitigate an insurgent movement’s geographic advantage.  
F. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
Though external support is not required during the initial stage of an insurgency, 
it is critical during the middle and later stages. Insurgencies that have external support in 
the initial stages will most likely grow more rapidly than those without. Initially only the 
insurgents in Dhofar had a significant advantage and the insurgents in the Greek Civil 
War had a limited advantage. With external support not a requirement in the initial stage 
of an insurgency it is not surprising that four of the insurgencies initially had a significant 
disadvantage.  
The insurgents during the Dhofar Rebellion at first received significant support 
from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the form of sanctuary and at one 
point direct military support in the form of four companies of PDRY regular army 
soldiers. Varying degrees of external support were also provided by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
China, Libya, Soviet Union, and Cuba. The insurgent movement during the Greek Civil 
War had an initial limited advantage in external support, primarily due to the ability to 
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develop sanctuaries in bordering states. The insurgents also failed to understand the 
Soviet Union’s position on their conflict.  
The insurgent movement during the Huk Rebellion was at a significant 
disadvantage in external support through out the insurgency. The Chinese did provide 
printed propaganda and an extremely limited financial contribution through the Chinese 
Communist Party in the Philippines. As the authority grew in strength this lack of 
external support became more acute. Unable to expand the conflict out of Central Luzon, 
the insurgency was also unable to effectively receive external support due to a lack of a 
port. External support was a significant disadvantage for the insurgency through out the 
Malayan and Kenya Emergency. Both insurgencies were unable to use international 
borders to gain an advantage over the authority. Both insurgencies also received very 
little to no external support. External support for Guevara’s doomed Bolivian campaign 
was initially a significant disadvantage from the beginning and only got worse. Even if 
Cuba had wanted to provide external support to Guevara’s insurgent forces, the 
geographic conditions and the Bolivian authority would have prevented it. 
When studying an insurgency, an authority should seek to accurately determine 
the level of reliance that an insurgent movement has on external support. Insurgent 
leaders will seek to solidify as much external support as possible during the initial phase 
of an insurgency. If an insurgency starts with a disadvantage in external support, 
insurgent leaders will most likely expend as much effort and resources as required to gain 
external support – political and material. The authority can use military means in an 
effort to impede supply lines and restrict cross border movement to sanctuaries to a 
limited degree. An effective counterinsurgency campaign should prioritize diplomatic 
efforts to limit external support to an insurgency, with military forces in a supporting 
role.  
G. INFORMATION ADVANTAGE 
Insurgents must shape the information environment in order to succeed. 
Insurgencies by their very nature begin with an information advantage over the authority. 
Many argue that if there is not an information advantage then there is not an insurgency. 
Five of the insurgencies initially had a significant advantage in the prerequisite 
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information advantage. One, Guevara’s Bolivian insurgent campaign, had a significant 
disadvantage through out the short duration of the conflict.   
Initially this prerequisite was a significant advantage for the Greek communists. 
The authority executed a relocation program that effectively separated the communists 
from the Greek populace. This resulted in a significant loss of intelligence for the Greek 
communists. This loss of intelligence was great enough over time to reduce this 
prerequisite to a significant disadvantage by the middle of the third round. The 
prerequisite, information advantage, was a significant advantage for the Huk movement 
until the 18 October 1950 capture of the entire Politburo operating inside Manila. The 
capture of this cell, with a significant amount of personnel and organizational 
information, also resulted in a significant loss of morale within the Huk movement.  More 
importantly the Huk movement lost their significant advantage in information in Central 
Luzon with the authority’s identification of the vulnerability of the insurgents’ courier 
system of communications. With the resultant loss of the initiative, this prerequisite 
became a significant disadvantage for the Huk movement. The insurgents during the 
Malayan Emergency initially had a significant advantage in this prerequisite, because 
they started with well established communication networks that they had developed 
during the Japanese occupation. By 1955, this prerequisite became a significant 
disadvantage for the insurgency due to the authority’s successful implementation of the 
Briggs Plan and the resettlement of the Chinese squatters. The insurgents’ loss of the 
information advantage deprived the communists of the ability to retain the initiative. The 
insurgency during the Kenya Emergency initially had a significant advantage in this 
prerequisite. The authority failed to act on the limited intelligence that was available on 
the Mau Mau movement. The Mau Mau were able to strongly establish an effective 
psychological campaign that utilized “oathing” to control the populace and recruit. The 
insurgents did nothing to impede the information capabilities of the authority. Language 
was also an advantage for the insurgents initially. This barrier was not overcome until 
pseudo gangs were established. Information obtained from the Home Guard, pseudo 
gangs, and the capture of Waruhiu Itote, General China, resulted in a decisive shift in the 
information advantage from the Mau Mau to the authority. By mid-1954, this prerequisite 
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was a significant disadvantage for the Mau Mau. This prerequisite was a significant 
disadvantage for the duration of Guevara’s Bolivian campaign due to a language barrier 
with the local Indians, a failure to win the support of the local populace, and the loss or 
failure of their communications equipment. 
The evidence suggests that though an insurgency may start with an information 
advantage it does not guarantee success. An authority that understands that information is 
the most important aspect of an effective counterinsurgency campaign will be able to take 
the information advantage away from the insurgency over time. The loss of an 
information advantage means that the insurgency will also lose the initiative. Without the 
initiative the insurgency will become reactive to counterinsurgent activities and more 
focused on survival.  
The authority’s counterinsurgency resettlement strategy during the Greek Civil 
War, Huk Rebellion, Malayan Emergency, Kenya Emergency, and Dhofar Rebellion 
enabled the separation of the populace from the insurgency. This separation deprived the 
insurgency of critical information and enabled the authority to gain an information 
advantage.    
The authorities utilized some form of pseudo gangs during the Malayan 
Emergency, Kenya Emergency, and Huk Rebellion, as part of their counterinsurgency 
campaign. Pseudo gangs were critical as human intelligence collectors. The collection of 
this intelligence when combined with supporting exploitation operations by the authority 
can severely degrade the insurgent movement’s command and communications systems.  
The capture of key insurgent personnel during the Huk Rebellion and the Kenya 
Emergency facilitated a shift in the information advantage from the insurgency to the 
authority. The resultant loss of the initiative created a secondary effect of decreased 
morale amongst the insurgent movement. 
The evidence suggests that in order to take the information advantage away from 
an insurgency the authority should develop a counterinsurgency campaign plan that 
incorporates a resettlement strategy, the development of pseudo gangs, and targets key 
insurgent leaders for capture.  
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H. A DISCUSSION ON THE TOPIC OF TIME AND THE DURATION OF AN 
INSURGENCY 
One can strongly argue that time is on the side of the insurgent and effects most of 
the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. Counterinsurgent forces must completely 
defeat an insurgent force in order to win. This takes time; insurgencies are typically long 
wars, with Ché Guevara’s failed insurgency in Bolivia being an extremely rare exception. 
On the other hand, insurgents do not have to completely defeat the authority or 
counterinsurgent forces; they have to merely survive. In the words of the former National 
Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “the basic equation of guerrilla 
war is as simple as it is difficult to execute: the guerrilla army wins as long as it can keep 
from losing; the conventional army is bound to lose unless it wins decisively.”211 
The duration of an insurgency is often difficult to measure precisely in 
comparison to a conventional conflict due to the lack of an official declaration of war 
from one or both belligerents and the lack of a treaty often obscures the end of the 
conflict. Kissinger argues that a stalemate almost never occurs; an authority fighting an 
insurgency must be prepared for a long struggle. A clear-cut victory for counterinsurgent 
forces is very rare; failed insurgencies tend to diminish over a long period of time and 
eventually fade away.212 Leaders of insurgencies, in the words of the scholar Robert R. 
Leonard, understand that "wars that last longer than expected challenge constitutions, 
destroy domestic harmony, and cause governments to fall."213 For these reasons, leaders 
of the authority, especially democracies, desire conflicts to be of short duration.  
Though time or duration is not identified as a prerequisite for a successful 
insurgency, it must be seriously considered by both the authority and counterinsurgent 
forces’ campaign planners. The strategic effects of time on the authority and 
counterinsurgent forces must be a factor when developing counterinsurgency campaign 
plans. Examining the six prerequisites for a successful insurgency we see that time is a 
factor that generally works in the favor of the insurgents.   
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Examining the prerequisite “a cause to fight for” it is argued that time enables 
insurgents to identify an issue and develop it into a cause that is both lasting and 
appealing to the insurgents. Time also enables the insurgent movement to become well 
established around this cause. Time enables the insurgents to raise the political 
consciousness of the populace reference the issue they desire to make their cause. Time 
enables insurgent leaders to groom a worthwhile cause that is credible to both the 
populace and insurgents.  
The duration of an insurgency affects the prerequisite “local populace support.” 
Time enables the insurgents to set the conditions necessary to first control the populace 
and then win over their support. Leonhard argues that the populaces of Western societies 
demand that wars be short in duration and decisive. The desire for the duration of future 
conflicts to be of short duration is complicated by several factors. The first factor is the 
ability of the authority and counterinsurgent forces to meet the security expectations of 
the populace is complicated by the fact that insurgencies will develop at varying speeds 
in different locations. The second factor is the number of participants in the insurgency. 
The greater the number of participants the longer the insurgency tends to be. And finally, 
the third factor is that errors in judgment of either or both the authority and insurgency 
will cause the insurgency to last longer.214  
Examining the prerequisite “weakness in the authority” it is argued that time 
generally favors the insurgent. Andrew Krepinevich argues that time allows the insurgent 
to develop a strong organization and consolidate his base of power. Furthermore the 
longer the duration of an insurgency the more likely there will be errors in judgment by 
the authority. These errors in judgment are usually due to the authority’s increasing sense 
of futility and frustration as they try to meet their populace’s expectation of a short and 
decisive conflict. In an effort to meet this expectation the authority will usually take 
shortcuts in an effort to defeat an insurgency.215 With time the insurgency has an 
increased likelihood of infiltrating the authority, especially its security forces.  
  
                                                 
214 Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes, 54, 63.  
215 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 8. 
  138
Time affects the prerequisite “geographic conditions.” Time enables insurgents to 
better utilize geographic conditions to their advantage. Given time insurgents will 
establish numerous sanctuaries in order to train, plan, and re-equip. Time also enables 
insurgents to establish numerous and well dispersed bases. Sanctuaries and numerous and 
well dispersed insurgent bases severely complicate counterinsurgency planning.  
Examining the prerequisite “external support” it is apparent that time or duration 
is a critical factor in the level of external support that insurgent leaders can develop. 
External support to an insurgency in the form of political support requires time. An 
insurgency must survive as diplomatic pressure is applied on the authority and 
counterinsurgent forces in the international arena. It also takes time for the insurgency to 
develop the organizational structure necessary to effectively absorb significant amounts 
external support.  
Time favors the insurgent when considering the prerequisite “information 
advantage.” Time enables the insurgents to shape the information environment to their 
advantage. The longer the duration of an insurgency the greater the opportunity of the 
insurgents to exploit local incidents involving the authority or counterinsurgent forces.  
Though time or duration generally favors the insurgent, there are some dangers 
that insurgent leaders must also overcome when considering the six prerequisites for a 
successful insurgency reference time. Given too much time an authority may be able to 
set the conditions that mitigate the cause upon which an insurgency is based. When 
considering the prerequisite “information advantage” time could be a severe disadvantage 
if the authority is able to win enough populace support to gain an advantage in 
intelligence over the insurgents.  Insurgent leaders may also have to deal with the 
impatience of their own leaders to defeat the authority. The Greek communist insurgents 
provide an example of how the impatience of insurgent leaders can lead to defeat. The 
KKE failed to heed Moscow’s advice, prior to the second round, that the struggle not be 
expanded. The KKE did not exploit time by keeping their true intentions hidden until 
appropriate strength and conditions could be established for a successful insurgency. By 
revealing their intentions and attacking too soon the KKE was forced into a race against 
time. With their intentions revealed, the Greek government was able to secure aid from 
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both the British and Americans. In the end the KKE was unable to take over before 
assistance provided to the Greek government became too great. Finally as time passes 
there is a greater likelihood that the leadership of the insurgency may splinter.  
Leonhard argues “that generally, the stronger side in a war seeks to shorten the 
duration of the conflict, while the weaker side generally tries to lengthen it in order to 
increase the opportunities for a favorable outcome."216 With this in mind it is posited that 
successful insurgencies will manipulate the duration of the conflict to their advantage.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
This final chapter contains a conclusion and discussion on the implications of the 
findings in the preceding chapters of this thesis on future counterinsurgency operations.  
A. CONCLUSION 
The six primary prerequisites for a successful insurgency are  
• A cause to fight for. 
• Local populace support. 
• Weakness in the authority. 
• Geographic conditions. 
• External support.   
• Information advantage.    
The evidence indicates that there is no silver bullet for defeating an insurgency. 
No one prerequisite for a successful insurgency stands out as the key to defeating 
insurgencies. Individual prerequisites for a successful insurgency can not be isolated and 
focused on as the solution for defeating an insurgency. Counterinsurgency campaign 
planners must consider and take into account all of the prerequisites and plan 
accordingly.  
The historical analysis of the six failed insurgencies indicates that there are three 
common characteristics that could potentially be exploited to promote failure in an 
insurgency.  For all six of the insurgencies analyzed three of the prerequisites: local 
populace support, external support, and information advantage, were a significant 
disadvantage at the end of the conflict. This trend would seem to indicate that these three 
prerequisites at a minimum must be reduced to a significant disadvantage in order to 
defeat an insurgency.  
The authority does not have to have a significant advantage in all of the 
prerequisites in order to defeat an insurgency. The authority did have a significant 
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advantage in all of the prerequisites in four of the failed insurgencies, but in two of the 
insurgencies the authority won without degrading all the prerequisites to a level of 
significant disadvantage for the insurgency.  In the Greek Civil War, the insurgency still 
had a limited advantage in the prerequisite, weakness in authority, and a significant 
advantage in the prerequisite, geographic conditions, at the end of the conflict. In the Huk 
Rebellion the insurgency only had a limited disadvantage in the prerequisite, a cause to 
fight for, at the end of the conflict.      
The Dhofar Rebellion demonstrated that though an insurgency may initially have 
a significant advantage in all of the prerequisites for a successful insurgency it does not 
guarantee victory over the authority. The Mau Mau movement started with a significant 
advantage in all the prerequisites for a successful insurgency, except external support, 
and they also failed to defeat the authority. 
In conclusion, this research indicates that defeating an insurgency is a very 
complex problem which cannot be solved solely with military means. The authority must 
have leaders that can look at all six prerequisites for a successful insurgency and develop 
an effective counterinsurgency campaign that utilizes all the capabilities of the authority. 
Over-reliance on military force to defeat an insurgency will at best just prolong the 
conflict until the authority changes strategy, or at worst lead to the defeat of the authority. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS 
Historical analysis of the selected six failed insurgencies reveals that no one best 
counterinsurgency strategy can be applied to all insurgencies. Though one can frame 
future insurgencies using the six prerequisites for a successful insurgency, each 
insurgency is unique and must be fought differently. Counterinsurgent campaign planners 
must be able to identify and understand future conflicts involving insurgencies. Both the 
authority and counterinsurgent forces must also develop a degree of flexibility in dealing 
with an insurgency that is uncommon in current conventional forces. Nowhere is this 
need for flexibility more evident than when examining the prerequisite “information 
advantage.”    
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Modern insurgent leaders have realized that the true battle is not fought in the 
physical domain, but in the cognitive domain. The capability of modern insurgent leaders 
to mount sophisticated information operations must be seriously considered by 
counterinsurgent campaign planners. The use of information, mainly through the media, 
propaganda, and disinformation may be more powerful than a division or corps of 
conventional troops. Insurgents have taken advantage of the fact that the “24/7” 
electronic global media, challenged to fill airtime, is most times repetitive and shallow in 
their analysis. The fact that this “24/7” electronic global media enables insurgents to 
reach portions of their respective populace or external supporters and rapidly inspire 
violent responses217 provides a distinct advantage to the insurgent reference the 
prerequisite for a successful insurgency, information advantage. Strategies involving 
historically effective counterinsurgency strategies such as mass resettlement and pseudo 
gangs may no longer be politically possible because of the “24/7” electronic global media 
and the ability of insurgents to utilize it to their benefit.   
Finally, the protracted nature of insurgencies makes it critical to both insurgent 
and counterinsurgent forces to maintain the determination and will to succeed. The 
“24/7” electronic global media only exacerbates the already, in the counterinsurgency 
expert John Nagl’s own words, “impatient national character”218 of the United States and 
the transparency required by a democracy. Cunning insurgent leaders will effectively use 
both of these to weaken the United States populace’s determination and will to succeed. 
United States’ counterinsurgency operations must keep this from happening.  
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APPENDIX A – POST-WORLD WAR II INSURGENCIES219 
 Palestine      1945-1948 Britain versus Jewish  
separatists   
 Greek Civil War     1945-1949 Britain, then U.S. and the  
Government of Greece, versus 
National Liberation Army 
 Indonesia Revolt    1945-1949 Netherlands versus Indonesian 
rebels    
 French Indochina    1945-1954 France versus Viet Minh 
 Kurd guerillas    1945-present Kurds versus Turkey, Iran, Iraq,  
Russia 
 Philippines (Hukbalahap Rebellion)  1946-1954 Philippine Islands versus 
Hukbalahap 
 Madagascar    1947-1948 France versus Mouvement  
Democratique de la Renovation 
Malagache (MDRM) 
 Jammu-Kashmir    1947-1949 Jammu and Kashmir with India  
versus insurgents and Pakistan  
 Burma     1947-1960 Burma government versus  
communist insurgent groups 
 Malayan Emergency   1948-1960 Britain versus Malayan 
Communist Party and Malayan 
Races Liberation Army 
 Kenya Emergency    1952-1960 Britain versus Mau Mau 
 Tibet     1952-present China versus Tibet 
 Cyprus     1954-1959 Britain versus Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprios Agoniston (EOKA) 
 Algerian Revolt     1954-1962 France versus National  
Liberation Front (FLN) 
 Oman     1955-1959 Jebel Akhdar and Britain  
Versus Talib 
 Cameroon     1955-1962 French Cameroon versus  
Union des Populationsdu 
Cameroon (UPC) 
 Aden Emergency    1955-1967 Britain and Aden versus  
Yemeni insurgents 
 Sudan (First Sudan War)   1955-1972 Sudan versus Southern Sudan  
Liberation Movement (SSLM) 
 Cuban Revolution    1956-1959 Cuba’s Batista regime versus  
Castro 
 Lebanon     1958  Lebanon versus United National  
Front (UNF) 
 France      1958-1962 France versus Secret Army  
                                                 
219 Though this list of Post WWII insurgencies was compiled from numerous sources, the core of 
information was gathered primarily from the following sources: Anthony J. Joes, Guerilla Warfare: A 
Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996; Kalev I. 
Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 8-12. 
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Organization (OAS) 
 Venezuela     1958-1963 Venezuela versus urban-based 
Armed Forces for National 
Liberation (FALN) 
 Haiti     1958-1964 Haiti versus Les Forces Armees  
Revolutionnaires Haitiennes 
(FARH), and several other 
insurgent groups 
 Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia   1958-1975 U.S. and Government of  
Vietnam (GoVN) versus 
National Liberation Front (NLF) 
and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Vietnam (DPRVN) 
 Laos (Pathet Lao Campaign)  1959-1962220 Laos versus Pathet Lao 
 Guinea-Bissau (Potuguese Guinea)  1959-1974 Portugal versus African Party  
for the Independence of Guinea 
and Cape Verde (PAIGC)  
 Venezuela     1961-1969 Venezuela versus Armed  
Forces of National Liberation 
(FALN) and Cuba-assisted 
guerillas 
 Angola     1961-1974 Portugal versus Popular  
Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) 
 Eritrea     1961-1993 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)  
then in 1973 the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Forces 
(EPLF) 
 Guatemala     1961-1996 Guatemala versus Rebel Armed  
Forces (FAR), Guerilla Army of 
the Poor (EPG), Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity 
(URNG) 
 Mozambique    1962-1975  Portugal versus Front for the  
Liberation of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) 
 Dhofar     1962-1976 Oman and Britain versus  
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), 
renamed later the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Oman and 
the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) 
 Uruguay     1963-1972 Uruguay versus Tupamaros 
 Rhodesia     1963-1979 Rhodesia versus Zimbabwe  
African People’s Union (ZAPU) 
and Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZAPU) 
                                                 
220 Souphanouvong, founder of the Pathet Lao movement, actually had three insurgency cycles: 1945-
1946, 1948-1954, and finally 1959-1962.  
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 Colombia     1964-present U.S. and Government of  
Columbia versus Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Columbia 
(FARC) and National Liberation 
Army (ELN) 
 Chad     1965-1976 Chad versus Liberation Front of  
Chad (Front de Libération du 
Tchad or FLT) 
 Thailand      1965-present Thailand versus Pattani  
insurgents 
 Bolivia     1966-1968 Bolivia versus Ché  
Guevara 
 India     1967-1972 India versus Naxalites 
 Spain     1968-present Spain versus Basque Euzkadi  
Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
 Philippines      1968-present Philippine Government  versus  
New People’s Army (NPA) 
 United States    1969-1976 U.S. government versus  
Weather Underground 
 Northern Ireland    1969-present Britain versus Irish Republican 
Army (IRA)  
 United States    1969-present U.S. government versus  
MEChA’s “Brown berets” 
(Movimiento Estudiantil 
Chicano de Aztlán) 
 Germany      1970-1972 Germany versus Baader- 
Meinhof/Red Army Faction 
 Philippines      1970-present Philippine Government  versus  
Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF)/Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) 
 United States    1971-1981 U.S. government versus  
Black Liberation Army (BLA) 
 Rhodesia     1972-1980 Rhodesia versus Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) 
and Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) 
 Sri Lanka     1972-present Sri Lanka versus Tamil New  
Tigers (TNT) 
 United States    1973-1975 U.S. government versus  
Symbionese Liberation Army  
 Palestine      1973-present Israel versus Palestine  
Liberation Front (PLF) 
 Western Sahara     1975-1991 Morocco versus Western Sahara 
Freedom Movement 
(POLISARIO) 
 East Timor     1975-present Indonesia versus Revolutionary  
Front for the Independence of 
East Timor (FRETILIN) 
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 Cambodia      1978-1998 Vietnam versus Khmer Rouge 
 Soviet-Afghan War    1979-1988 Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics (U.S.S.R.) and 
Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA) versus Mujahideen  
 Salvadoran Civil War    1979-1991 U.S. and Government of El 
Salvador (GoES) versus 
Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) 
 Nicaragua      1980-1990 Frente Sandinista Deliberacion  
Nacional (FSLN) versus 
National Guard (GN)/Contras 
 Peru (Senderista Insurgency)  1980-1995 Peru versus Sendero Luminoso  
(“The Shining Path”) 
 India     1980-present India versus Communist Party  
of India (Marxist Leninist) 
(CPI-ML) (People’s War) (PW) 
 Sri Lanka     1983-present Sri Lanka government versus  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam 
 Sudan (Conflict Renewed)   1983-present Sudan versus Southern People’s  
Liberation Army (SPLA) and 
Southern People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM)  
 Uganda     1987-present Ugandan government versus  
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
 Kashmir      1988-present India versus Kashmiri Muslim  
separatists 
 Somalia     1992-1994 U.S. and United Nations versus  
warlords and armed factions 
 Algeria      1992-present Algeria/National Liberation  
Front (FLN) versus Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS)/Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) 
 Sierra Leone     1993-1997 Sierra Leone versus  
Revolutionary United Front  
 Mexico     1994-present Mexico versus Zapatista Army  
of National Liberation (EZLN) 
 Chechyna (Russo-Chechen War)  1994-present Russia versus Chechen  
separatists 
 Peru     1996-1997 Peru versus Tupac Amaru  
Revolutionary Movement 
(MRTA) 
 Nepal      1996-present Nepal versus Maoists 
 Afghanistan    2001-present U.S., NATO and the  
Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA) versus Taliban 
 Iraq     2003-present U.S. led coalition and  
Government of Iraq [GoI] 
versus Jihadists and insurgents 
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APPENDIX C – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ALN  Alianca Libertadora Nacional 
BCP  Bolivian Communist Party 
CIC  Counter Intelligence Corp  
DA  Democratic Alliance   
DLF  Dhofar Liberation Front 
DSE  Democratic Army of Greece (Greek: Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas) 
EAM  National Liberation Front (Greek: Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo) 
EDES National Democratic Greek League (Greek: Ethnikos Demokratikos 
Ellenikos Syndesmos) 
EKKA National and Social Liberation (Greek: Ethnike kai Koinonike 
Apelevtherosis) 
ELAS National Popular Liberation Army (Greek: Ethnikos Laikos     
Apelevtherotikos Stratos) 
ELN  National Liberation Army of Bolivia (Spanish: Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional de Bolivia) 
GoG Government of Greece 
GNA Greek National Army  
JUSMAG  United States Military Assistance Group   
JUSMAPG  Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group  
KCA  Kikuyu Central Association  
KKE  Greek Communist Party (Greek: Kommounistiko Komma Ellados) 
MCP  Malayan Communist Party 
MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
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MPABA Malayan People’s Anti-British Army 
MPLA  Malayan People’s Liberation Army 
MRLA  Malayan Race’s Liberation Army 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PDK  Temporary Democratic Government  
PDRY  People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen  
PFLO  Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman 
PFLOAG People’s Front for the Liberation of the Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
SAF  Sultan’s Armed Forces (Oman) 
SAS  Special Air Service (British) 
SNOF  Slavomacedonian Liberating Front  
SOAF  Sultan of Oman’s Air Force 
UNRRA  United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
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